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ORGANIZING FOR SOCIETAL SECURITY AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT:
Cross Country Mapping Report

PER LÆGREID AND LISE H. RYKKJA (EDS.)

STEIN ROKKAN CENTRE FOR SOCIAL STUDIES
UNI RESEARCH AS, BERGEN
JUNE 2016

Report 4 – 2016
Introduction

Johannes S. Førde, University of Bergen, Norway

Country mapping reports:

**Germany:**

Bastian Jantz and Werner Jann, University of Potsdam, Germany

**The Netherland:**

Arjen Boin and Tim de Jongh, Leiden University, The Netherlands

**Norway:**

Lise H. Rykkja, University of Bergen, Norway

**Sweden:**

Per Becker and Fredrik Bynander, Swedish Defence University, Sweden

**UK:**

Martin Lodge, London School of Economics, UK
Foreword

This is a descriptive mapping report on how the general central administrative apparatus for societal security and crisis management is organized in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. Main developments after 2000 in the organizational landscape is described and the main actors, events, motivation and driving forces for changes are outlined. A special focus is on principles for crisis management, responsibility patterns as well specialization and coordination mechanisms. The report is part of the research project «Organizing for Internal Security and Crisis Management: Building Governance Capacity and Legitimacy» (GOVCAP), funded by the SAMRISK program, The Norwegian Research Council (2014–2018), Project no. 238016. Professor Per Lægreid is project leader and research professor Lise H. Rykkja is project manager. Project partners from Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK have contributed to the report that is based on a joint mapping protocol. Previous drafts of the report have been discussed in project meetings.

Bergen, June 2016

Per Lægreid and Lise H. Rykkja
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Introduction

Johannes S. Førde

GOVCAP studies government arrangements for societal security and crisis management. The overall research question is:

*What makes a well performing governmental system for societal security and crisis management?*

The project focuses on both government capacity and legitimacy, and examines the organization and coordination of government apparatuses; and the public perceptions and attitudes toward societal security, safety and resilience. The trade-off between the capacity for resilience and for emergency preparedness and between societal security and individual rights are central. There is a need of unpacking the field of societal security and crisis management into different types of management situations and crises. There are significant variations across types of crises, for example between natural disasters and terrorism. What is considered exemplary and acceptable capacity and performance may vary. We explore why some cases are considered successful, while others are not, across different countries and cases.

The existing literature on crisis management, emergency response and societal security is often oriented towards specific sectors and organizations or devoted to the evaluation of reactions to specific crises ex post. Few focus specifically on public sector arrangements in a comparative perspective. Systematic research covering experiences across different sectors, countries and public administration and types of crisis is lacking. Research taking governance and political aspects into account is also limited. Our ambition is to contribute to this line of research. An exception is the EU-project «Analysis of Civil Security Systems in Europe» (ANVIL) (Bossong and Hegemann 2013). The project observes first that there is no convergence towards one best practice when organizing for internal security in Europe and second that it is hard find a strong correlation between specific structural arrangements and system performance. We build on findings from this project and analyze the relationship more in depth by performing case studies of specific types of crisis across countries as well as taking the broader institutional setting of national administrative systems into account.

As a basis for further research into these issues each country partner delivered a mapping of relevant government institutions, organizations and network
arrangements for crisis management in each of the participating countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK) with a main focus on the central government level. The mapping reports contain an overview of the relevant government institutions and network arrangements in the field of social security and crisis management within their respective country, including major changes and reorganizations since 2001. These mapping reports are intended to feed into the context part of the Case Studies that is the next step of the GOVCAP project.

Each country mapping has two main parts. The first part focuses on getting an overview of existing organizational arrangements at the central government level responsible for societal security and crisis management, with a special focus on the strategic level and the non-military area. Project partners where ask to pay special attention to: forms of coordination, forms of specializations, centralization vs. decentralization, integration vs. fragmentation and variation in responsibility regarding prevention, preparedness and response.

The second part of the mapping reports are more about change over time, where the different countries describe the development of the policy field after 2001. 9/11 2001 was set as a starting point as it is a watershed moment that has resulted in important organizational and policy changes in public sector crisis management across the world. This part the mapping reports answer questions like: What characterizes the field after 2011? Have there been any reorganizations or major reform, and if so what characterizes them. Who are the main actors, who are the main driving forces or constraints for change? The project partners were also asked to briefly describe any major national crisis or disasters since 2001 that may have had an impact on public sector management.

The impact of the different changes and reforms in the five countries is something this report does not focus too much on, and it is therefore also hard to say much about legitimacy within the policy field drawing on the data presented here. That being said, this is something that will be followed up more closely in later stages in the project. There are also some areas, like cyber security, that get attention in some of the individual country reports but not so much in others. These themes are therefore not included in this summary of the mapping reports.

In this report we first summarize some of the findings from the five country mapping, looking at similarities and differences between them. What characterizes the field of societal security and crisis management across these countries, and what types of change can be observed? After the short summary the five individual country mappings are presented in alphabetical order.
The countries

The five countries featuring in this report are quite different in size, ranging from Germany and the UK with a population of 80,8 million and 64 million, down to the Netherlands with 16,9 million and the two Scandinavian countries – Sweden with 9,9 million and Norway being the smallest of the five with 5,2 million inhabitants. All five can be characterized as mature Western European parliamentary democracies with a bureaucratic state infrastructure that have implemented reforms in the policy field of societal security during the last 15 years. They differ, however, in administrative traditions (Painter and Peters 2010). The UK belongs to an Anglo-American meritocratic tradition with no legal basis for the state; Norway and Sweden belong to a Scandinavian collaborative tradition with big professional welfare state; and Germany and the Netherlands represent a Germanic Rechtstaat tradition with special interlocking coordination problems especially in Germany as a result of the federal system. In contrast to the other countries, the principle of ministerial responsibility does not apply to Sweden, which operates under a collective, cabinet-based responsibility principle. Five of the countries are members of the European Union, while Norway is integrated into Europe through the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement. The countries have different experiences of major crises and terrorism. They also display important variations in organizational arrangements for dealing with crises, and the specific orientation, scope and depth of the reforms within the policy area vary considerably.

Organizing for societal security and crisis management

The policy field of societal security and crisis management encompasses many sectors and crosses the levels of the governmental system. In this regard one can say that it is a fragmented and decentralized policy field. Fragmented due to the different functional specializations that operate within the policy field, and decentralized since much of the crisis management in the different countries are performed on the lowest levels of government. At the same time there is a trend in all countries to try to counter fragmentation through different mechanisms, many of which aim to coordinate and centralize. In the following section we first address the sectorization and decentralization aspects of the five countries. Thereafter we examine the changes since 2001 that lead to more centralization and more coordination. It must be underlined that the examples presented in this part do not represent an exhaustive list of all coordination arrangements in the five countries. There are both formal and informal arrangements that are not mentioned in this
summary. Finally we present some additional observations and ideas concerning possible catalyzers for change in the different countries.

In the different mapping reports it is clear that important actors and organizations with responsibility for societal security are located within almost all sectors of the government. In the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden it is clearly stated that all sectors are responsible for a crisis within their sector. In the two Scandinavian countries this is made clear by two of their guiding principles for societal security, the principle of responsibility/liability and in the principle of parity/conformity. The first principle states that the actor responsible for a certain activity under normal conditions is also responsible for that activity during a crisis. The second principle that states that that the localization and organization of activities should, as far as possible, be the same under normal conditions as during a crisis. The Netherlands do not have these stated principles but each ministry has its own Departmental Crisis Centre. In Germany responsibilities for civil security are highly differentiated at both the state and federal level. Building on different sectoral ministries (e.g. environment, transport, health), specialized state-level and federal bodies and authorities are responsible for specific types of crises.

Although many sectors and ministries play an important role in the policy field there is commonly one ministry that has a special ownership to the topic. In Germany this is the Ministry of the Interior, in Norway and Sweden it is the Ministry of Justice. In the UK the responsibility is a bit more divided. The Home Office (Ministry of the Interior) is responsible for terror-related emergences. Where no clear competence existed, the Cabinet Office is in charge. Also in the Netherlands the Ministry of Security and Justice has become the largest actor in crisis management and disaster preparation at the national level by shifting a large part of the structures and responsibilities from the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to the Ministry of Security and Justice.

Decentralization is also an important feature that can be found in all five countries. For Sweden and Norway this is again found in the guiding principles, in this case the principle of proximity/decentralization. This principle states that the crisis should be dealt with where it happens, which in effect gives the responsibility to the municipalities. In Sweden the Parliament has provided the municipalities and county councils with considerable power over crisis management in their jurisdictions. This power is embodied in the mandatory crisis management committee (krisledningsnämnd) in each municipality and county council to facilitate the implementation of necessary activities during crises. In the Netherlands municipalities are the principal operational institutions (in cooperation with the safety regions) when it comes to disaster preparation and response at the local
level. For Germany the decentralization element is especially strong. Because of the federal system the Länder (states) «own» a crisis. Each German state government – usually through its Ministry of the Interior – is responsible for policy formulation, i.e. legislation, but also implementation, coordination and management in the area of civil security, which also includes the police. The Länder delegate as many administrative and operational tasks as possible to the regional and local levels. Therefore most disaster management services are being held available on these lowest tiers of governance. For the UK local authorities are also the ones that are to manage a crisis, either alone or through local multi-agency arrangements, led by a particular service depending on the nature of the specific incident. Central government only gets involved in the case of «significant emergencies».

When looking at the changes in the different countries since 2001 there seems to be a tendency towards centralization. The Netherlands has formed a national police, regionalized the administration of fire departments, created safety regions and merged the most important security-related units at the national level in the Ministry of Security and Justice. By doing this The National government can more easily centralize decision-making power in times of crisis. In Sweden the police became one national agency in 2015. Norway has throughout the period since 2001 gradually strengthened the coordination and lead role of the Ministry of Justice. Also Germany has, as the four other countries, established new agencies and organizational arrangements at the national level. That being said, the main actors in German societal security are still the different Länder.

For Germany the new agency, Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK), was a reestablishment in 2004 of a former agency. The BBK is an agency within the remit of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesoberbehörde) and is set up as a «service provider» for training, risk mapping, warning systems, research and coordination capacities, but cannot exercise operational authority over lower-level actors, i.e. states or local governments. Regular large-scale national exercises that are organized by the BBK further strengthen the voluntary and informal links between different actors across levels, districts, states and in civil security. Similar to the German BBK Sweden and Norway merged different agencies and formed new national agencies for societal security and crisis management. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) was established in 2009 and tasked with all phases of crisis management and has an operative role (albeit limited) as well as capacity building, coordination, and communication. MSB reports to the ministry of Justice. Norway established The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning in 2003 and it is responsible for national, regional and local preparedness and emergency planning. As an agency
under the Ministry of Justice it supports the Ministry in its coordinating role. This includes developing and maintaining national emergency preparedness and response plans, as well as providing advice and report to the Ministry and the Government regarding national crisis management. The Directorate carries out supervision of all ministries, and also County Governors and municipalities. Similar for all these three agencies mention here is that they operate with a rather soft power, and are more about giving advice and surveying then being a strong actor in a decision making process.

