

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE IN THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND PUBLIC SECURITY AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON 22 JULY 2011

Susan Jensen



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MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND PUBLIC
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ON 22 JULY 2011

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STEIN ROKKAN CENTRE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH

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Sammendrag

I dette notatet undersøkes hvilke endringer som har blitt foretatt i Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet (JD) etter terrorangrepene i Norge 22. juli 2011. Fokuset er rettet mot JDs interne og eksterne formelle organisering, interne og eksterne prosedyrer og demografiske profil. Et sentralt funn er at JD har innført flere små inkrementelle endringer, som samlet har styrket departementets styringskapasitet på samfunnssikkerhetsfeltet i perioden. De mest omfattende endringene har skjedd i departementets avdelingsstruktur og ledelsesstruktur. Dette notatet viser at det er vanskelig å innføre nye tverrsektorielle ordninger med formål om å sikre samordning. Tradisjonelle organiseringsprinsipper, som ministerstyreprinsippet kan forklare hvorfor dette er tilfellet. Notatet belyser videre at selv om endring stort sett planlegges ut fra en rasjonell instrumentell tankegang, kan innføringen av disse også påvirkes av organisasjonskultur og tradisjoner. Dette er vanskelig å endre på bakgrunn av politiske styringssignaler alene, selv etter store grenseoverskridende kriser.

Summary

This paper examines changes in the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJ) after the terrorist attacks in Norway 22 July 2011 until 2016. The focus is on the MJ's internal and external formal organization, internal and external procedures, and demographic profile. A main finding is that the MJ has been subject to several small incremental changes, which collectively have resulted in a considerable development of the Ministry's governance capacity in the field of societal security. The most radical changes have been introduced in the Ministry's internal and central management structure. The paper shows that implementing cross-sectoral measures to enhance coordination between central operators is difficult. Traditional organizational principles in the Norwegian public administration, such as the principle of ministerial responsibility, can explain why this is the case. The paper further demonstrates that although change is largely planned through rational instrumental thinking, the implementation of such change involves altering organizational culture and traditions, and these are difficult to change based on political signals alone, even after a major transboundary crisis.

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List of abbreviations

Abbreviation	Full name
BH	Board of Health
CSU	Crisis Support Unit
DCMS	Department of Crisis Management and Security
DCMPS	Department of Crisis Management Preparedness and Security
DCP	Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection
DPS	Department of Public Security
DPPSA	Department of Preventive Public Security and Analysis
DRE	Department of Rescue and Emergency
ESU	Emergency Support Unit
GCC	Government's Crisis Council
GSC	Government Security Committee
ICT	Information and communication technology
MCC	Ministries Coordination Council
MD	Ministry of Defense
MJ	Ministry of Justice and Public Security
NIS	Network for Information Security
NPD	National Police Directorate
NPM	New public management
NSA	Norwegian National Security Authority
OAG	Office of the Auditor General
PD	Police Department
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
Post-NPM	Post new public management

Introduction

This paper addresses organizing for societal security in Norway, focusing on the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJ). Organizing for societal security is about protecting society against incidents that can threaten fundamental values and functions, and put lives and health at risk (St. Meld.nr 29 (2011–2012)). The MJ has had a key role in the preparatory and operational matters of societal security since the early 1990s when it was assigned the role of a coordinating ministry (St. Meld.nr 24 (1992–1993)). The field of societal security is characterized by many operators from different sectors and levels. A coordination ministry is mandated to ensure ‘better coordination’ between the involved organizations in the field on societal security and crisis management at the national level (Egeberg and Trondal, 2015). It means it must ensure more consistency among decisions horizontally as well as vertically. Still, it is often constrained by the principle of ministerial responsibility in which the line ministries are responsible for tasks within their own sector.

The MJ's responsibility as a coordinating ministry was put to the test on July 22 2011 when Norway was struck by a terror attack of an unimaginably large scale. First, a bomb exploded in the Central Government Complex in Oslo, destroying several buildings including the MJ. Later this day, the same terrorist shot a large number of people from the Labor Party's youth organization who attended a summer-camp on the island of Utøya. In total 77 people died, and many sustained severe injuries. The terrorist attacks were a big shock for Norway that, until then, had minimal experience with terrorism. The loss of lives and large damage on central governmental buildings and infrastructure was considered a national tragedy and seen as the most severe atrocity since the Second World War. It was an unpredictable major transboundary crisis that was difficult to handle (Boin and Rhinard, 2008). The Ministry of Justice was put under great pressure (NOU 2012:14).

This paper address both planned and implemented organizational change within the field of societal security, focusing on the development within the MJ between 2011 and 2016 (Jensen 2016).¹ It examines the ministry at a time when it is conceivable that several changes as a result of the terrorist attacks are developing. A five-year period is expected to be sufficient to provide some indications of a developing pattern in the MJ. The paper is delimited to organizational changes

¹ The working paper presents data and research from the project «Organizing for Societal Security and Crisis Management: Building Governance Capacity and Legitimacy (GOVCAP)» financed by the Norwegian Research Council (2014–2018), Project no. 238016. The paper is mainly based on Jensen (2016).

within the MJ's internal formal structure and its relation to other ministries and to agencies and directorates subordinate to the MJ. It also covers changes in internal and external procedures as well as demographic changes. The analysis is based on qualitative analysis of relevant official documents, documents from the MJ's internal archives and further supplemented with interviews with leaders within the MJ at director general- and deputy director level.² Any changes within departments that are not related to societal security were not analyzed for this paper.³

The national organization of societal security includes many bodies across different sectors and levels. Previous research has shown that large crises can challenge established organizational patterns (Kettl 2004). New crises rarely fit existing organizational structures, which often lead to a consecutive process of change, where the content is affected by the type of crisis and how it was managed (Boin 2008, Christensen et al. 2016). During the handling of the terrorist attacks the MJ was the most central ministry through its key role as a coordinating ministry on the field of societal security. This makes it a crucial case in studying how major crises affect organizational change in core public organizations.

Studying organizational aspects of societal security is important since it can provide insight into which organizations that are responsible for and involved in dealing with crises, at which time, with what resources and what knowledge. The different forms of specialization determine which matters get attention, are overlooked or ignored, and which factors that are seen in coherence (Egeberg 2003, Lango et al. 2013). The field of societal security combines specialization by purpose, process and geography (Gulick, 1937). This is believed to have an impact on how crises are perceived, handled and for the coordination challenges that may arise. All forms of specialization require further coordination to ensure coherence. On the field of societal security this is reflected *horizontally* – in that tasks are separated into sectors within different ministries – and *vertically* within underlying administrative bodies (Christensen et al., 2007).

Regarding the MJ, hierarchy and network are particularly relevant as coordinating mechanisms (Bouckaert et al. 2010). The hierarchical organizational form characterized by coordination through formal instructions, and the more informal network arrangements are characterized by a continuous tension in «hybrid» forms (Boin, 2005). According to Kettl (2004) crises challenge established specialization

² See Jensen (2016) for more details on the data base.