At the heart of the UK’s administrative infrastructure at the time of our mapping were the Cabinet Office and its Civil Contingencies Secretariat. This body had around 130 staff and was a unit within the Cabinet Office. It was centrally involved in advising and leading on civil emergency planning and responses. It’s central function was therefore to offer horizontal co-ordination across departments and agencies, and to provide for a central secretariat that would operate contingency planning. It was therefore also in charge of the National Risk Register and performed National Risk Assessments.

In the national domain of crisis and disaster management in the Netherlands, the Ministry of Security and Justice is a key actor. It houses the National Crisis Center in addition to its own Departmental Crisis Centre. The most relevant departmental cluster is the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, which refers both to the person in charge of this Directorate-General and the Director-General himself. As in several of the other countries, the NCTV is the result of a merger between several agencies. The NCTV organization is tasked with the formulation and implementation of strategies for counterterrorism (and aviation security), public–private partnerships concerning national security, cyber security, strategic developments affecting the safety regions and the establishment of the national police. It also assists other Ministries and private parties with security issues. The NCTV houses the National Academy for Crisis Management (NAC), which trains civil servants of all departments who may become involved in crisis management.

It seems like all five countries strive for more coordination in a fragmented field. Norway added a fourth principle (to the three they share with Sweden) after the terrorist attack in 2011, the principle of cooperation. This principle states that all government authorities are independently responsible for ensuring cooperation with relevant actors and bodies in their work to ensure prevention, preparedness and crisis management. To facilitate coordination in Sweden, the crisis management legislation stipulates six coordination areas and their memberships. These coordination areas represent important categories of critical societal functions for which coordination is necessary for crisis management. The six coordination areas
are (1) Technical infrastructure, (2) Transportation, (3) Hazardous material, (4) Economic security, (5) Geographical area responsibility, and (6) Protection, assistance and care. Each of the coordination areas includes five to ten governmental authorities or enterprises, except the geographical area responsibility that includes one national authority and the 21 county administrative boards.

For more general political coordination between federal and state-level ministries in Germany they use the Interministerial Coordination Committee of the Federal Level and the States (IntMinKoGr). It plays an important role alongside the existing federal and state crisis management system, dealing with threats or emergencies which affect more than one state over a longer period of time (e.g. accidents at nuclear power plants in Germany and abroad, pandemics and major natural disasters). During a crisis one also see that most of the countries have forums where the different ministers can meet and coordinate. Examples are the UKs Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms, the Ministerial Crisis Management Committee of the Netherlands, and the Norwegian Crisis Council. These forums, often with their own 24-hour crisis secretary, meet cross sectors and make decisions in times of crisis. There are also more ad hoc forums across sectors in the field that exist more in the shadow of hierarchy.

Further observations

Two interesting aspects that have not been covered in this summary because it is not equally described in the five different country mappings are; (1) to what degree terrorism is included in the overall plans and organization for societal security, and (2) the use of volunteers in the operational field of societal security and crisis management. For example, the UK the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 includes terrorism as well as serious damage to the UK’s security, human welfare or environment. In Germany both governmental organizations like Federal Technical Support Service (THW) and non-governmental organizations like the Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Deutschland that involves a large number of volunteers are essential for the system to work. 80% of the German rescue service and 95 % of the German disaster medical relief are realized by these organizations.

Motivation for change

Change and reform in the policy field of societal security seems to be largely incident driven in all five countries. Even though all country mapping reports mention the terrorist attack of 9/11 it seems that crises that affect the countries more directly have more impact. For the two Scandinavian countries the tsunami in South-East Asia in 2004 had a great impact, and later for Norway the terrorist attack
in 2011. The experiences from a massive flood in 2002 (Elbeflut) lead to several changes in Germany. The 2000 fuel protests, the 2001 foot and mouth disease, the London bombing, the Buncefield fire in 2005 and the 2007 floods have all impacted the policy field in the UK, while the assassinations of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh in 2002 and 2004 lead to changes in the Dutch system.

**Conclusion**

In line with the findings from the Anvil project and also findings reported by Christensen, Danielsen, Lægreid and Rykkja (2015) we observe a movement from a military oriented concept of total defense, towards a more civilian all-hazard approach (Bossong and Hegemann 2015). The field of societal security and crisis management is still fragmented with a strong degree of sectorization and decentralization. Nevertheless, there are some parallel changes across the countries. In several of the countries there is a tendency towards more centralization. There are also different establishments of coordinating arrangements both on central and local level, and on both political and administrative levels. These coordination arrangements take different forms, some are formalized, and some are more informal. Some arrangements move towards a more lead-agency function, but none of the countries have an organization with clear lead-agency function. The coordination arrangements are both coordination through hierarchy and through more network like arrangements. There is no strong convergence towards one best practice, but parallel moves in the same direction. The different national administrative and legal structures and cultural, institutional and historical context of the different countries play an important role.

The individual country mapping reports that follows gives a rich contextual backdrop for the continuing work on the GOVCAP project, and highlights several interesting areas of further research.
GOVCAP COUNTRY Report: Germany

Bastian Jantz and Werner Jann, University of Potsdam

Introduction

This working paper documents the existing organizational arrangements at government level responsible for societal security and crisis management in Germany. Germany is a federal state, consisting of 16 states called Länder. The Federation and the Länder are governed by a parliamentary system, that is, by a cabinet led by a chancellor (on the federal level) or a prime minister (on the Länder level). The chancellor/prime minister needs a parliamentary majority and usually heads a two-party coalition government. In contrast to e.g. Nordic countries, minority governments are the exception within the German political system and the governments at the Länder and the federal level are generally supported by a cohesive majority in the respective parliament. German federalism is often referred to as «executive federalism» with a high degree of «joint decision-making» (Benz 1999), because the Länder are responsible for the implementation of most laws (Länder laws and almost all federal laws), while the Federation dominates the lawmaking process. Only a few lawmaking competencies remain at the Länder level. To ensure Länder influence on federal legislation, there is a representation of Länder governments in a second chamber at federal level, called the Bundesrat (Federal Council). Members of the Bundesrat are neither elected nor appointed but consist of the government of their constituents. The Federal Council co-regulates federal law affecting Länder competencies and, since the Länder are responsible for nearly all administrative tasks, has a strong say in all federal legislation. Germany is often labeled a consensus democracy as its federal structure, the strong bicameralism, corporatism and a powerful constitutional court demand cooperative action on the part of all actors involved in legislative decision-making. However, even though most policy outcomes are highly consensual, the process to achieve those outcomes is often conflictual, because of inter- and intra-party competition, struggles between government and opposition or between the two parliamentary chambers.

Government organization in Germany is characterized by three – sometimes complementing, sometimes conflicting – principles. Article 65 of the German constitution (Grundgesetz, GG) divides the executive power between the Chancellor (Kanzlerprinzip), the departmental ministries (Ressortprinzip) and the cabinet
(Kollegialprinzip). The Chancellor «shall determine, and be responsible, for the general policy guidelines» (Richtlinienkompetenz) (art. 65 GG), he is in charge of the appointment and dismissal of ministers (art. 64 GG), and of the allocation of the numbers and portfolios of ministries. However, the Ministries of Finance, Justice and Defense are constitutionally protected. In the 2005–2009 legislative term there were in total 14 ministries. The actual powers of the Chancellor are more limited than those of other heads of government (such as the British Prime Minister) for a number of reasons. First, Germany has been traditionally ruled by coalitions of parties which elect the Chancellor. The coalition negotiations and their written outcomes (coalition treaty, Koalitionsvereinbarung) concern influential issues such as the allocation of ministerial portfolios in the Federal Cabinet. Furthermore, the coalition treaty also lays out the policy program determining the course of action during the election term, sometimes in some detail. A second factor limiting the powers of the Chancellor is the so called departmental principle, meaning that every minister conducts his ministry and policy domain independently. Ministers are thus not subordinate to the Chancellor and he cannot instruct them on single issues within their ministries» affairs, but can only set out the general policy guidelines.

It is the conventional wisdom that even though competencies and resources in the triangle of governmental principles are changing over time, the departmental principle is the most important and most defended principle in German government organization. The departmental principle provides substantial autonomy to single ministers within their policy domains as well as in all questions of the organization and management of the department. The departmental principle also implies the principle of ministerial responsibility. The Minister is responsible to the Chancellor for his department and all subordinated agencies. Furthermore, the different departments – and here the different specialized sections – have a key role in policy formulation. In fact, the sections of the ministries are officially responsible for the development of legislative proposals within their domains resulting in a rather specialized organization within the ministries.

This thus results in powerful sector ministries and a strong vertical coordination, but a weaker horizontal coordination between policy areas. The strong position of the ministries leads in practice to negative coordination, implying lowest common denominator negotiations between the ministries. The division of responsibilities is strongly emphasized by ministry officials and coordination is primarily oriented towards accomplishing individual departmental agendas and interests and less towards a coherent government policy.
Societal security in Germany

General Principles

The German civil security system is, as it is typical for Germany, characterized by a high degree of decentralization, subsidiarity, voluntarism, legalism, sectoralism and consultation. While there are thus divided operational and legislative competences across levels and issue areas, there are at the same time a large number of formal and informal coordination mechanisms. The basic structure of the peacetime civil security system at the local level works largely irrespective of the source of a crisis. The German civil security system thus tends towards an all‐hazards approach, but retains strong sector-specific dimensions.

Decentralism

Crisis management and disaster response are primary tasks of the states (Länder) and districts while a genuine leading role of the federal level is foreseen only for the case of war-time civil protection. Each German state government – usually through its Ministry of the Interior – is thus responsible for policy formulation, i.e. legislation, but also implementation, coordination and management in the area of civil security, which also includes the police.

Subsidiarity

As it is usual in Germany, following the principle of subsidiarity, the Länder delegate again as many administrative and operational tasks as possible to the regional and local levels. Therefore most disaster management services are being held available on these lowest tiers of governance. Districts (Kreise) and district-free cities (Kreisfreie Städte) are thus the main actors on the lowest level. Local fire brigades, voluntary relief organizations, police and regional crises management authorities deal with all regular emergencies and crises at the local and regional level. In all administrative districts and district-free cities, disaster control (usually a ‘crisis center’) is set up by the local administration. During disaster relief operations, this operational command is present on site.

Voluntarism

The German system of subsidiarity also includes a division of work and cooperation between official and private institutions, with many official and private relief organizations being responsible for the execution of crisis management tasks. In Germany, the following organizations exist:
• the government organizations (GO) include the Technisches Hilfswerk (THW/Federal Technical Support Service), a federal agency which actually organizes voluntary work (see below) as well as fire brigades, which again include both professionals and volunteers;

• the private, non-profit organizations (NGOs) include Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Deutschland (ASB/Workers’ Samaritan Association Germany), Deutsche Gesellschaft zur Rettung Schiffbrüchiger (German Lifesaving Association), Deutsches Rotes Kreuz (DRK/German Red Cross), Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe (JUH/St. John’s Ambulance), and Malteser Hilfsdienst (MHD/German Order of Malta Volunteers).

80% of the German rescue service and 95% of the German disaster medical relief are realized by these organizations. Most management tasks and everyday emergency services are carried out by professional staff, but volunteers remain essential for training, public outreach, and more exceptional crisis management situations. Thus, non-profit organizations are included in all public crisis management structures and exercises, but retain their independent character and have to bear the costs of crisis operations through membership fees. However, depending on their size and scope of activities, they receive official financial compensation.

With more than 1.3 million members, the firefighters are the backbone of the German local relief system, conjointly with medical rescue organizations and the local forces and specialized task forces of the THW. Supervision, however, remains on a superordinate level, and also the coordination of larger emergencies is carried out by a district office or a regional council in case of a disaster. Basically, Germany is split into a Northern half where fire brigade coordination centers are used also to coordinate medical emergency relief (and sometimes provided it themselves), while in the Southern half medical relief agencies, especially the Red Cross, have coordination centers of their own. As of today, in most of the states, medical rescue and fire service control are currently being merged into joint coordination centers, initiated and, because of missing regulation, mostly informally governed by superior administrative levels. This process is plagued by reservations and opposition on the part of both types of local relief organizations.

The importance of voluntary engagement in Germany’s civil security is often cited as one of its main sources of legitimacy. According to the available data, non-profit organizations can draw on about 520,000 active volunteers, many of which contribute a substantial number of service hours per week. The THW adds another 80,000 volunteers, approximately 40,000 of which are active personnel for crisis
tasks. Numbers on participation in voluntary fire brigades are based on less reliable estimates due to their strictly decentralized organization, but it can be estimated that there are 1.2 million volunteers in fire brigades.

However, voluntarism in Germany faces severe challenges from wider trends such as demographic change, domestic migration and growing work demands. Despite state subsidies the private organizations depend on membership fees, voluntary donations and the willingness of members to invest their leisure time. Only voluntary fire brigades can rely on guaranteed leaves of absence for their members in the case of crises. Their work, thus, requires a great amount of trust and regular engagement.

**Legalism**

Within this general setting, all sixteen German states pass their own disaster management laws, and accompany them with a variety of administrative regulations and structures. Most states have also separate laws on rescue services and fire protection. These state laws also set the basic parameters for operational crisis response procedures, the role of citizens and the cooperation between the state and private organizations. Internal security and the law of the police is a primary responsibility of the states as well.

**Sectoralism**

At the state and federal level, responsibilities for civil security are highly differentiated. Building on different sectoral ministries (e.g. environment, transport, health), specialized state-level and federal bodies and authorities are responsible for specific types of crises, such as epidemics or nuclear accidents. In this context, the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) and the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) assume central support functions, but do not exercise any direct operational authority. A comprehensive crisis management competence for the federal level is only foreseen in the case of war-time civil protection.

**Consultation**

In the area of policy formation the Federal Ministry of the Interior and state ministries meet regularly and coordinate their activities in the Permanent Conference of Interior Ministers (IMK) under the lead of a rotating (Land-)presidency. The IMK is flanked by regular expert consultations, i.e. there is a close and permanent contact between officials at the Länder and the federal level which is further organized and supported by the BBK – Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz
Summary

Generally speaking, management authority for major crisis is thus taken up as a temporary function by various actors. After declaring a state of disaster, the districts or independent cities form task forces that are typically led by the highest local political actor (e.g. mayor, Landrat). State governments and intermediary administrative districts focus on the assessment of the overall situation, the definition of political priorities and the provision of additional civil security forces. Specialized state authorities that can come into play during specific types of disasters include health agencies, forestry administrations or road traffic departments. Germany's civil security system thus boasts a high level of professional expertise, strong volunteer involvement and considerable response capacities at local and regional levels of government.

Crisis Management on the Federal Level

On the federal level the Federal Ministry of the Interior is responsible for disaster management, internal security and especially for anti-terrorism activities. This includes amongst others besides the BBK – Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance) – the work of the Federal Criminal Police (BKA) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, legislation relating to foreigners, i.e. asylum, visa and immigration policy, and border control. The principles for airport security checks of passengers and baggage are developed within the Federal Ministry of the Interior and carried out by the Federal Police.

Below the Federal Ministry of the Interior thus the following agencies are engaged in Societal Security and Crisis Management:

- **BBK – Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance):** The BBK was established in November 2003 and commenced operations in May 2004. It’s predecessor, the Bundesamt für Zivilschutz (BZS), which had existed under different names since 1953, and which had mainly been concerned with civil protection in the case of a war, had been abolished through a general budgetary law (Haushaltssanierungsgesetz) in 1999 (as part of the 'peace dividend' after the end of the cold war) and its remaining tasks had been given to an all-purpose agency (Bundesverwaltungsamt, i.e. the Federal...
Administrative Office). But following the events of 9/11 in 2001 and especially a large flood of the Elbe in 2002 the civil protection establishment and policy network was able to re-create the old agency, even with new tasks and responsibilities.

The BBK is responsible for a mixed bunch of disaster management activities, which are grouped into the following main areas: civil protection, emergency planning, international matters, ABC protection, critical infrastructure protection, civil protection research, public health protection and civil defense technology. The BBK is an agency within the remit of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Bundesoberbehörde) and is set up as a «service provider» for training, risk mapping, warning systems, research and coordination capacities, but cannot exercise operational authority over lower-level actors, i.e. states or local governments. The BBK aims at supplementing the civil crisis preparedness of German states through specialized capacities for protection against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents and medical services, offers open access to its training programs and coordination and crisis management resources and provides conceptual and communication services. The BBK also has a training institution, the Academy of Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Protection (AKNZ) which serves as the central training provider about emergency management issues in Germany. Thus, the BBK can be regarded as a platform and a service provider for operational agencies at all levels of government.

- **THW Technisches Hilfswerk (Federal Technical Support Service)**: Also the THW is a federal agency in the remit of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. However, only one percent of the staff works full-time for the authority, 99 percent of the THW-members work on a voluntary basis for the THW. Nationwide more than 80,000 volunteers are engaged in 668 local sections in order to provide professional help to people in distress. The agency maintains amongst others advanced technical capabilities for water conditioning, power supply, emergency logistics and rescue clearing. The THW claims itself that across the world, the structure of THW is unique. The THW is providing technical and humanitarian aid in all kinds of disasters, not only in Germany, but worldwide. It is incorporated in the organizational structure of a federal authority but keeps the self-image of an operational organization which is based on the voluntary work of its members. The THW also plays a part in the critical infrastructure protection and has increasingly formed contacts with large utility companies in ensuring the continuity of
services. Furthermore, the THW is the main public organization in Germany which contributes to international emergency operations (for example for the time being in Nepal). In the context of the EU’s Monitoring and Information Centre, it lists 14 specialized units for the EU’s civil protection mechanisms. Since December 2006, it has been appointed by the European Commission as coordinator for the EU exchange of experts in civil protection.

- **Bundespolizei (Federal Police):** The Federal Police was formally the Federal Border Police, protecting the German border against illegal immigrants and criminals. Since Germany has by now only borders with other EU-states, its mandate has been enlarged towards protecting rail transport, airport security and organized crime.

- **BKA – Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police):** The BKA is the central office for police information and communications as well as for the German CID to coordinate crime suppression at national and international level. By acting as information and communications centre of the German police, the BKA provides support to the police forces of the federation and of the states in connection with the prevention and prosecution of crimes that involve more than one German state and that are of international significance or otherwise of considerable significance. The BKA investigates outstanding cases of international crime as defined by law either on its own initiative, or whenever a public prosecutor’s office puts it in charge of such investigations due to the significance of the criminal offence in question.

- **BfV – Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution):** The BfV collects and analyzes information about extremist, terrorist, and any other efforts posing a threat to internal security, and about foreign intelligence services activities directed against Germany. The predominant purpose of collating all gathered information is to keep the Federal Government informed about the security situation. Besides the BfV also each federal state has its own Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz. Because of the experiences in the Nazi period (Gestapo) police and intelligence operations are clearly separated in Germany, i.e. the BfV has no executive mandate to law enforcement at all.

- **BSI – Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (Federal Office for Information Security):** The BSI investigates security risks associated with the use of IT and develops preventive security measures. It provides information on risks and threats relating to the use of information
technology and seeks out appropriate solutions. This work includes IT security testing and assessment of IT systems, including their development, in co-operation with industry. To minimize or avoid these risks, the BSI's services are intended for a variety of target groups: it advises manufacturers, distributors and users of information technology. It also analyzes development and trends in information technology.

Further federal ministries and their agencies or regulatory authorities come into play in the case of specific threats and situations (see also below). This applies, for example, to the Ministry of the Environment and the Federal Office for Radiation Protection, the Ministry of Transport and the Federal Railway Authority as well as the German Meteorological Agency with its forecasting and warning functions, the Ministry of Health and the Robert-Koch-Institute (RKI) with its special expertise on epidemics. Potentially, all federal agencies or regulatory authorities can become involved in different civil security scenarios, but none of them can exercise operational command over local and state actors.

In practice, the federal level enters into crisis management via two constitutional paths. The first enables financial assistance (Art. 104b GG) to the Länder «in cases of natural disasters or exceptional emergency situations beyond governmental control and substantially harmful to the state’s financial capacity». The second path originates from the military responsibilities of the federal level, which fall under the exclusive matters of federal legislative power according to Art. 73 (1) 1 GG: «The Federation shall have exclusive legislative power with respect to [...] foreign affairs and defense, including protection of the civilian population». The federal competency for war-time civil protection has enabled additional federal legislation and capacities for regular crisis management. This mainly concerns the law on the THW and the Civil Defense and Disaster Assistance Act (ZSKG). Additional sector-specific federal laws regulate the basic provision of goods and services in times of national emergencies.

**Developments after 2001**

As mentioned, 9/11 and even more the experiences from a devastating flood in 2002 (Elbeflut) had forced the existing governance structures to adapt to new disaster and security threats. Without a clear constitutional basis the federal level drew up a «New Strategy for Civil Protection» in 2002 (actually by the then responsible Federal Administrative Authority) and tried to catalyze the establishment of a reformed comprehensive framework more adequate to the newly recognized security challenges. But all in all the reactions towards the
increased internal security threats after 9/11 and towards insufficiencies in fighting the Elbe flood of 2002 led to two different and rather uncoordinated reform efforts, one in the area of civil security (‘innere Sicherheit’, i.e. terrorism and organized crime, see below), and one in the area of civil protection (‘Zivilschutz’, i.e. traditional disaster management).

The legal mandate for crisis management on the national level was specified through a revised Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance Act (ZSKG – Zivilschutz- und Katastrophenhilfegesetz) which was passed in 2009. The ZSKG specifies and gives legal authority to the above mentioned «New Strategy for Civil Protection». It states that tasks in crisis management often joint efforts of the national and the regional level are required and describes the way this could be done. The revised ZSKG sets out the need to improve the cooperation between the federal and state level in disaster protection and crisis management, which mostly concerns improved coordination and communication processes. However, a new full-blown comprehensive federal civil protection law and constitutional amendments to the division of powers, which was favored by large parts of the policy network, remained out of reach, so that the federal level still needs to wait for a request by the affected state. The ZSKG also defines the tasks of the above mentioned Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) within the German crisis management system.

**New Coordination mechanisms in disaster management**

Coordination problems arise especially in a crisis that crosses the border of one state, or which involves different sectors. From the constitutional division of powers it is still a task for the states, even in cases when a central coordinating might be necessary. Special problems arise when necessary help and assistance from the central level is not requested by the individual states.