³ This includes the Civil Affairs Department, the Correctional Services Department, the Department of Administration and Finances, the Department of Integration, the Legislation Department, the Migration Department, the Polar Affairs Department and the Press Office.

and coordination patterns. Transboundary crises in the area of societal security are «wicked issues» with a lot of complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty and a mismatch between the problem structure and the organization structure. Dealing with complex crises, such as terrorist attacks it is typical that responsibilities appear to be indistinct. As a result, political disputes often arise, related to both responsibility and accountability challenges. According to Boin (2008) this can affect which changes or reforms that follow.

This paper proceeds as follows: firstly, I look in to central elements within the Norwegian context as governing principles on the field of societal security before 2011 that may have had an impact on organizational change in the MJ (2011–2016), before I describe key elements in the Norwegian political context. Then I give a description of main changes in the MJs internal and external organizational structure, internal and external procedures and demography based on my empirical data. Finally, I discuss the main changes in the MJ and provide some concluding remarks.

Context

Organizing for societal security in Norway

The Norwegian government is responsible for protecting its citizens against current and potential threats. This is a challenging strategic and organizational task since the field of societal security and crisis management is characterized by the unpredictability of crises. The government can never be completely prepared for a crisis, and have in place all possible measures that should be implemented to ensure societal security. However, the mere possibility that a crisis might occur makes the implementation of preventive measures essential (Kettl, 2004).

To understand the prerequisites for introducing new organizational and strategic measures in the MJ, it is necessary to consider a central organizing principle in the Norwegian public administration: The principle of ministerial responsibility. The principle builds on a hierarchical approach and specialization by tasks or purpose. In general, the principle states the individual cabinet minister's responsibility for the activity within their own policy area. This creates strong sectors and line ministries, and the Parliament is typically only aware of the individual ministries activities through information from the seated cabinet ministers (Christensen et al., 2007). The principle can be problematic when coordinating for «wicked problems», such as organizing for societal security, because these matters do not follow traditional sector boundaries and therefore require strong horizontal coordination and

distribution of responsibility across sectors (Christensen and Lægreid 2008, Bjørgum 2010).

Although the ministerial responsibility means that the individual cabinet ministers are responsible, the principle often becomes an obstacle for taking responsibility for joint matters. This is because matters that fall within a particular sector often is regarded as theirs alone, meaning that the seated minister holds the primary responsibility. Conversely, the minister may actively choose to opt out on larger matters that are cross-boundary or on the intersection between different policy areas. A mindset like this can be negative for coordination and an understanding of joint problems and solving these together (Rittel and Webber, 1973). It creates a division of work and specialization that might complicate coordination (Smith, 2015). This is also referred to as ‘negative coordination’ or coordination ‘underlap’ in the exercise of authority (Sharpf 1994, Koop and Lodge 2014). Underlap refers to situations when the policy area of public security falls between the remits of different organizations so that no organization feels responsible (Christensen et al., 2016). Smith (2015) argues that the principle of ministerial responsibility should not be considered as an obstacle to take responsibility for joint matters. It is in fact the cabinet in Norway that chooses how to organize the executive power within various sectors. Thus, the cabinet also has the authority to modify the sectoral structure if it appears to be counterproductive.

The principle of ministerial responsibility was one of several coexisting organizational principles on the field of societal security before 2011. At the time, there were also three other stated principles: A principle of responsibility, proximity and equality. The principle of *responsibility* corresponds to the principle of ministerial responsibility in that the ministries are responsible for societal security within their field. The principle of *proximity* means that a crisis is to be handled at the lowest possible level. The principle of *equality* means that the responsibility in crisis situations should follow the same organization structure as in normal situations. This means that each ministries organization in crises should be as similar as possible to the one operating with in regular situations (St. Meld. nr. 17 (2001–2002)).

These principles are intended to structure the work of societal security by allocating responsibilities and tasks; however, one can argue that the principles are contradicting. The field of societal security includes many operators across different levels and sectors. This requires coordination to ensure consistency. However, the principle of responsibility can constrain inter-organizational coordination, because the ministers may be too focused on ensuring their own territories. The principle can also cause challenges for the implementation of new cross-sectorial measures,

because the individual cabinet ministers can be too concerned with protecting their own territories rather than to create a common platform. The principle of proximity emphasizes that crises should be managed at the lowest possible level, but this can lead to the loss of a central holistic perspective on the crises management. The contrast between the principles are relevant in a societal security context, where coordination challenges often occur between operators across sectors and levels (Fimreite et al., 2014).

Political context

Challenges associated with coordination are not only actualized for the field of societal security. It is a general challenge which is also reflected in other policy areas in Norway. Public sector reforms labeled «New Public Management» (NPM) and «Post New Public Management» (Post NPM) have been implemented an effort to deal with this (Lægreid and Rykkja 2014b). NPM-reform measures often emphasize efficiency and have mainly been concerned with vertical coordination, in the sense that they have resulted in a higher degree of specialization and division of work in public administration. Post-NPM reforms are characterized by structural reorganizations such as the establishment of network arrangements. These arrangements are meant to ensure more coherence between specific policy areas where there is identified a need for more connection (Christensen et al. 2007).

Horizontal coordination has become a key concept regarding the establishment of network arrangements on the field of societal security and crisis management (Christensen et al., 2015, Lægreid and Rykkja 2015). Although network structures are positively associated with political control and 'better coordination', Egeberg and Trondal (2015) argue that network structures are on a 'collision course' with participants' attempts to enhance vertical coordination and consistency within own policy areas. This is because network structures require that the involved participants de-couple from their own primary structures (hierarchy) to allow their reconnection to the secondary (network) structure. The argument is that horizontal coordination often compromise vertical coordination, making it difficult to ensure both forms of coordination simultaneously (Egeberg and Trondal 2015, Magnussen 2012). This implies that «hybrid» structures with organizational traits from both hierarchy and network are difficult to combine (Christensen et al. 2007, Bouckaert et al. 2010). Because of the principle of ministerial responsibility, the participants in network also have complete control over measures regarding their own «territory». This creates flexibility for each participant, but further complicates the establishment of a common ground regarding joint issues (Christensen et al., 2016).

Another relevant element in the political context is the change of government in October 2013 from a center-left majority government to a conservative minority government. It is reasonable to think that the change in government in 2013 affected which solutions were considered appropriate, considering the different political orientations of the involved political parties. Also, three different Ministers of Justice were in office during the course of this period. The incumbent Minister of Justice at the time of the attacks was replaced late autumn 2011 by the former Minister of Defense. Both these ministers were from the Labor Party. As a result of the change in government in 2013 a third shift happened when a Minister from the Progress Party (PP) was appointed.

Organizational change in the MJ's formal structure before 2011

In Norway, the police is an integrated police, which means that all police forces are gathered within one organization subordinate to the MJ, which leads the Norwegian Police Services. To ensure a freer and more professional management of the Norwegian police forces, a new subordinate government agency was established in 2001 named the National Police Directorate (NPD).

In 2003 two additional directorates, the Directorate for Civil Protection (DCP) and the National Security Authority (NSA) were established. DCP was established as a coordinating agency to support the MJ's work with matters regarding societal security and emergency preparedness (Serigstad 2003, Lango and Lægneid 2014). The NSA is a cross sectoral supervisory authority within the protective security services in Norway. The NSA was established to counter threats to the independence and security of the realm and other vital national security interests, primarily espionage or acts of terrorism. NSA's is a tripartite organization, which means that the NSA reports to the Minister of Defence in military affairs and the Minister of Justice in civilian affairs.