Due to the individual state’s responsibilities, the federal government claimed that competences were often insufficiently specified and optimized help delayed. One example for this was the Elbe river floods of 2002. During the large-scale relief operation, a dispute arose between the individual states and districts. There was no cross-state organization or operation control and the federally organized disaster control through the THW and assistance by the Military soon reached its limits. One of the involved states, the State of Saxony, commissioned a special independent inquiry, which produced the so called Kirchbach Report (named after the chairman, a former General and for some time the highest officer of the German Armed
Forces), which focused on regional flood defense mechanisms, but also discussed the general effectiveness of the German civil security system. The report attested a high level of technical competence to first responders and specialized civil protection forces, while the support of military units in upgrading and defending dams was also praised. Thus, the basic principles of the German disaster and crisis response system’s effectiveness, namely a decentralized approach that builds on local capacities, were defended. Yet the report also highlighted severe coordination failures across district-level and state-level structures. Integrated communication processes were missing – shortening warning times for local actors and leading to inefficient requests for aid and misallocation of resources. Regional and state-level disaster plans and structures were not adequately prepared for such a large-scale crisis. The biggest deficits emerged with regard to warning mechanisms for the population at large, which also highlighted weak forecasting mechanisms for extreme weather and floods.

As one consequence, the German Joint Information and Situation Center (Gemeinsames Melde- und Lagezentrum/GMLZ) of the federal and the state governments was established in October 2002 as alarm and support institution. As a service facility, it provides a 24/7 situation picture, a single point of contact for information management between the horizontally and vertically fragmented state actors, but also for international requests. The GMLZ is now managed by the BBK and aims to facilitate the communication and information flow between state-level and federal actors. But again, the GMLZ does not directly exercise responsibility and command, but has been activated as a communication channel for a number of national as well as international crises. The provision that the GMLZ could assume more operational crisis coordination functions upon the request of one or more German states has never been activated or exercised to date.

More general political coordination between federal and state-level ministries is possible by way of the Interministerial Coordination Committee of the Federal Level and the States (IntMinKoGr). It plays an important role alongside the existing federal and state crisis management system, dealing with threats or emergencies which affect more than one state over a longer period of time (e.g. accidents at nuclear power plants in Germany and abroad, pandemics and major natural disasters). The IntMinKoGr is intended to draw on the relevant expertise of the federal ministries to produce coordinated recommendations; it is also supposed to advise and assist the states concerned. To this end, the IntMinKoGr is responsible for preparing joint situation assessments, risk analysis and forecasts, drafting situation-specific proposals and developing a coordinated strategy for communication between the federal and state level.
In order to practice efficient interaction between federal and state crisis management personnel, the IntMinKoGr has held a series of interministerial, interstate crisis management exercises (LÜKEX) and planning conferences since 2004. The Federation and the states have agreed to continue conducting these exercises every two years. LÜKEX involves a different scenario each time. So far, power blackouts, terrorist attacks, various aspects related to the football world championship 2006, a pandemic, a dirty bomb and a cyber-attack were covered. As required by the respective scenario, private actors (e.g. airports, power supply companies, train stations, banks) are also involved.

Furthermore, vertical co-operation between the Länder and the central level should be fostered by German Emergency Planning Information System II plus (deNIS II plus), which is a platform initiated for an overarching disaster governance data management. Its approach seeks to gather data on all resources on all levels, such as medical laboratories, mobile pump stations, generators, etc. The Bund invested heavily into deNIS II plus, yet a large majority of the Länder have refused to provide their resource data to the platform.

The Federal Ministry of the Interior plays a special role in managing crises which take place within Germany. In case of serious threats to internal security, the Federal Ministry of the Interior crisis task force may be called on to manage the situation. This task force is responsible for coordinating measures taken by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the agencies within its remit, for coordinating between the federal ministries and the states, and for advising the political actors. The Communications, Command and Control Centre at the Federal Ministry of the Interior calls up the crisis task force. Depending on the situation, special advisers and liaison officers from the subordinate agencies of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, other federal ministries and the states will be added to the crisis task force.

To ensure a consistent nation-wide response to situations affecting more than one state and concerning more than one federal ministry, the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI), the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB), and the Federal Ministry of Health (BMG) have agreed to set up joint crisis task forces patterned on the BMI crisis task force. The joint BMI/BMUB crisis task force is intended to respond to serious threats or emergencies involving the illegal use of radioactive materials, and the BMI/BMG crisis task force is to deal with pandemics and bioterrorism. The BMI further assists the coordination through an Interdepartmental Committee for National Crisis Management (Ressorkreis Nationales Krisenmanagement).
Furthermore, in order to assist the states in managing specific threats or emergencies relevant to a single federal ministry, the responsible ministries have provided inter alia for the following separate crisis management structures:

| Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMLE) | Crisis Task Force on Food Safety, Central Crisis Task Force for Animal Disease Control (composed of the state secretaries of the federal/state ministries responsible) |
| Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) | Division Strategy and Operations coordinates at the ministerial level, crisis task forces are set up by the subordinate authorities |
| Federal Ministry of Health (BMG) | Federal Ministry of Health crisis task force |
| Federal Ministry of Transport and digital Infrastructure (BMVI) | Federal Ministry of Transport and digital infrastructure crisis task force |

Finally, there is, as in many other policy fields, an advisory Commission on Civil Protection (*Schutzkommission beim Bundesminister des Innern*), which has published several reports, and a number of German members of parliament and scientists formed an additional platform on civil security, the so-called Future Forum on Public Security (*Zukunftsforum öffentliche Sicherheit*). So the policy network is highly integrated and well organized. Since 2007 the federal government has run a civil society research program, which for the time being has a volume of 55 Mio. € per year, but which is very little social science oriented.

One of the most important coordination challenges, however, remains in the land–land-coordination on the more general strategic as well as operational–tactical and political–administrational level. The latter is partially and informally institutionalized within the Conference of Ministers of the Interior (*Innenministerkonferenz IMK*), precisely in its Working Group V. The Conference of Ministers of the Interior is one of the typical highly formalized, but basically informal (i.e. without any legal foundation or official mandate) coordination structures between the federal government and the states (Bund–Länder-Koordination) which exists in all policy fields and which is supported by long standing administrative networks between civil servants at the 'working level'.

Within this negotiating network, the Länder debate (mostly accompanied and observed by a representative of the Bund) about fire and rescue service affairs, disaster management, and civic protection in regular intervals, often (yet in some
eyes not often enough) reaching decisions on parallel activities or coordinative measures. One of the undoubtedly positive outputs this governance network produced is the review and update of a standardized joint manual on operation leadership during an emergency. Yet although these common operational standards have now been proclaimed, resource and capability descriptions on the ground are still by no means equal—even when the same technical label is used. And the new manual is not at all used in all Länder and districts (see Schulze-Gabrechten 2014). In case of an emergency, a communication problem between and about units from different Länder still exists, with potentially fatal consequences when the support that arrives is not of the type that was requested.

New Developments in internal security

As a response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the legislature has adopted extensive legislative amendments in the area of internal security (innere Sicherheit), that, all in all consist of more than 25 different measures. The legislative process proceeded with an unparalleled haste and without any great discussion, which was also due to the fact that three out of four Arab highjackers had been living in Hamburg and had presumably been involved in the planning of the attacks. Core elements of the new security architecture are (1) the Law on Counter-Terrorism (TBG) from 11 January 2002 and (2) the Complementary Law on Counter-Terrorism (TBEG) from 10 January 2007. The TBEG only prolongs the regulations made in the TBG that were in force from January 2002 until January 2007. It is therefore the result of an evaluation and readjustment of the TBG. Both laws summarize amendments of more than 15 laws into one package and extend the powers of the security services. However, some of the laws that were enacted for the improvement of counter-terrorism were integrated in other legislation procedures. Both laws –the TBG and the TBEG– are framework legislation. They include rules on:

- Improvement of data exchange
- Prevention of terrorist offenders’ entry
- Implementation of identity-proving measures in visa procedures
- Improvement of border controls
- Intensified screenings of security vulnerable activities
- Inclusion of biometric characteristics into identification papers
restrictions of extremist foreign associations.

The latest legislative development is the Amending Law on the Protection of the Constitution from 10 January 2012. This amendment became necessary as the powers of the secret services that were regulated in the TBEG expired on this date. Following an evaluation in 2009 of the efficacy and proportionality of the powers given to the secret service, the 2012 law extended the powers until 2016. However, several powers of the intelligence services that were provided for in the TBEG until 2012 have been removed; these include the power to obtain information on postal traffic, the use of certain technical measures in accommodations in order to protect servants of the intelligence services, and the power to obtain information on data about postal services.

Institutionally, also after 9/11 the key institutions occupied with counter-terrorism (excluding civil society measures and national defense) are the police authorities on the one side, and the intelligence services on the other. The separation requirement, however, sets limits to their cooperation. In order to facilitate cooperation between intelligence services and police authorities, a Joint Counter-Terrorism Centre was established in 2004. It is modeled on the US fusion centers and became necessary as German federalism was deemed to pose a serious threat to an effective counter-terrorism strategy. The GTAZ concerns itself exclusively with Islamist terrorism and pools the security services’ professional knowledge without creating another agency and thus multiplying the number of administrative points of contact. In general, the GTAZ consists of the Intelligence Information and Analysis Office, monitoring extremist and terrorist aspirations, and the Police Information and Analysis Office, focusing more on criminal prosecution and averting terrorist dangers. Its founding did not require a new legal basis, because no agency was given additional competences or had to share sovereignty. Instead, each of the agencies involved takes its measures on its own authority and within the framework of the prevailing laws. Due to its organizational structure, the GTAZ has no director, but representatives of the following agencies co-operate on an equal footing. Altogether 40 police and intelligence agencies of the Federal level and the Länder are represented in the GTAZ, listed as follow:

- Federal Criminal Police Office
- Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution
- Federal Intelligence Service
- Federal Police
• Customs Criminal Investigation Office
• Military Counter-Intelligence Service
• Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
• Representatives of the Federal Prosecutor General
• 16 State Offices of Criminal Investigation
• 16 State Offices for the Protection of the Constitution

In order to overcome obvious coordination failures related to the right-wing «terrorist» actions that have taken place in the past few years, and which recently came to light (National Socialist Underground), in December 2011 the Joint Centre for Countering Right-Wing Extremism/Terrorism (GAR – Gemeinsames Abwehrzentrum Rechtsextremismus/-terrorismus) was set up, and in November 2012 it was expanded to form the Joint Centre for Countering Extremism and Terrorism (GETZ – Gemeinsames Extremismus- und Terrorismusbwehrzentrum). Even though it is unconnected with the GTAZ, as it focuses on right-wing extremism, it was modeled on the GTAZ.

Another pivotal institution related to Germany’s counter-terrorism strategy is the Joint Internet Centre. The centre consists of representatives of security authorities of the Federal level. The Länder may participate actively in it through, for example, visits. The centre has been developed in response to the fact that Islamist propaganda is substantially distributed via the internet. Here, the often foreign-language ideological contents are assessed in an interdisciplinary manner, in order to inform the security services involved.
**Findings**

The provision of civil security is principally organized in a decentralized, subsidiary, bottom-up manner in Germany’s federal political system.

However, in most crises scenarios and for crisis preparedness, the different levels of government need to cooperate closely. The shocks of 9/11 and the 2002 Elbe flood, which stretched Germany’s civil security system to the limit, led to a series of reforms that tried to strengthen coordination structures, communication and risk assessment processes. The German experience over the last ten years exemplifies the potential for, as well as obstacles to, reform in such multi-level systems.

On the one hand, Germany managed to improve centralized capacities for crisis management, while keeping the basic decentralized structures with their strength on local expertise and fast reaction times in place.

Moreover, Germany (re)created a federal agency for civil protection tasks (BBK) that has been set up as a «service provider» for training, risk mapping, warning systems, research and coordination capacities, but cannot exercise operational authority...
over lower-level actors. Regular large-scale national exercises – allegedly the biggest table-top civil security exercises in Europe – that are organized by the BBK further strengthen the voluntary and informal links between different actors across levels, districts, states and in civil security (increasingly also with private ones). Concerning counter-terrorism, three different centers have been created in which police forces and intelligence services of the federal level and the Länder level are cooperating.

On the other hand, the reform process took several years and could not clearly resolve key constitutional questions and conflicts over an unambiguous division of competences and finances. In addition, the gradual build-up and professional acceptance of the BBK did not resolve the possible problems with regard to the weak or non-existent political powers of coordination through the federal Ministry of Interior or the Chancellery. But it may be that a highly decentralized system like the German one, which many actors, both public and private ones, at many levels and with a number of more or less overlapping informal coordination structures, is more resilient and perhaps also even more adaptive to cope with highly ambiguous, complex and unknown situations then any simple and clearly hierarchical and centralized structure.

*Figure 2: Civil Protection and Disaster Infrastructure*
GOVCAP COUNTRY Report: the Netherlands
Arjen Boin and Tim de Jongh, Leiden University

Introduction

The Dutch national system for crisis and disaster management has been characterized by change since 2001. Municipalities still remain the principal operational institutions (in cooperation with the safety regions) when it comes to disaster preparation and response at the local level. But the main reforms have all worked towards centralization of decision-making power in times of crisis. The Netherlands formed a national police, regionalized the administration of fire departments, created safety regions and merged the most important security-related units at the national level in the Ministry of Security and Justice. The establishment of the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism in this ministry is perhaps the most illustrative example of the bundling of national capacities. The main goals of these reforms are characterized by the need for efficiency and, importantly, the need to make quick and authoritative decisions.

Starting points

In theory, the Dutch system is governed by an all-hazards approach to crisis and disaster management. Yet in practice, a clear (if informal) distinction is made between natural disasters and riots, terrorism, and what we may call «transboundary threats». Each type triggers different institutional responses.

Disasters and riots are the traditional types of incidents that primarily affect local communities and are managed by local authorities. The Safety Regions Act makes a formal distinction between «crisis» and «disaster» situations (Wet veiligheidsregio's, 2010, art. 1).

- Disaster: a major incident or accident which seriously threatens or damages the lives and wellbeing of citizens, environment or property, and that requires a coordinated deployment of multi-disciplinary services and organizations to counter the threat or mitigate the consequences.
• Crisis: a situation that violates, or threatens to violate, vital interests of society.

According to the National Safety and Security Strategy, national safety and security are considered at risk if the vital interests of the state or society are threatened by an actual or potential disruption (Strategie Nationale Veiligheid, 2007, p. 4). A «crisis» here refers to a terrorist event, a nuclear accident, an epidemic or a breakdown of critical infrastructures. When a «crisis» occurs, crisis management is centralized at the national level. Municipal authorities remain primarily responsible for maintaining public order and safety, and execute ministerial instructions.

The distinction between a local and a national level is not water tight and may well invite discussion in certain situations. For instance, in the preparation phases for the crowning ceremony of King Willem-Alexander and the organization of the National Security Summit (2014), tensions emerged between leaders of the big cities (Amsterdam, The Hague) and the Ministry of Security and Justice. If areas larger than municipalities are affected or when local authorities are overwhelmed, authority can be «scaled up» to regional or national authorities. The Netherlands does not have a Disaster Declaration (settling for instance, reimbursement of damage). According to the Extraordinary Competences of Civil Authority Act, the local, regional and national governments can exercise powers that allow involuntary searches of buildings and persons or limit civil movement, public gatherings and the circulation of documents, beyond their normal authority (Wet buitengewone bevoegdheden burgerlijk gezag, 1996, Art. 5–32). Involuntary incarceration also belongs to the extraordinary powers given by the same Act in exceptional situations. Since it has been written, the Act has never entered into force.

Strong centralization pressures have shaped the workings of the system. Since 2001, all major reforms have supported this tendency towards centralization. This report describes the current structure of the Dutch crisis management system, taking account of the centralizing effects of these reforms.

Core ministries and central agencies responsible for crisis management

The Netherlands does not have one central crisis organization or «lead agency», but as soon as a crisis occurs or a threat of national importance emerges, the response is quickly centralized. This can happen in a few ways, depending on the nature of the threat (terrorism, health, natural disaster, cyber). Here we discuss the central organizations that would play a central role when such a crisis occurs. The dominant
crisis management (CM) approach is civilian, as the Dutch do not have a strong military heritage and tend to eschew military dominance in executing government tasks. The Ministry of Defense therefore does not feature in this overview.¹

Each minister and department is responsible for CM in its own sector. Central ministries execute authority and responsibility for crisis preparation and response in their specific domain (e.g. fighting infectious diseases or preventing floods) and delegate tasks/mandates to local/regional authorities when customized implementation is required. Each ministry has its own Departmental Crisis Centre (DCC) in charge of early warning, training and preparation in the «cold phase», and information processing and sectorial coordination in the «hot phase» of a national crisis.

The National Steering Committee for National Safety and Security (SNV – Stuurgroep Nationale Veiligheid) coordinates preparation and risk reduction across sectors in the cold phase. It consists of director‐generals of all national ministries. The SNV promotes coherence in national security and CM policy. Further, the SNV advises the cabinet on disaster risk reduction, and reports on the National Risk Assessment (NRA) and activities to strengthen capabilities and coherence.²

When a national crisis occurs and the response requires interdepartmental coordination, a specific process is initiated. The process is managed by the NCTV, which is part of the Ministry of Security and Justice.³ Figure 1 depicts the organizational chart of a national response.

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¹ There are civil‐military cooperation programs to support authorities in their tasks to increase, maintain or restore public safety. Occasionally, the military has provided such support by evacuating communities, piling up sandbags, or rolling out temporary infrastructures or equipment. A local or regional authority can request such military support through the Minister of Security and Justice, who formally asks the Minister of Defense for assistance. The National Operations Coordination Centre (LOCC) coordinates such efforts.


³ The process is described in the National Manual on Decision Making in Crisis Situations, 2013.
The National Crisis Centre (NCC – Nationaal Crisiscentrum) is where crisis teams convene. It serves as an interministerial coordination centre and information hub, with a 24/7 front office that alerts all government officials involved in the national crisis management structure when incidents occur. In the preparation phase, the NCC is tasked with early warning, awareness raising, providing crisis communication, and CM training and advice. The NCC develops national model handbooks (for regions to customize), advises other government agencies and regions in crisis situations on communication issues, and provides tools such as the national crisis website (www.crisis.nl) and telephone service upon request. When preparing for interministerial decision making in a crisis, the NCC focuses on four key areas: the assembly of accurate and factual information, the analysis of this information to formulate suggestions on which measures should be taken, the communication of information to the public at large and formulating scenarios of the possible ways in which the crisis may develop (National Manual on Decision Making in Crisis Situations – The Netherlands (brochure), 2013, p. 23). The NCC also functions as a direct contact between the safety regions and central government.

In the event of a crisis, an advisory team of representatives of the ministries involved can be convened (but is not mandatory to convene) to exchange information and arrive at a common operational picture and coordinated crisis
management approach.\textsuperscript{4} The composition of the advisory team is flexible and is
determined by the chair (National Manual on Decision Making in Crisis Situations –
The Netherlands (brochure), 2013, p. 15). Figure 2 shows the organizational
structure of the National Coordinator for security and Counterterrorism (NCTV). It
fits in with figure 1 on the points of the advisory team and the National Crisis Centre
(NCC). The advisory team can be convened at the NCC on the instigation of a
director of the NCTV and is usually chaired by a director from the NCTV.

\textit{Figure 2. The National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism – organizational chart}

Source: website NCTV see: https://english.nctv.nl/organisation_en/who_is_nctv/the_organisation/

The advisory team serves the Interdepartmental Crisis Management Committee
(ICCb – Interdepartementale Commissie Crisisbeheersing). The ICCb consists of the
director-generals of the ministries involved and is chaired by the NCTV. It convenes
to discuss and decide upon issues prepared by the advisory team. The ICCb
prepares political strategic decisions for the Ministerial Crisis Management
Committee (MCCb – Ministriële Commissie Crisisbeheersing), which consists of the
Prime Minister, Minister of Security and Justice and the Ministers of the sectors
involved. The Minister of Security and Justice is chair of the Ministerial Crisis

\textsuperscript{4} When there is need of a quick response to a crisis or disaster from political decision makers, the convening of
the advisory team can be bypassed and information can be delivered directly to the ICCb and MCCb.
Management Committee unless the Prime Minister takes the lead (*National Manual on Decision Making in Crisis Situations – The Netherlands* (brochure), 2013, p. 5).\(^5\)

**Ministry of Security and Justice**

*National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV)*

In the national domain of crisis and disaster management, the Ministry of Security and Justice is a key actor. It houses the NCC in addition to its own Departmental Crisis Centre. The most relevant departmental cluster is the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, which (confusingly) refers both to the person in charge of this Directorate-General and the Director-General himself.\(^6\) The NCTV is the result of a merger between the National Security Department (*Directie Nationale Veiligheid*), originally embedded with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (*Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding*), originally under joint authority of the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Ministry of Justice and the Government Computer Emergence Response Team (GOVCERT.NL), originally embedded with the ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in 2010.

The NCTV organization is tasked with the formulation and implementation of strategies for counterterrorism (and aviation security), public–private partnerships concerning national security, cyber security, strategic developments affecting the safety regions and the establishment of the national police. It also assists other Ministries and private parties with security issues. The NCTV houses the National Academy for Crisis Management (NAC), which trains civil servants of all departments who may become involved in crisis management. The Academy aims to professionalize the national crisis organization (for more information on the National Academy for Crisis Management in Dutch see: [https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/crisisbeheersing/nac/](https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/crisisbeheersing/nac/)).

*The National Operations Coordination Centre and National Operational Staff*

The National Operations Coordination Centre (LOCC – *Landelijk Operationeel Coördinatie Centrum*) is where requests for operational support arrive when the capacity of a region or municipality is overwhelmed, or when specific resources are

\(^{5}\) See Appendix for more information on this «manual».

needed (such as special police forces, military aid, or advanced technological equipment or expertise). The LOCC is managed by the police and staffed by police, fire services, medical services, municipalities and the Ministry of Defense. It falls under the authority of the NCTV and is operational in nature. During upscaling in a national crisis situation, the LOCC’s duties are to submit an assessment of the operational feasibility of potential actions, advise the organizations and ministries involved on operational matters, contribute to operational planning and coordinate assistance requests. It also maintains the National Operational Staff (LOS – Landelijke Operationele Staf), which is similar to the LOCC but operates at a higher administrative level. The LOS advises the MCCb through the ICCb and advisory team on operational matters. So where the LOCC mainly advises on operational matters on a regional level, the LOS advises the main political decision makers on a national level (*National Manual on Decision Making in Crisis Situations – The Netherlands (brochure)*, 2013, p. 25). For an organizational chart, see Figure 3.