It was not until after the crisis in relation to the tsunami in South-east Asia in 2004 that more significant structural changes at the central level in the MJ were introduced. One of the changes was the attempt to clarify the MJ's coordinating role by assigning the MJ the responsibility for the brunt of the national emergency resources. Other changes were the establishment of the Government's Crisis Council (GCC) and the Emergency Support Unit (ESU) in 2005. The purpose was to ensure an enhanced emergency coordination during complex crisis where there is a need for stronger coordination between the ministries (St. Meld. Nr. 37 (2004–2005), Lango and Lægneid 2014). If a crisis occurs, the ESU provides support in form

of advisory services and technical assistance to the lead agency and the GCC in their crisis management. This includes support for analyses and overall situation reports to establish a common ground for strategic coordination.

Despite the fact that it was introduced several new organizational measures to strengthen the MJ's role as a coordinating ministry (2001–2005), it was highlighted in a white paper about societal security from 2007–2008 that the ministry had to strengthen its coordinating role further to ensure a comprehensive crisis management in the period 2007–2010 (St. Meld. Nr 22 (2007–2008)).

Organizational structure, procedures and demographics

This section of the paper is divided into four parts, including: the MJ's internal and external formal organization, internal and external procedures and demographics. Regarding the internal formal organization, I focus on changes in the MJ's department structure. External formal organization highlights changes in the ministry's connection to subordinate agencies and collegial bodies. Change in the MJ's internal and external procedures is described in the third part. The fourth, demographics, describes changes in its management structure.

Appendix 1 contains a chronological overview of the most important events (2011–2016). The timeline shows that the immediate public reaction to the terrorist attacks was strong. This is in line with Boin et al.'s (2008) classification of crises and insights regarding which reactions that often arises after a major crisis; including crises such as the terrorist attacks on 22 July 2011. This is a crisis that is unexpected, and where necessary arrangements for optimal crisis management do not exist. These crises are often evaluated afterwards in an attempt to learn from the crisis management, resulting in a process of change where new measures are implemented in order to be able to handle a similar crisis better in the future.

The public impression that has been conveyed through the media after the terrorist attacks made it important for the MJ as the central ministry of societal security in Norway to expel decisiveness and signal a strong leadership. There are many ways a public organization can act, and right after a crisis these actions are often symbolic in the form of speeches and promises. This paper also studies action but in other forms, namely action through political decisions, and the implementation of these as a result of the most unforeseen crisis in Norway in recent times.

Internal formal organization

One of the first political measures in the wake of the terrorist attacks was the Norwegian government's appointing of an independent inquiry commission by a Royal Decree of 12. August 2011 (22 July Commission). The purpose was to give the Norwegian society a basis for learning, and a basis for taking further action. The Commissions mandate was:

(...) to review and learn from the attack on the government quarter and the massacre on the island of Utøya so that the Norwegian society can be as prepared as possible to prevent and handle any future attacks (NOU 2012: 14).

This was followed by several actions that could be interpreted as a reaction to the crisis. As an effort to strengthen societal security in Norway the central government stipulated new objectives for the MJ's work with societal security in a Royal Decree of 11 November 2011:

To ensure that Norway can handle the risk and vulnerability, it as a society is facing, the Justice- and Police-ministry's responsibility for societal security and emergency functions in peacetime is to be strengthened and clarified (...).

These objectives concerning the ministry's central emergency and crisis management were meant to strengthen and develop its coordinating role as a lead ministry and a driving force in this policy area, but also to strengthen the overall capacity for crisis management centrally. In order to strengthen the ministry's role, the government renamed it the Ministry of Justice and Public Security from January 1 2012 (kgl.res.11.11.2011).

As one of the first initiatives to develop the MJ into a lead ministry, the newly appointed minister of Justice and Public Security established an internal «fast-working» group to evaluate the organization of the ministry's tasks for the future: the Bleikelia group. Based on reviews and experience related to dealing with the terrorist attacks the working group suggested several measures concerning three key areas: coordination, internal organization and enhanced capability (Bleikelia, 2012). They were particularly concerned with the ministry's internal structure and operational capacity during crisis in their evaluations.

In 2011 the responsibility for societal security was divided between a Police Department (PD) and a Department of Rescue and Emergency (DRE). The Bleikelia group assessed the organization between PD and DRE. Because the group believed that the MJ's reinforced role as a lead ministry would require a continuous attention towards cross-sectoral challenges, the responsibility for societal security in the group's opinion, should be handled in a separate department for societal security.

However, the Bleikelia-group recommended that the PD retained their traditional societal security tasks. They did not recommend any specific areas of responsibility to be given to such a new societal security department, but they emphasized the importance of establishing a complementary expertise in contrast to a competing as it traditionally had been between the departments of PD and DRE.

Strengthening of the crisis support unit and establishment of a Civil Situation Center

Lessons learned from 22 July proved that it was difficult to fulfill the role as a coordinating minister when the ministry itself was hit. The ministry's Crisis Support Unit (CSU) played a key role by assisting the Ministry with the overall crisis management and coordination at the central level. The Bleikelia-group recommended a strengthening of the CSU, as a part of the efforts to strengthen the ministry's crisis management capability, by giving CSU a more independent role (Bleikelia 2012, St. Meld. no. 29 (2011–2012)). As a result, the CSU became a separate unit from February 2012, directly subordinate to the ministry's Secretary General. These changes to the formal organization were followed by further organizational developments. According to the director general of the MJ's Department of Public Security (DPS) the ministry:

(...) built components in the MJ that probably would not have been there in the past, including the creation of a Civil Situation Center, placed under CSU in July 2012.

The establishment of a Civil Situation Center was meant to enhance the ministry's crisis management capability and the rest of the government apparatus, in that the center was to facilitate the government's crisis council and the MJ's lead agency tasks. The center was to ensure crisis preparedness 24/7, using situation analyses and having recurrent dialogue with the government about relevant national and international incidents (Bleikelia 2012, JD 2012a, and JD 2013a). The director general in the DPS characterized it as «somewhat special» that an operative agency such as the Civil Situation Centre was organized within a ministry, but emphasized that its function was to only have a supporting capacity for the MJ. He said:

(...) a crisis does not change the ministry's assignments, only the exercise of strategic crisis management. All the other tasks are to be continued (Interview, Director General in DPS)

Further, he talked about the Civil Situation Center's responsibilities on an everyday basis:

(...) The Civil Situation Center has a continuous oversee of what happens nationally and internationally. The subordinate agencies report directly to the center in the event of a crisis, and during a crisis (Interview, Director General in DPS).

He found it unproblematic that there also was a civil situation center in the Police Directorate, and portrayed it as a «hierarchy of centers». It seems that the new center was given a lead role considering the Police Directorate being one of the MJ's subordinate agencies. The Civil Situation Center cooperates daily with the Ministry of Defense (MD) on the military side, and the Foreign Ministry on civilian side for information about relevant foreign affairs (St. Meld. nr. 29 (2011–2012)).