*Figure 3. The National Operational Coordination Centre (LOCC) – organizational chart*


*Inspectorate for Security and Justice (IVJ)*

The Ministry also houses the independent Inspectorate for Security and Justice, (formerly the IIOV – Inspectorate Public Order and Safety) which concerns itself with monitoring the functioning of the (public and private) organizations employed in the policy field of security and justice. It also investigates and reports on incidents within its field of expertise to improve governmental policy (see: https://www.ivenj.nl/english/organisation/).
The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)

The National Cyber Security Centre started operations in 2012. The NCSC is tasked with contributing to the defense of the Dutch digital domain and a safe, open and stable digital society (see: https://www.ncsc.nl/english/organisation/about-the-ncsc.html). The NCSC has four core functions with regards to cyber security: threat/incidence response, disaster prevention and preparation, crisis management and it functions as a platform for public–private partnerships and information sharing (Producten- en Dienstencatalogus, 2013, p. 6).

The NCSC offers around the clock assistance to its constituents when an incident directly affects the primary processes of a vital sector. Depending on the nature of the incident (a digital viral outbreak or hacking attack for example), the National Cyber Security Centre offers several forms of assistance. In times of an ICT crisis, the NCSC is tasked with the operational coordination and advising of the national crisis management structure. When incidents are threatening to have a disruptive effect on the vital ICT sectors that the Centre supports, the NCSC is scaled up depending on the complexity of the threat (Producten- en Dienstencatalogus, 2013, p. 11).

Special Intervention Service (DSI)

The DSI (Dienst Speciale Interventies) is part of the organization of the National Police (KLPD), and responsible for counterterrorism operations, situations with a possibility of severe violence and guarding persons or objects in extraordinary situations (Regeling Dienst speciale interventies, 2009, Art. 2).

The service is divided in several specialized units. The arrest and support unit is responsible for the detainment of armed suspects and consists of regional police units and state troopers (marechaussee). The intervention unit (previously the special support unit) executes small, high risk operations. The expertise and operational support unit are the sharpshooters of the DSI. Police and the Ministry of Defense are both responsible for staffing half of the unit. The last unit is the marines' intervention unit consisting of Special Forces. It specializes in complex offensive actions on a larger scale than the intervention unit (see: http://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/terreurbestrijding/inhoud/speciale- eenheden).

For the assistance the NCSC offers on several types of incidents see: Producten- en Dienstencatalogus, 2013, p. 8–9.
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports

The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports (VWS) is responsible for public health, the handling of infectious diseases, emergency medical assistance, hospital care policy, the safe distribution of medicines and nuclear healthcare (Departementaal Handboek Crisisbeheersing, 2013, p. 4–5). The department within the ministry responsible for crisis prevention and response is the Directorate-General of Public Health.

VWS has a central role in the Dutch national crisis management system. It is involved in many different crisis situations ranging from the control of zoonoses, to food and product safety and supervising the implementation of quality healthcare in hospitals. The ministry also offers advice to other actors in the event of a crisis outside of its mandate (Departementaal Handboek Crisisbeheersing, 2013, p. 5). As a crisis partner, VWS is involved in incidents with dangerous chemicals, terrorism, the repatriation of disaster victims abroad and extreme weather.

In the case of national crises, VWS secures the continuation of a standard of healthcare quality. In the event of a nuclear disaster, VWS is responsible for providing information on the healthcare aspects of radiation exposure. In the case of flooding, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment is in charge but VWS takes care of the safe evacuation of health care institutions and the continuity of health care.

Centre for Infectious Disease Control (CIb)

The ministry is responsible for a certain group of diseases classified as type A infectious diseases (SARS for example). This classification is based on the severity of the disease ranging from the most severe infectious diseases (type A), down to less severe (type B1 and B2) and least threatening (type C). When a disease is classified as type A, the minister can take extreme measures like mass vaccinations and quarantines. In the event of an outbreak of other types of infectious diseases (B1, B2 and C), the safety regions and municipalities are responsible for controlling the disease as long as it remains local or regional.

The CIb falls under the jurisdiction of the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), within the Ministry of VWS. The CIb is responsible for the national coordination of collective disease prevention. In the event of an outbreak

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8 For an overview of the different types of disease classifications see: http://www.rivm.nl/Onderwerpen/M/Meldingsplicht_infectieziekten/Welke_infectieziekten_zijn_meldingsplichtig
of infectious disease, the Centre gives the ministries scientific advice on outbreak control measures. It contributes to the setting up and maintenance of the professional network tasked with the prevention and control of infectious diseases. It develops guidelines for infectious disease prevention for the regional and municipal health services and is also responsible for the preparedness for, response to, and surveillance of infectious diseases.

*Cooperation between the Ministry of VWS and Economic Affairs regarding zoonoses*

In the event of an outbreak of zoonoses, responsibility is shared by the Minister of VWS and the Minister/Secretary of Economic Affairs. Within the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Directorate-General of Agriculture is responsible for the control of Zoonoses and animal diseases. In the Ministry of VWS, the Director-General of Public Health fulfills this role. The responsibility for human health lies with the Ministry of VWS and the responsibility for animal health lies with the Ministry of Economic Affairs. In the event of a disease which can possibly disrupt society, the Minister of VWS has control.

**Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment (I&M)**

This ministry is responsible for crisis management and disaster preparation in the following sectors: transportation (aviation, commercial shipping, railway and public transport), water and air quality, the environment and genetically modified organisms (GGOs). Vital sectors are transport (mainport Schiphol and Rotterdam, the road network and waterways), managing the surface waters, water quality (non-drinking water) and drinking water supply and the chemical and nuclear industries. For these vital sectors, extra security measures have been undertaken to guarantee their continuity in event of a crisis. The Ministry of Economic Affairs is politically and administratively responsible for the nuclear industry but its crisis management tasks lie with the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment (I&M) (Departmental Crisis Coordination Centre of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, 2013, p. 6).

The relevant directorates-general within the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment are the Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport, the Directorate-General for Spatial Development and Water Affairs, the Directorate-General for the Environment and International Affairs, the Department of Waterways and Public Works (Rijkswaterstaat), the Human Environment and

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9 In the Netherlands, agriculture falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Transport Inspectorate and the Royal Netherlands Meteorological institute. The DCC-I&M is responsible for the crisis coordination of the ministry.

The ministry was formed in 2010 by combining the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment and the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. As a result, different approaches to crisis management came together. The ministry is still busy creating uniformity in the different approaches and visions to crisis management to promote common working methods. The ministry works closely with partners in the crisis management chain. A few examples of those partners are the Ministry of Security and Justice, the coastguard, and RIVM.

The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD)

The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD – Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst) is divided in three directorates: the Intelligence Directorate, Operations Directorate and the Security Screenings and Business Administration Directorate. The AIVD is governed by the Intelligence and Security Services Act of 2002 (Wiv – Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten) and it describes all the powers the agency is authorized to use. The agency is overseen by the Commission for Oversight on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD – Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten) and the parliamentary committee for the intelligence and security services (CIV – Commissie voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten).

Regarding crisis management, the AIVD is involved in the countering of terrorism, promoting the security of vital sectors in society and compiling risk and threat analyses (see: https://www.aivd.nl/english/aivd/tasks-and-areas/). The agency offers a risk assessment of certain terrorist threats to its partners like the Ministry of Security and Justice or the Ministry of Defense. The intelligence service monitors radicalized youths trying to leave the Netherlands for Syria and Iraq, or who are returning, and advises the Ministry of Security and Justice on precautionary measures like the taking of passports and restriction of mobility.

In cooperation with the NCSC, the AIVD works on fighting cyber terrorism and espionage. Where the NCSC mainly focuses on cyber criminality and cyber threats to vital sectors, the AIVD fights cyber espionage and extremism online.

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The Dutch Safety Board

The independent Dutch Safety Board (*Onderzoeksraad voor de Veiligheid*) has a strong legislative mandate to conduct an investigation on any crisis it selects as important and relevant for learning from accidents. Since its inception in 2005, it has the mandate to investigate (near) disasters and accidents in transport, industry and trade, healthcare, the environment, the emergency services and crisis management (see: http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/nl/over-de-raad/geschiedenis-van-de-onderzoeksraad). The board publishes reports on its website, presents them in the media and provides copies upon request.

The board started out as the Transportation Safety Board. It had the responsibility to perform all the necessary inquiries in the Dutch transportation sector. After the fireworks disaster in Enschede in 2000 and the fire in Volendam on New Year’s Eve 2000–2001, the government decided to expand the mandate of independent investigative inquiry to all sectors.

**Development of the policy field after 2001**

Since 2001, the crisis management field has been characterized by change. This is not so strange, as the world of crises has changed significantly since the 9/11 attacks. This has led to new legislation concentrating decision-making powers in The
Hague. It has also led to quite a few reorganizations: reshuffling of existing units and the creation of new ones.

Characteristics of the main reorganizations and the main goals behind reform

On the national level, centralization has been the dominant pattern. The Ministry of Security and Justice became the largest actor in crisis management and disaster preparation by shifting a large part of the structures and responsibilities from the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations to the Ministry of Security and Justice.

The implementation of the Safety Regions Act (Wvr) and the Royal Decree Safety Regions (Bvr) in 2010 divided the Netherlands into 25 so-called «Safety Regions» (veiligheidsregio’s), which are in charge of disaster prevention, coordination of the fire brigade and the emergency medical care for their territory (GHOR). Prior to the establishment of the safety regions, the Dutch municipalities were responsible for disaster preparation and crisis management. However, not all of local governments were equipped to deal with large-scale disasters. New types of potential disasters, such as large-scale agricultural epidemics and terrorist threats seemed to demand a scaled up response.

The reorganization of the police into one national police organization (since 2013) is one of the largest and most complex reform operations enacted since 2001 and is characteristic for the centralizing tendencies of reforms since 9/11. The organization went from 25 separate police regions to a centrally directed, national police with ten regional units. The safety regions closely cooperate with the police units. The main goal for the reorganization of the national police was to the enhance performance of the police on a national scale and increase the efficiency of the organization.

Changes in the relationship between the national, regional and local governments and the private sector

The relationship between national units and regional/local units has changed. The National government can more easily centralize decision-making power in times of crisis. The relation with the private sector has not changed that much. While there is increased awareness that private actors play a role (especially in critical infrastructure protection and cyber), the relation between the public and private
sector has not intensified (let alone institutionalized). Most developments in public-private cooperation are found in the cyber sector.