Reorganizing the department structure

In August 2012, the inquiry Commission submitted their report. In the Commission's opinion, what failed under the handling of the attacks 22 July 2011 was mostly due to:

(...) leadership, coordination, culture and attitude- then lack of recourses, a need for new legislations, organization or choice of values (NOU 2012: 14).

The Commission was not particularly interested in organizational structure and stated that:

(...) the last decade the government has put in place a new administrative structure for central crisis preparedness. Our evaluation does not give any reason for recommending any change regarding this structure beyond what the government have done in the societal security-White paper (NOU 2012:14).

The Commission further emphasized that:

(...) structural organizational challenges are less important than challenges regarding attitude, culture and leadership. We have seen few examples of formal organization being a limiting factor (NOU 2012:14)

The Commission's conclusion that the failures under the handling of the terrorist attacks were not due to formal organizational structure has been challenged (Læg Reid and Rykkja 2014a, Fimreite et al. 2012). How management is practiced depends on what applicable constraints that are set within the formal organization structure. This also applies for coordination which can concern how tasks are distributed as a part of the structure (Christensen et al., 2007). Christensen (2013) also argues that the Commission's analysis and conclusions were too narrow, and that a wider organizational perspective would have been more useful to understand the crisis management on 22 July 2011. The argument is that changes in formal structure are just as important as a cultural change to handle any future terrorist attacks.

The Commission did not suggest any changes in the MJ's formal structure, but they suggested two changes regarding the organization of the police structure. The first suggestion was to establish a national operation center as a part of the operation

central in the Oslo police. The second was to restore the plans regarding a new national emergency response center for the police. This was also suggested by the Bleikelia-group.

The first comprehensive change in the MJ's internal department structure was introduced fall of 2012 through the establishment of a new Department of Crisis Management and Security (DCMS). The establishment of the DCMS was a part of the ministry's efforts to develop a complementary competence between its central departments. This was also enhanced by the Bleikelia-group. The director general of DPS highlighted that:

(...) an important focus in that regard was to try to see the totality. The new department was meant to attend tasks regarding the exercise of crises management and the ministry's security tasks.

The DRE was still to be a central department, responsible for strengthening and clarifying the ministry's role on the national level. The DCMS was, however, delegated the responsibility for the ministry's internal follow-up of societal security tasks, and the responsibility for being an initiator pursuant to the Security Act within the justice-sector in accordance with the requirements of its lead agency role (Kgl. Res. 15.06.2012, JD 2015b).

The tripartite organization (the PD, the DRE and the DCMS) was assessed in an audit conducted by the Board of Health (BH) in 2013. According to the BH the cooperation between the DRE and the PD had been difficult for years (Helsetilsynet, 2014). The argument was that the two departments had been governed on the basis of various strategies and goal-structures. The cooperation between the two departments was described to be so difficult that it could compromise societal security.

According to some of my interviews who worked in these departments at the time some appeared to have a different opinion. One of the interviews mentioned a previous professional disagreement about the responsibility for the rescue services. The director general in the PD stated that when he was appointed director general in 2012 there was a clear expectation from the political leaders that he would contribute to terminate the long-standing conflict between the DRE and the PD. In his view, the matter is now resolved and the two departments cooperate closely on several areas today. The interviews show that the alleged conflict was perceived differently within the two departments. The interviews still indicate that there previously had been some profession-based or political tension between the departments.

In 2015 the organizational development in the MJ continued. These reorganizations can be considered as an attempt to resolve the conflict mentioned in the BH's audit report. The changes included a renaming of the DRE to the Department of Preventive Public Security and Analysis (DPPSA). The cross sectorial responsibility for audit in other ministries was extended from the DRE to the DPPSA. This also applied for the coordination responsibility regarding the ministry's ICT-measures which was strengthened through the establishment of a new section for ICT-security. The other department that was altered was the DCMS, which were renamed the Department of Crisis Management, Preparedness and Security (DCMPS).

The MJ's alterations in internal department structure also included a transition from team-based internal organization to section-based internal organization. The section-based organization was described as a more hierarchical approach. The previous teams were from January 2015 organized in separate sections. In the MJ's internal document the transition is explained with the MJ being under great pressure after the terrorist attacks, and that this affected how the teams functioned. The argument was that the section based organization was supposed to be a better solution because it clarified responsibility relations. This seems to have improved after the transition to sections.

The new organization formalized the MJ's internal structure. A transition from a generalized organization in favor of more specialization can limit flexibility, innovation and development in the longer term. Public organizations are often characterized by formalization and specialization (Christensen et al., 2007). The flexibility underlying the former teams was probably not entirely negative. Societal security is an area characterized by a high degree of unpredictability (Boin, 2008). This necessitates the ability to adapt to indeterminate scenarios and find new solutions continuously. A high degree of flexibility can, however, compromise efficiency. By ensuring a high degree of specialization, it is conceivable that the ministry wanted to ensure a more time efficient completion of daily work.

An internal project called «The Change Program» enhanced concrete measures that were considered expedient. The main goal was to change attitudes, culture and leadership, the main areas of improvement identified in the Commission's report (NOU 2012: 14). The program was organized in seven different subprojects. «Project 6» formulated the specific goals for the creation of a new societal security department. It emphasized that the main objective of a new department was based on a desire to develop the MJ's new role as a coordinating lead ministry (cf. Royal decree of 11.11.2011) (JD, 2012b).

The plans to develop a new societal security department continued in a new project called the OU-process. Unlike the Change Program, where the establishment of a new department was explained by a desire to develop the ministry’s coordination responsibility, the establishment of a new department was in the OU-process described as an effort to enhance efficiency in the ministry. The project was to ensure this by reviewing the ministry’s organization to manage societal security tasks more efficient (JD, 2015a).

1 January 2016 the previous DCMPS and DPPSA were merged, and the new Department of Public Security (DPS) was established. The responsibility for the MJ’s work with societal security was through the establishment of the DPS merged into one big department again. Figure 1 shows the introduced changes in the MJ’s department structure:



Figure 1 Illustration of the changes in the MJ’s internal department structure (2011–2016)

Figure 1 illustrates the changes in the MJ’s internal department structure from 2011 to 2016. Although it looks like the MJ’s department structure has changed considerably in the period, there is also some continuity from the MJ’s original organization in 2011. The new department, the DPS, have all the same tasks as the DRP in 2011, but the internal section based organization is new. There are also some new tasks that were not a part of the MJ’s composition before, including the ministry’s ICT-tasks which are now handled in a separate ICT-section. The CSU and the new Civil Situation Center was also integrated into the DPS in 2016. The upgrading of the CSU and the creation of a Civil Situation Center seem to be some

of the most significant changes in the MJ's internal department structure in this period.

According to the director general of the DPS: «(...) the changes in the MJ's internal department structure were planned and temporary – a part of the same plan». Further, he presented the changes as a two-stage process where prevention was placed in one department in 2013 as an interim arrangement to ensure a gentler transition to the larger new societal security department. Even though the Commission's recommendations emerge as a consistent explanation in the MJ's internal documents; the other rationales in the documents are so different from each other that they can hardly be considered as a part of the same plan. It seems that the MJ in 2012 – through the evaluations of the Bleikelia-group set the objective of establishing a major societal security department juxtaposed to PD, but the absence of a clear strategy seems to have resulted in a somewhat arbitrary process.