The National Cyber Security Strategy (2011) contains guidelines for coordinating and strengthening public-private partnerships and initiatives regarding cyber security. It also announced the establishment of the Cyber Security Council and the National Cyber Security Centre (National Cyber Security Strategy, 2011, p. 9). In October 2013, the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism issued the Cyber Security Strategy 2 (NCSS 2). The NCSS 2 can be seen as an addition to a framework set by several strategic policy documents.\(^{11}\) According to van den Heuvel and Klein Baltink, the formation of the second edition of the National Cyber Security Strategy was a true public–private partnership that involved all relevant stakeholders (2014, p. 119). It aims to facilitate public–private participation and it shows that partnerships with private institutions are highly valued in Dutch Cyber Security. This is because over eighty percent of the critical ICT infrastructure is in the hands of the private sector (van den Heuvel & Klein Baltink, 2014, p. 120). The focus of the strategy lies on working with businesses and the scientific community, and maintaining a transparent relationship with the various stakeholders in cyber security.\(^{12}\)

**National laws regarding safety and security**

*Police Act (2012)*

With the Police Act of 2012, the regional police departments began their reorganization into one national police force with ten regional units. The national unit mostly handles organized crime that crosses the boundaries of the regional units. A new feature of the Police Act is that the Minister of Security and Justice sets the budget for the entire Dutch police force. The Act places the national police directly under the control of the Minister of Security and Justice. It also stipulates criteria for the number of community police officers (wijkagenten) per 5000 inhabitants (Politiewet, 2012, Art. 38a), the lines of responsibility from the chief of police to the minister (Art. 27–29) and the different regional (Art. 38–41) and national units (Art. 42–55).

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\(^{12}\) For an overview on how NCSS2 differs from, and builds on NCSS1, see: National Cyber Security Strategy 2, 2013, p. 8.
The Safety Regions Act (2010)

The Safety Regions Act replaces the Disaster and Heavy Accidents Act, the Act on Medical Assistance in Times of Disaster and the Fire Service Act of 1985. There is no «formal disaster declaration» equivalent to that in other countries. Municipal and regional decision makers assess each situation to determine whether extraordinary authority, according to the mandates in the Safety Regions Act and other laws, is necessary for drastic intervention or response. The Safety Regions Act (Wvr), Royal Decree Safety Regions (Bvr) and the Decree for Safety Regions’ Personnel include quality requirements for fire and rescue services, emergency medical services and training and preparation efforts within the safety regions. In the preparation phase, the Provincial Governor (CdK) can give instructions to safety regions when the Inspectorate of Security and Justice (IVJ) assessment indicates a lack of preparedness.

Public Health Act and the amendment of 2012

With the amendment of the Public Health Act in 2012 to accommodate for the enactment of the Safety Regions Act, directors of the regional health services became the chief coordinators for, and advisors on the alleviation of infectious diseases (other than type A) and public health issues in the safety regions and municipalities. The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports acts as a crisis partner for other ministries, municipalities and safety regions in a number of crisis types (Departementaal Handboek Crisisbeheersing, 2013 p. 17–18). The Ministry of VWS supports the safety regions with advice on the structuring of healthcare.

Emergency laws

In extraordinary circumstances, a variety of emergency laws can also be applied, such as the Coordination of Exceptional Situations Act, the Extraordinary Competences of Civil Authority Act, the Evacuation Act and the War Act. These Acts will be applied by Royal Decree at the request of the Prime Minister. According to the Dutch Constitution (Art. 103), the Extraordinary Competences of Civil Authority Act (Wet buitengewone bevoegdheden burgerlijk gezag, 1996, Art. 5–32) and the Evacuation Act (Wet verplaatsing bevolking, 1952, Art. 2–8), deviation from constitutional regulations and certain civil rights is possible during an emergency.
The main actors, participants and driving forces behind the reform process

The Dutch national crisis management structure has many actors involved in the development of national strategies and other reforms. Mostly, reforms take a long time to materialize because of the consultation that precedes it between the different stakeholders and committees. These committees often come together in an informal setting. Steering committees and working groups negotiate a reform proposal that seems acceptable to everyone. Universal support for a reform is a characteristic of the Dutch culture in crisis management.

Crises that had an impact on public sector crisis management (after 2001)

The assassinations of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh

The politician Pim Fortuyn was assassinated on May 6, 2002. His political party LPF was a newcomer in Dutch politics and became the second largest party in the 2002 elections after his death. Dutch film director and columnist Theo van Gogh who was assassinated on November 3, 2004 by a Muslim extremist.

These assassinations did not immediately lead to new measures for counterterrorism. After the investigation of the murder of Fortuyn, the committee responsible for investigating the incident (Van den Haak Committee) recommended the modernization of the system of surveillance and personal protection.

The murder on Van Gogh led to the establishment of the Holtslag Committee. It concluded that the different agencies responsible had not cooperated sufficiently because of an institutional culture of distrust. The committee recommended increasing the administrative will to cooperate and remove distrust among the agencies. The Commission for Oversight on the Intelligence and Security Services (CTIVD) carried out an investigation of the considerations of the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) regarding the murderer Mohammed B. The AIVD already had the perpetrator in its sights but his threat analysis was not sufficient to anticipate the murder (Counterterrorism measures in the Netherlands in the First Decade of the 21st Century, 2011, p. 41).

Plane crash above the Ukraine

On July 17, 2014, commercial flight MH17 was shot down when it was flying over Ukrainian airspace. All of the 298 people on board were killed, 196 of which were of
Dutch nationality. Returning the bodies of the Dutch nationals was difficult because the plane crashed in the middle of a warzone. The Ukrainian military and Russian separatists were fighting each other around the crash site, which made it unsafe to enter for investigators and emergency personnel trying to recover the bodies. Even though the crash did not take place in Dutch territory, it is regarded as one of the largest national disasters in Dutch history.

Only the highest administrative bodies were activated in the disaster. The ICCb and MCCb convened on a weekly basis in the first weeks after the crash and bi-weekly after that period. No advisory team was convened to assist the ICCb and MCCb on the crisis. Instead, information was inserted directly into both committees. This was necessary due to the nature of the crisis and the urgency of the decisions that had to be made. Every day, it was assessed if it was safe for the emergency workers and investigators to enter the crash site. The necessity of having to make this decision quickly each day was paramount in the decision to skip the gathering of the advisory team. The Dutch Safety Board is still investigating the crash, after publishing a preliminary report stating that the fuselage indicated damage from a large number of high-energy objects (Dutch Safety Board, 2014, p. 30).

**General findings**

In some cases, investigations explicitly point at the shortcomings in the crisis response that allowed the situation to deteriorate, and may have even cost lives. Compared to the Dutch Safety Board reports, the IVJ reports are usually milder in tone, but still very critical when it comes to rapid deployment of response teams, command and coordination, and the exchange of information. These are the most recurrent issues in the reports. The culprits of any alleged wrongdoings are never named personally, but their organizations are. Another process of crisis management that receives criticism is communication to citizens. Government agencies seem to find it difficult to catch up with modern technology and the use of social media. CM teams at all government levels tend to lock themselves in a room until they have sorted out the crisis, before they go public with a message. Investigations are always concluded by practical recommendations. Incidents typically lead to adjustments; they do not directly lead to reforms. Usually, after a severe incident, an ad hoc government commission is created whose recommendations lead to reform.
Appendix: National Manual on Decision Making in Crisis Situations

The National Manual on Decision Making in Crisis Situations presents the government’s central points in the crisis management policy structure and outlines the powers, responsibilities and core tasks of the main players (National Manual on Decision Making in Crisis Situations – The Netherlands (brochure), 2013, p. 9). Its directives apply to all crisis situations where interdepartmental coordination and cooperation is required on a national level. The manual provides the framework for the central government’s policy. It serves as a basic document for specific agreements between ministries or the central government and local/regional governments. It also describes the relationship between the national government, the municipalities and the safety regions in a crisis.

The national manual also functions as the model for the departmental handbooks in crisis management of each ministry. One of the most important features of the national manual is that it brings uniformity to the national crisis management structure. Because every departmental handbook is modeled after the national handbook, it never deviates too far from it and thus ensures uniformity. It points out the vital interests of the Dutch state: territorial security, economic security, ecological security, physical security and social and political stability (National Manual on Decision Making in Crisis Situations – The Netherlands (brochure), 2013, p. 11).

The manual stipulates that the central government has a steering function in national crisis situations and is authorized to give binding instructions to the relevant parties if they ignore its urgent advice (National Manual on Decision Making in Crisis Situations – The Netherlands (brochure), 2013, p. 12). The MCCb can also declare GRIP Rijk protocol in effect, which means it can decide how the local and regional authorities use their powers in the event of a terrorist attack, category A nuclear incident or other GRIP Rijk situations (National Manual on Decision Making in Crisis Situations – The Netherlands (brochure), 2013, p. 12). In the event of a GRIP Rijk situation, the national government will dictate how the local authorities may use their powers; these authorities then take the appropriate measures.

Regarding the ICCb, MCCb and the advisory team, the national manual describes their tasks and responsibilities in relation to each other and to the national crisis management structure (*National Manual on Decision Making in Crisis Situations – The Netherlands (brochure),* 2013, p. 15–20). The organizations of the NCC and LOCC/LOS are also stipulated in the manual.

Regarding crisis legislation, the manual stipulates that the main principle of crisis management is to adhere to the normal powers (legislation) in place for as long as possible before activating emergency legislation. There are two levels of emergencies: a restricted state of emergency and a general state of emergency. A general state of emergency involves more extraordinary powers for the central, regional and municipal governments than the restricted state of emergency. Infringement of fundamental human rights is only permissible in a general state of emergency. A state of emergency is declared by Royal Decree on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and needs to be prolonged by the States General (*National Manual on Decision Making in Crisis Situations – The Netherlands (brochure),* 2013, p. 29).

Furthermore, the manual describes the responsibilities for the ministries and governmental organizations involved in crises outside of the Netherlands (like repatriating bodies in the case of the airplane crash above Ukraine), follow-up of a crisis by a follow-up team and the evaluation of the governmental performance in a crisis (*National Manual on Decision Making in Crisis Situations – The Netherlands (brochure),* 2013, p. 30–35).
GOVCAP COUNTRY Report: Norway

Lise H. Rykkja, Uni Rokkan Centre/University of Bergen

Introduction

This working paper documents the existing organizational arrangements at central government level responsible for societal security and crisis management in Norway, with a main focus on the strategic level and the non-military civilian area and on developments after 2001. A more detailed table listing the main central governmental organizations with responsibility for societal security and crisis management, including references to resources providing further information, is attached (appendix 1).

Norway is a unitary state with 5 million inhabitants spread out over a large territory (more than 380,000 km²). Its multi-party system generally results in minority coalition governments, and it is generally characterized as a consensus type of democracy (Lijphart 1999). The period 2005–2013 was an exception with a majority coalition. There are three administrative levels: a national level (16 ministries and several national agencies), a regional (19 counties) and a local level (429 municipalities). The Ministries are relatively small and work as secretariats for the political staff and manage subordinate agencies. Agencies report to their parent ministry and are located outside the ministries.