External formal organization

The administrative executives in the MJ expressed in the interviews that after the terrorist attack the attention and expectation-level towards the MJ on the field of societal security had increased in line with the development of the Ministry's role as a coordinating lead agency. It was not until the Royal Decree of 11.11.2011 that the Ministry felt that it acquired the role and was taken seriously by other key actors. According to one of the administrative executives this gave the MJ more influence. She stated that the Ministry no longer had to fight for attention regarding societal security matters, and described this as a positive development.

These statements contrast with previous research describing the MJ's coordinating role on the field of societal security as «negative coordination», indicating that it was difficult for the MJ to get approval for important matters from other ministries who did not want interference in their own policy areas (Sharpf, 1994; Lango et al. 2013). The willingness to coordinate seemed to be greater than the willingness to be coordinated (Lægreid and Rykkja, 2014a). However, the administrative executive's perception indicates that the MJ have achieved more authority among key actors in the external formal structure.

The Bleikelia-group also reviewed the MJ's external formal structure, and recommended evaluating the relation between the MJ and the NSA. This was justified by the importance of clarifying the MJ's responsibility for ICT-security and the need to develop this area in line with the ministry's other societal security tasks (Bleikelia, 2012). NSA which reports to both the MD on military side and the MJ on

civilian side were described as a «challenging construction» in interview by the director general of DPS. In terms of current security legislation, he said that it mostly affected the military aspects of ICT-security, but in his opinion, it was impossible to analyze the law without also considering the civilian aspects.

In 2014 there was made an attempt to resolve these challenges through the appointment of a public committee called the Lysne-group. They emphasized that no sector can handle their own digital vulnerability alone. Although the government is sector-based, the attackers do not relate to these boundaries – they attack vertically and horizontally. To ensure the government's ability to handle any transboundary ICT attacks, the Lysne group suggested a strengthening of the MJ's cross sectoral means in this area (NOU 2015:13). In 2015 there was made a second attempt to resolve these challenges through the appointment of the Traavik-group. Although its mandate was to come up with a better solution, it ended up recommending keeping the current organization despite the challenges (NOU 2016:19).

Other documents show that the MJ's relation to the Directorate for Civil Protection (DCP) was perceived as difficult by the DCP before, and the first four years after the terrorist attacks. This was also emphasized in the audit-reports from the Board of Health and the Office of the Auditor General. The informants' statements, however, suggest that this has been addressed and strengthened in recent years to ensure a better relation between the DCP and the ministry. The change within the ministry from teams to sections seems to have contributed to a better relation. For example, the section-based structure made it easier for external operators to know where to address specific matters.

Central collegial bodies

Before 22 July 2011, there were three collegial network bodies on the field of societal security in Norway: The Government Security Committee (GSC) (est. 1949), The Government's Crisis Council (GCC) (est. 2005) and The Ministries Coordination Council (MCC) (est. 2007). After 22 July 2011, these bodies were criticized for not meeting frequently enough, emphasizing that this could affect the coordination between involved operators centrally. BH's audit report showed for example that no meetings were held in MCC between January 2012 and December 2013. Central reports emphasize that the MJ, on the basis of their coordinating role, has a particular responsibility to ensure appropriate meeting venues (NOU 2012: 14, Helsetilsynet 2014, Riksrevisjonen 2015).

These comments have been addressed through the introduction of a more regular meeting structure (Helsetilsynet 2014, Riksrevisjonen 2015, St. Meld. Nr 29. (2011–2012)). Other changes that may be mentioned is that the cabinet also has introduced regular societal security conferences in the cabinet. These measures show that the external recommendations after 22 July have been taken into account by the ministries. It is likely that this has contributed to an enhanced coordination between involved operators. Previously, the ministries attended to these issues separately, in line with the rule of ministerial responsibility. After the terrorist attacks, the focus was more on a holistic and cross-sectorial approach.

A new security role for the Prime Minister's office

After the change of government in 2013, a new security function was introduced within the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). The Prime Minister expressed that she wanted to: *«(...) establish a structure around (my) office to ensure that this area can provide better overall knowledge and awareness»* (Riksrevisjonen, 2015).

A state secretary was assigned to the field of societal security. She was a political scientist and a 'terror-researcher' from the Labor party. She was assigned the main responsibility for societal security within the PMO. Later the responsibility was assigned to a specialist advisor who is Norway's former London ambassador. He was assigned the responsibility for societal security, like he's predecessor, but also the responsibility for developing the new security function. A short time after the prime minister hired a third specialist advisor from the Police Security Service. The prime minister's choice to hire more than one specialist advisor can be seen as a desire to establish a structure rather than to delineate the function to one single person (Riksrevisjonen, 2015).

The secretary function in the PMO's office have monthly meetings where they address matters based on relevant updates from the security services in Norway. If a crisis occurs, they are called in to discuss the handling of the crises. This includes strategic issues and coordination at the central level. These areas of responsibility overlap to some extent with the MJ's lead ministry tasks during crises. It can therefore be questioned whether the PMO's new security function has challenged MJ's lead agency role on the field of societal security. The respondents, however, expressed that the new security function has not challenged the MJ's lead-agency role, but they emphasized the importance of being clear regarding the division of responsibilities. This can be seen as a «precautionary approach» to avoid any disagreements between the parties. The director general of DPS was particularly

positive to the PMO's new function, emphasizing its contribution to a strengthening of coordination between involved parties. He said that the PMO only has responsibility for the secretariat function and that it is strengthened with a person from the MJ, the director of CSU. This inclusion seems to have utterly strengthened their collaboration on societal security matters.

Another collegial body named the Network for Information Security (NIS) was also established post 2011. The structure was established in 2015 by the MJ to manage their new coordinating responsibility regarding ICT measures. The NIS is mandated to follow up and implement the NSA's ICT-strategies, discuss information-security-matters and to develop a cross-sectorial ICT-competence in and between involved ministries. The latter purpose of its establishment was an important area of improvement in the Lysne-group's report from 2015. This shows that the importance of a transboundary approach to ICT-security was taken into account by the MJ, contributing to the establishment of the first collegial ICT body on the field of societal security.




Figure 2 the hierarchy of the collegial bodies on the field of societal security (2016)

In sum, several secondary structures in the form of collegial network bodies have emerged in the shadow of the ministries' primary hierarchical structure. Earlier research has demonstrated that such arrangements for managing horizontal relations in Norwegian public sector are widespread (Lægreid og Serigstad 2006, Christensen et al. 2007). My data do not give any indications on how effective these meetings are or how successful other ministries perceive them to be. Still, the informant's statements show that they perceive that these arrangements have a stronger position than before, and that the coordination between the involved

operators is strengthened through these measures. This is an important development.

Procedures, formal rules and regulations

Several new internal and external procedures were suggested and introduced in 2011–2016. A «*mandate for the ministries work of societal security (...)*» was introduced by a Royal Decree in 2012 to ensure a unified and coordinated cross sectorial work with societal security through new requirements and guidelines based on the principles of responsibility, equality, proximity and cooperation. This mandate has also been called «the coordination decree».

The last principle – the principle of cooperation enhanced the ministries responsibility to cooperate in the preparatory work and the management of a crisis. The MJ's coordinating role as a lead ministry was further expanded through new formal requirements, stating the ministry's areas of responsibility as a coordinating ministry (Royal decree of 15.06.2012).

The tension between the principle of responsibility and the principle of cooperation is a central issue. These principles seem to challenge the MJ's ability to fulfill its intended role. In accordance to the principle of responsibility, each minister has the constitutional responsibility for preventive security within their respective sectors. The principle of cooperation, however, requires cooperation across traditional sectoral boundaries. Situations where safeguarding the MJ's role and these principles can be a challenging task is during handling of so-called «hybrid scenarios» – situations that require coordinated response from various sectors (NOU 2016:19).

Although, the MJ in such situations has the overall coordinating responsibility, the individual cabinet minister still can oppose the MJ's management signals. Traditions within each ministry seem to limit the actual enforcement of the principle of cooperation. It seems that the ministries have not been accustomed to act according to the principle of coordination. Still, the introduction of the principle of cooperation shows an interest in strengthening the coordination between central operators on the field of societal security at the central level.

A new *instruction of assistance* between the Police (MJ) and the MD was introduced in 2012. Thus, collaboration between the two parties was anchored in law. The purpose was to ensure a regulated cooperation between the military and the police, giving relevant commanders procedures for requesting assistance in crises such as

terrorist attacks in Norway. However, disagreements about the areas of overlap have made the instruction difficult to enforce.

A group (The Røksund-group) was appointed in 2013, and mandated to suggest a revision of the instruction. Its report was published in October 2016. It emphasized the need to simplify the instruction by removing the number of decision points. This included a removal of political leadership as a decision point. Further, it recommended that the Police was to be responsible for preventive measures and the handling of terrorist attacks on civilian side, with the opportunity to ask MD for support. A majority of the committee also recommended that the MD should have the responsibility for counter-terrorist measures at sea. The police did not support this recommendation. To ensure this the same majority suggested that the military establish a squad of Special Forces on high alert and station them at their training facility in Horten (Røksund, 2016).

In 2012 the DCP was mandated by the MJ to develop an overview of cross sectorial features that are important for societal security. The overview has later been called the «KIKS-model». The purpose was to establish a framework that strengthen each minister's awareness of existing vulnerabilities, thus contribute to reducing them, and facilitate good preparedness. The KIKS-model is anchored in the Royal Decree of 12.6.2012, and defines 12 critical societal security functions and 8 critical infrastructures to be safeguarded – regardless of responsibility and organization (Prop 1. S. (2013–2014)).

According to the Deputy General in the DPS use the model as a base when they conduct audits in other ministries. He said that the KIKS-model combined with the coordination decree serves as a «certificates», in the sense that they legitimize MJ's audits in other ministries. If a ministry disagrees with the MJ's assessment in a given area, the MJ can refer to the model or the coordination decree. The KIKS-model is also included in a separate matrix in the national budget for MJ, which clarifies the formal areas of responsibility between the ministries. These procedural instruments have probably helped to strengthen MJ's proactive role on this field. This shows a positive development from previous research of MJ's coordinating role which found that its proactive role was perceived as unclear by the other ministries, and that it lacked means of power as regards to notify the Cabinet about shortcomings in other ministries (Lango et al., 2013).

Since 2005 the MJ have delegated parts of its auditing responsibility with other ministries to the DCP. The DCP have conducted the first round of audits, and the MJ have handled the follow-up themselves. Although this arrangement has relieved some of the Ministry's coordinating tasks, their cooperation was criticized for a lack

of clarity, control and legislation. A central argument was; if their cooperation was anchored in law the directorate could have entered a more controlling role.

Since there is no formal regulation of their cooperation, the DCP has been dependent on the ministry's willingness to act and therefore adopted an advisory role (Høydal, 2007). Before 22 July 2011 there were also no formal means they could employ to ensure that the other ministries follow up recommended areas of improvement.

In 2014 new procedures for the conduct of audits of other ministries' efforts in the field of societal security and crisis management was established. This includes the introduction of the concept called «violation of requirements». The concept determines that violations must be 'closed' before an audit can be concluded, and that audit reports are to be made public (Helsetilsynet, 2014). According to the Director General in DPS, the new procedures has changed the audits from being system-oriented to being more substantive, contributing to a higher degree of awareness. The new procedures have also ensured more transparency and openness because the reports are now made public. According to the Director General, the process towards attaining such a system was characterized by a 10-year struggle.

He also described the follow-up of audits as improved through a new measure requiring that each cabinet minister must respond to the cabinet twice on the audit report and about how they will address areas of improvement. According to the respondents this measure has increased the ministries awareness on societal security and their willingness to improve. The new audit-procedures were further described as a Norwegian innovation and as unique in Europe: «(...) *audits began with clear ritual and symbolic elements, but have become more significant after 22 July 2011*» (Director General DPS).

Although the new audit procedures are exclusively described in positive terms by the respondents, it can be questioned whether a single audit regime are effective to measure very different ministries' efforts in the field of societal security. The ministries have varying tasks in their preparatory work and during crisis, thus there might not be as convenient to use one system to measure various sectors efforts'. This field is initially difficult to measure and to delimit the conduct of audits within one system can perhaps compromise the results. My informants' perceptions are that the new procedures fulfill its purpose, and that the MJ now has more formal means of power available to ensure improvements in other ministries' efforts in this field. This development seems to be sufficient at the present time. Whether the

new audit system is further modified over a longer period of time remains to be seen.

Furthermore, the performance management system within the field of societal security has been altered. The main goals have been reduced from 52 to 10 for the sector as a whole. Four specific goals are included in the so-called 'societal-security chain': 1) *An improved management and strengthened leadership culture*, 2) *A strengthened coordination in crisis management*, 3) *Evidence-based prevention and* 4) *Reduced vulnerability* (Prop 1. S (2014–2015)). The reduction of goals is related to the 22 July Inquiry Commission's report comments emphasizing that there were too many and too vague goals on the field of societal security. It also reflects the Commission's key areas of improvement related to attitudes, leadership and culture (NOU 2012: 14).

According to my interviews it was previously many main goals that covered the entirety of the MJ's responsibilities on the field of societal security, but only a few goals with the purpose of change. This made the previous system, in the interviews opinion, unsuitable as a mean for prioritizing tasks. The new goal structure ensured a more precise definition of the main areas. At this point, it is difficult to say how successful the new system will be.

Because of the many external evaluations describing the MJ's strategies as «blurry», the ministry developed what has been referred to as the «chain-perspective». The chain-perspective was to ensure a more holistic approach and transparency on matters regarding societal security. One instrument was the introduction of weekly meetings between the two societal security departments DPS and PD, but also with directors in subordinate agencies.

Post 22 July 2011, several small procedural measures, rather than few and radical have been introduced. Although some of these measures have proven difficult to enforce, such as the new instruction of assistance between the Police (MJ) and the MD, the attention to an enhanced coordination has become stronger. This is particularly evident through the establishment of the separate principle of cooperation, and the introduction of regular meetings between DPS and PD. The new audit procedures have also ensured an increased attention towards improving the individual ministries organization for societal security. The latter procedures have particularly been perceived as an important development by my interviews. If these arrangements will serve as intended, remains to be seen.

Demography: growth and replacements of top executives

From 2011 to 2016 there was a steady growth in number of employees in the MJ's societal security departments. The increase in the number of employees during this period was seen as a necessity due to the MJ's continuous reorganizations in internal department structure. In particular, the strengthening of CSU and the establishment of a civil situation center in 2012 necessitated a staff expansion.

Between 2011 and 2016 both top executives in the MJ were replaced. In 2012, previous Secretary General, was replaced by a very experienced top civil servant from outside the ministry. This ensured a change in the MJ's internal leadership culture – a key matter of improvement in the Commission's report (NOU 2012:14). Although the new Secretary General did not have any professional experience in the MJ, he had experience with big administrative reforms in other policy areas. The hiring of the new Secretary General seems to be a choice made to acquire legitimacy to the secretary general position after the reassignment of the previous secretary general who was relocated internally in the MJ. In 2012, the deputy Secretary General, who had the responsibility for the ministry's societal security tasks, was also replaced. The new deputy Secretary General was assigned to other tasks in the ministry.

There have also been replacements of the Director General in PDs section for Safety and Preparedness in and the departments of public security. The director general in PD was replaced by former deputy general in the MJ's Department of Immigration. Also, the deputy director general in PDs societal security department has been replaced after 2011. The Commission's report revealed extensive problems in the police (NOU 2012: 14). Although leadership-roles in the police were revised only three weeks before the attacks in 2011, the Commission highlighted that there was a lot of confusion regarding leadership and cooperation in the police (NOU 2012: 14, Johannesen 2015). The many replacements in management seems to be an indication that PD took the criticism from the Commission into consideration, and that the need to change management culture was interpreted as a need to replace the management structure rather than to revise the management routines for the incumbent management one more time.

The Director General in DRE was relocated to the MJ's Polar Affairs Department. DRE's other employees were transferred to either DPPSA or DCMPS, which later became DPS. With the establishment of DCMS, former director of CSU, was

promoted to Director General of the new department. He was later appointed Director General of DPS.

Between 2012 and 2013, 13 of 17 leaders were recruited internally. This was contrary to the Commission's recommendations regarding a change in management culture (NOU 2012: 14). The previous minister of Justice and public security (2011–2013) was criticized for these internal recruitments. In the MJ's central management only one leader has been promoted several times – the director general in DPS. The other leaders have either been replaced or reassigned. According to the director general in DPS a change in the MJ's leadership culture was a necessity. He confirmed that the MJ's change in management culture reflected the Commission's recommendations. Still, he questioned whether an organization learns by conducting radical alterations in management:

(...) criticism is the best foundation for change, but if everyone is fired when something goes wrong – one can never learn. Mistakes will always be made, but this is exactly where the management responsibility plays a central role – by ensuring that critical decisions are taken in advance. Sometimes it's still required to make some changes. Certain decisions are more difficult to live with than others (Director General of DPS).

Discussion

This study has demonstrated a process of change in the Ministry of Justice, where many small measures rather than few radical changes have been introduced. The introduced measures nevertheless contributed to the development of a different ministry in 2016 compared to 2011. Some changes seem to have been «symbolic», including the ministry's new name. Still, the MJ has kept the traditional organizing principles, including the principle of ministerial responsibility. Regarding the choice of measures, the MJ has mostly introduced legal measures when they have changed formal procedures, laws, regulations and established new royal decrees and instructions. This is in line with the strong legal traditions in the ministry.

Further, the study shows that the majority of changes correspond with the suggestions from the Bleikelia-group and the Inquiry Commission. The Commission's report can especially be considered as a mainstay of the justifications for the proposed and implemented measures. The Commission's report concluded that what failed during the handling of the terrorist attacks in 2011 had nothing to do with formal organization structure. Still, the MJ's many alterations in internal department structure are mostly justified by the Commission's deliberations. It appears as if the ministry has interpreted the Commission's conclusions extended in light of an organizational structural context. This has been possible due to the Commission's general conclusions that have given the ministry a broad margin of

discretion regarding which measures to implement to improve attitude, culture and management.

The critical audit reports from the BH (2014) and the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) (2015) have also had an impact on the MJ's choice of measures (2014–2016). It may be due to the new audit procedures (2014), which have made it difficult for the Ministry to overlook audit results. The ministries are now closely followed up. If shortcomings are detected, the ministries must correct the errors for the audit to be terminated. The new «openness policy» where audit reports are made public have also made it easier for the Norwegian society to know how well prepared key operators on the field of societal security are. However, the results depend on how arrangements are measured. This was something the last audit conducted by OAG received some critics for. The argument was that the Auditor General's perspective was too narrow considering the scope of this field, emphasizing that this had compromised a holistic perspective in the assessments and the reliability of the results.

The stipulated goals in the period have also been related to enhancing the ministry's ability to handle a similar crisis as the terrorist attacks on 22 July 2011, rather than to prepare for the next unforeseen crisis. According to Boin et al., (2005, 2008) it is common that organizations and politicians «over-learn» from the experiences from the most recent crisis. This strategy, however, can make the organization more vulnerable to other types of crises. It can therefore be questioned whether implemented measures after a crises is a result of actual learning, or a mean used by leaders and politicians to regain legitimacy among the population (Boin and't Hart, 2015).

A possible explanation is that «external shocks» often lead to a shift in political debate and public policy. The agenda changes and there is an attention shift (Baumgartner and Jones, 2005). The MJ may have altered on the surface as a result of the external shock from the terrorist attacks, but have ended up with virtually the same. These arguments overlap to some extent with Kettl (2003) who argues that stress (like the terrorist attacks in 2011) alters the political system, making politicians propose and introduce several measures as an immediate response. These measures, however, has proven difficult to sustain for bureaucratic organizational structures where coordination is about boundaries. A strengthening of coordination in this regard, can involve a shift in the balance of power, and this is something bureaucratic organizations often oppose (Kettl, 2003).

The terrorist attacks on 22 July 2011 led to a debate about the national organization for societal security. How are tasks within various sectors handled, which operators

are involved and what arrangements should be implemented to handle a similar crisis better in the future? These key issues were discussed in the Inquiry Commission's report, the audits conducted by the Board of Health and by The Auditor General. Within the MJ, these issues have also been a basis for proposed and implemented measures. However, these challenges are not entirely new. Actually, they have been subject to change ever since the responsibility for societal security was transferred from military to civilian side after the end of the Cold War (Serigstad, 2003). As illustrated, several measures were introduced after 22 July in an attempt to deal with these matters, including the efforts to strengthen the MJ's coordinating role, and the introduction of regular meetings in collegial organs. Coordinating problems still seems to occur in the intersection between new and existing measures.

The field of societal security and crisis preparedness is characterized by a complex organization. The MJ has the primary responsibility as a coordinating ministry, and a hierarchical primary structure. Various areas of responsibility are further linked in networks that be considered as the ministry's «secondary structure» (Egeberg 2004, Magnussen 2012). The secondary structures on the field of societal security are referred to as collegial bodies. These arrangements are intended to ensure consistency between different sectors and levels, as a result of existing fragmentation, meaning that tasks and responsibility are dispersed among many operators at different levels and across policy areas. According to Lægreid and Serigstad (2006) the collegial organs have resulted in complex and «hybrid» organizational structures, and have not necessarily lead to improved coordination. However, my study has shown that these collegial bodies have been extended.

The introduction of a new security function at the PMO show an increased focus on introducing new types of network arrangement. As the superior executive power in Norway, the PMO has an overarching responsibility in making sure that the responsibilities delegated to the subordinate ministries are handled in a proper manner. The PMO is therefore superior to the MJ – regardless of their lead ministry role (Smith, 2015). Although my interviews expressed that the strengthening of the PMO on the field of societal security have not challenged their role, it can be questioned whether this is the case. The fact that the MJ emphasized the importance of clarifying areas of responsibilities in relation to the PMO indicates insecurity in the MJ regarding the PMO's role in the operational matters on societal security and crisis management. The PMO's new role is similar to the MJ's, in the sense that they convene meetings during the handling of a crisis with focus on coordination (Riksrevisjonen, 2015). One can therefore wonder why such an

overarching body, initially sees the need to establish a supplementary scheme considering the MJ's lead role in this field.

Collegial network bodies have also been introduced in other policy areas (Lægreid and Rykkja, 2014b). Public administration in Norway is characterized by strong line ministries with specific tasks and responsibilities. They are regulated through performance management systems. Coordination between these bodies is ensured through informal cooperation within and between the various policy areas (Christensen et al. 2007, Sørensen og Torfing 2005). According to Lango et al., (2013) A policy like this can be effective as long as problems follow existing organizational boundaries. The field of societal security is however, a policy area characterized as «wicked», where problems typically cross sectoral boundaries and levels of government, and therefore require significant coordination between the involved participants (Head 2008, Bouckaert and Verhoest 2004). Thus, network structures are established to ensure coordination (Christensen et al., 2007).

Network structures are, however, difficult to combine with hierarchy in «hybrid» structures (Bouckaert et al. 2010, Christensen et al. 2015, Lægreid and Rykkja 2015). This is because the organizational forms are based on different organizational principles (Boin et al., 2005). The hierarchical formal organizational structure differs from network arrangements which are characterized by informal links with varying basis of power (Christensen et al. 2007, Sørensen and Torfing 2005). The traditional hierarchical organization also creates authority-related problems regarding the other ministries' recognition of the MJ's extended responsibility as a «lead ministry». A possible explanation can be the principle of ministerial responsibility, which makes it difficult for the individual cabinet ministers to disclaim responsibility to another minister.

Regarding the limitations these principles set for introducing cross-sectorial measures, one can question why the MJ has not been given stronger formal means of power to overrule the key management doctrines in the Norwegian public administration. One explanation can be that a strengthening of the MJ's authority as coordination ministry on the field of societal security also would have limited the other ministries base of power. It would have been political controversial, because it would have altered the fundamental traditions and the balance of power in the central government in the MJ's favor. Therefore, it seems to be of interest to the other powerful ministries to oppose such a development. This means that a strengthening of the MJ's lead role does not depend solely on political signals, but also traditions, norms, values and organization in the Norwegian public administration.

Conclusion

Several structural changes have been introduced to amend the organizational and leadership culture in the MJ, such as the Change Program and the replacements of key executives. Even though culture is important, the interaction between structure and culture is even more important to understand and deal with challenges on this policy field (Lægreid and Rykkja 2014a). However, culture is difficult to change through organizational means, since it is something that emerges over time as a result of interaction between organizational members (Christensen et al., 2007). Structural reorganizations can solve some problems, but may also create new ones (Lægreid and Rykkja, 2014a).

Such, «wicked problems» are difficult to solve because they often are multidimensional and weakly coupled (Head, 2008). There are many operators involved, their authority diverges and they have established traditions that are difficult to change – even after a crucial crisis. Structural changes are often introduced after such a major crisis, but they are not often easily implemented. Although the terrorist attacks can be seen as a «window of opportunity» (Kingdon, 1984), it seems hard to find «a best solution» in a policy area where preparing for the next unforeseen crisis is difficult. According to Baumgartner and Jones (2005), attention from public officials is a limited resource that often shifts as a result of dynamic environments. This creates a system where operators constantly respond to new signals, devoting less attention towards matters that was highly prioritized in the past. My findings suggest that the awareness regarding the implementation of new societal security measures have been constant after the terrorist attacks on 22 July 2011, however.

This implies that the willingness to learn from the attacks have been constant. In the initial period this might be due to the severity of the attacks and the criticism that followed in media and public evaluations, making it difficult for the MJ to shift attention (Boin et al., 2008). The new auditing procedures, implemented after the BH's audit in 2014, seem to have utterly contributed to reduce the Ministry's ability to shift attention on a later stage where it previously might have moved its' focus to something new in the environment. It remains to be seen if the MJ's attention shifts over time, for example as a result of a new crises.

This paper has looked at both internal and external changes in relation to the MJ. The analysis indicates that it has been easier for the MJ to introduce new internal arrangements compared to external. The external changes seem to be more difficult to introduce because they depend on establishing a common

understanding regarding their appropriateness. They also introduce a further process that requires horizontal coordination. This seems to have resulted in an incremental pattern of change in the external structure. In sum, the MJ's level of discretion has developed more regarding the introduction of new internal arrangements compared to external (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010).

The internal development of the ministry can be a result of the major replacements of managers. The new leaders seem more proactive. The MJ has also received more formal means, developing its coordinating role and contributing to a strengthening of its authority on the field of societal security. Still, the MJ has been reluctant to utilize these means. This may be because other powerful ministries are opposing a development of the MJ's coordinating role, fearing that it can compromise their own independent role. These findings may indicate a pattern of change characterized by «layering» and «drift» (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). Layering means that old arrangements are adjusted to new goals and aspirations, which eventually can lead to fundamental change. Drift means that the process of change has been characterized by new interpretations of existing goals because of environmental change.

The MJ received a lot of criticism for the handling of the attacks and the evaluations in the aftermath demonstrated that something had to be done. Although coordination between central ministries are somewhat strengthened through new procedures and objectives, the principle of ministerial responsibility limits the outcome. This seems to be a major reason why the MJ, in the fear of failure, has chosen incremental adjustments of existing structure.

The main conclusion is that the uncertainty that underlies major transboundary crisis makes it difficult to find optimal solutions to how a public organization like the MJ can and should organize to ensure societal security. Although the willingness to implement changes often is present after the crisis, the flexibility to implement these measures seems to be limited by internal and external factors, such as culture and context. However, the continuous change in society makes the efforts to implement new measures essential for the handling of any future attacks.

Societal security is a young policy area, and has been little researched. Organizing for societal security can and should be further researched to enhance the possibility for evidence based policy-making in this policy area. A greater base of knowledge can (hopefully), strengthen the society's ability to understand and manage challenges associated with societal security – which in turn could result in the introduction of even more effective arrangements.

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
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Appendix 1



Overview of the most important events and documents (2011–2016)