Societal security in Norway

Societal security was defined in a Norwegian Government White Paper from 2001 as: «the ability a society has to maintain important societal functions and to attend to citizen’s life, health and basic needs under different forms of stress» (St. meld. 17 (2001–2002)). It is delineated from other security related concepts, such as national security or human security, but includes both man-made (intentional) and natural

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14 The appendix is based on information from official websites of government organizations and from the Norwegian State Administration Database: http://www.nsd.uib.no/polsys/en/civilservice/.
(non-intentional) disasters. It also normally signals that military issues feature only to a limited extent.\textsuperscript{15}

General principles

*Individual ministerial responsibility* is a core principle within the Norwegian system. The minister has the ultimate responsibility for actions within his or her ministerial portfolio. This creates powerful sector ministries and a strong vertical coordination, but a weaker horizontal coordination between policy areas. Coordination by hierarchy therefore generally dominates over network mechanisms (Lægreid and Rykkja 2014, Bouckaert et al. 2010). Another central feature of the Norwegian polity is the principle of local self-government. Local authorities are responsible for providing a broad range of services, and are traditionally rather autonomous.

Government arrangements for societal security and civil protection in Norway rest on four central principles: liability (or responsibility), decentralization (or subsidiarity), conformity (or similarity), and cooperation. The liability principle implies that every government authority is responsible for the security and safety within its own sector or portfolio. This includes strategic as well as operative responsibilities. The decentralization principle emphasizes that a crisis should be dealt with at the lowest operational level possible. This puts important tasks at the level of the municipalities. The principle of conformity implies that «normal» arrangements and procedures should prevail in the event of a crisis. This means that organizational structures and command chains are normally not altered in the event of a crisis. The principle of cooperation states that all government authorities are independently responsible for ensuring cooperation with relevant actors and bodies in their work to ensure prevention, preparedness and crisis management.

The dominant crisis management approach in Norway is based on an «all hazards» approach (Hollis and Ekengren 2013), meaning that the civil security system aims to cover and plan for a wide range of potential threats, and to deal with these threats through prevention, preparedness, response and recovery strategies.\textsuperscript{16}

Cooperation with the armed forces/military is central to crisis management in Norway and ensured through a «Total Defence» concept established after the end

\textsuperscript{15} For a more detailed discussion on this, see Bailes 2014, Buzan 1991, Kruke 2012).

\textsuperscript{16} The theory is that an «all-hazards» approach can provide a basic framework for responding to a wide variety disasters, both man-made (like terrorism) and natural (like earthquakes or fires). The approach is frequently criticized for being oriented towards «known» crises, claiming that planners within such broad frameworks tend to address the kinds of disasters that they expect to occur or crises that are more politically salient at the given point in time (see for instance Perrow 2007, pp. 127).
of the Second World War. The concept was originally oriented towards the threat of war (Serigstad 2003). The end of the Cold War in the late 1980’s created a new situation, and the imminent threat of war seemed more remote. This resulted in a broader understanding of the concept, and «Total Defence» came to mean mutual support and cooperation between the military services, the civil defence and the authorities responsible for civil protection in peacetime (Lango, Lægreid and Rykkja 2011).

General structure

At the central level, the Cabinet makes decisions on overall policy, main goals and frameworks, also covering general policies for societal security and crisis management. The Office of the Prime Minister (PMO) assists the Prime Minister in leading and coordinating the work within the Government, and has in recent years taken a more marked responsibility for societal security. This includes, from 2013, a politically appointed State Secretary with special responsibility for security coordination.

The Government Security Council consists of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Minister of Defence, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Finance, and has since the end of World War II been the superior body for discussions concerning national security. This includes according to one definition: «all systematic and targeted measures to secure information, personnel, material and activities pertaining to the security of the realm or allies, or other vital national security interests concerning espionage, sabotage and terrorist acts» (Ot. prp. 49 (1996–1007), chapter 5). In later years, this has also included discussions concerning societal security and crisis management more generally.

In a crisis situation of national proportions within the civil area, a Crisis Council is called to deal with vital decisions and ensure strategic coordination at the central level – in particular between those ministries that are affected by a given crisis. The Crisis Council has five permanent members: the Secretary to the Government (with the PMO), the Secretary Generals of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It may also be broadened if the situation calls for it.

Due to the liability principle, different ministries take the lead in different types of crises pertaining to their area of responsibility. The Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJPS) has the main responsibility for security in the civil sector, including rescue and emergency preparedness. This entails an overall coordinating responsibility within the policy field. The MJPS is to act as a driving force for societal
security in the civil sector. It is also the designated permanent lead ministry in national crises within the civil area, unless the Crisis Council decides otherwise. In addition to its tasks within the area of societal security, the ministry is responsible for general civil affairs (concerning the rights of individual citizens), the Correctional Services, immigration, and the Police.

The MJPS is responsible for coordination and supervision within the area of civil security mainly through the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, the National Security Authority\(^\text{17}\) and the Joint Rescue Coordination Centres (more on these bodies below). It is also responsible for the Police, mainly through the Directorate of the Police.

Within the MJPS, three designated departments have responsibility for societal security. The Department of Civil Protection Prevention and Analysis is responsible for the central coordination of preparedness and public security. This includes the management of the Directorate for Emergency Management and the National Security Authority. The Department of Crisis Management, Preparedness and Security includes an Emergency and Rescue section, an Emergency Support Unit and a Security Section. The department is responsible for central crisis management, rescue and emergency work. It includes the *Emergency Support Unit*, which acts as Permanent Secretariat for the Crisis Council. The Emergency Support Unit provides administrative support to the lead ministry in a crisis, and includes a civilian situation center with administrative facilities that operate 24/7. The MJPS also includes a Police Department. The Police Department constitutes the central authority for the police together with the Directorate of the Police.

*The Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning* is responsible for national, regional and local preparedness and emergency planning. It is also responsible for fire and electrical safety, safety in the handling and transport of hazardous substances, product and consumer safety and manages the Civil Defence. As an agency under the MJPS it supports the Ministry in its coordinating role. This includes developing and maintaining national emergency preparedness and response plans, as well as providing advice and report to the Ministry and the Government regarding national crisis management. The Directorate carries out supervision of all ministries, and also County Governors and municipalities. It is also responsible for carrying out research and providing studies and documentation related to development of national vulnerability and threat scenarios as a basis for planning emergency preparedness, response and priorities. Finally, the Directorate

\(^{17}\) The National Security Authority is organized as an agency under the Ministry of Defence, but reports to the MJPS in civil matters.
plans and conducts exercises in crisis management and crisis communication for strategic management on the national, regional and local levels.

*The Directorate for the Police* is responsible for the professional direction, steering, supervision and development of the 27 Police districts and six so-called Special Bodies\(^\text{18}\), including about 11000 employees within the Police (in 2001).

*The Police Security Service’s* main task is to prevent and investigate threats to national security, most relevant is terrorism and terrorist threats. The service collects and analyses information and implements countermeasures. The service is organized as a special police service parallel to the regular police. Key methods include gathering information on individuals and groups that may pose a threat, preparing various analyses and threat assessments, investigating relevant matters, and other operative countermeasures, as well as offering general advice. The Service also produces an annual Threat Assessment made public.

*The Directorate for Emergency Communication* was established in 2007. It has the responsibility for the operation and development of «Nødnett», a nationwide emergency communications/digital radio network for the emergency and public safety services. Nødnett is due to be completed and fully implemented in 2015.

The different sector ministries have responsibility for societal security within their specific policy area:

*The Ministry of Agriculture and Food* is generally responsible for the food and agricultural policy. Three agencies operate within the policy area: The Food Safety Authority, responsible for food safety; The Agriculture Agency, responsible for food supplies; and The National Veterinary Institute, responsible for animal welfare also relating to food safety. A Scientific Committee for Food Safety carries out independent risk assessments for the Food Safety Authority as well as for the Environment Agency (under the Ministry of Climate and Environment).

*The Ministry of Climate and Environment* is generally responsible for the environmental policies of the Norwegian Government. The Ministry also manages the Environment Agency, responsible for nature management, pollution control and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The agency is responsible for sewage system management together with the municipalities. The Norwegian Polar Institute is the central governmental institution for research, mapping and environmental

\(^{18}\) The Special Services include: Kripos (National Competence Centre for the Police, about 500 employees in 2015), Økokrim (National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime, about 141 employees in 2013), International Police Immigration Service, The Traffic Police, The Commissioner for the Norwegian-Russian border, The Police University College.
monitoring in the Arctic and the Antarctic. Also, the Directorate for Cultural Heritage is placed under the Ministry of Climate. This directorate is responsible for the management of cultural (archaeological and architectural) monuments, sites and environments (the protection of cultural monuments is also the responsibility of the National Archives of Norway, an agency under the Ministry of Culture).

The Ministry of Defence is responsible for the formation and implementation of Norwegian security and defence policy, including general guidelines and development of the national defence. It manages the National Security Authority. The agency is in a special situation whereas it is organized as an agency under the Ministry of Defence, while it also reports to the Ministry of Justice in civil matters. The National Security Authority is responsible for information security and «object» protection (protecting certain buildings, persons, and infrastructure), alerts and coordination for ICT and cyber security. It is responsible for countering security threats vital to national interests, primarily espionage, sabotage and acts of terrorism. The Ministry of defence is also responsible for the Norwegian Intelligence Service, a unit within the Norwegian Armed Forces. The Intelligence Service surveys other countries that may represent a threat to the country.

The Ministry of Education and Research is responsible for primary, secondary and higher education, and research. Within the specific area of societal security it manages the Meteorological Institute, a public enterprise with the responsibility for meteorological services for the military and the civil services, as well as the public. This includes services for the Civil Aviation Authorities, meteorological and climatological observations, and research and development. It provides specialized weather forecasts for the marine and offshore industry as well as for the armed forces.

The Ministry of Finance plays a minor role in traditional civil protection, but is generally responsible for financial stability. In this respect the Central Bank of Norway and the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway have important functions. Both are organized under the Ministry of Finance. Also, the Customs and Excise Authorities might be considered to have a role in civil protection whereas they are responsible for customs control.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs works to secure and promote Norway's interests internationally. This includes «promoting peace and security, an international legal system, an economically just world order and sustainable development» (MFA 2015). The Ministry is responsible for giving help, advice and protection to Norwegian citizen's vis-à-vis foreign authorities, as well as assisting Norwegian citizens abroad in the case of criminal proceedings, accidents, illness and death. The
Ministry has a central role in central crisis management and national security in the civil sector. It includes 101 foreign service missions (embassies, delegations and consulates).

The Ministry of Health and Care Services is responsible for providing health and care services throughout the country. It manages six agencies with particular responsibilities within the area of societal security. The Directorate for Health works to promote public health and excellence in health care. This includes monitoring public health trends and developments within the health and care services. The Board of Health Supervision provides supervision of child welfare, health and social services. The Institute for Public Health is responsible for disease prevention. It acts as a national competence institution for governmental authorities, the health service, the judiciary, prosecuting authorities, politicians, the media and the general public on issues related to forensic science, physical and mental health, prevention of communicable diseases and prevention of harmful environmental influences. The Radiation Protection Authority is generally responsible for radiation protection and nuclear safety. This includes the protection of the water supply, life and health, and nature and environment. It is also responsible for central crisis management in the case of a radiation crisis. The Medicines Agency is responsible for supervising the production, trials and marketing of medicines. It approves medicines and monitors their uses and supervises the supply-chain. The Norwegian Health Network is specific telecommunications network set up to support patient trajectories and provide secure electronic exchange of patient information between all relevant parties within the health and social services sector. It is organized as a state enterprise under the Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Health is also responsible for four state-owned Regional Health Authorities responsible for the operation of hospitals and thus with important functions in a crisis situation.

The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs manages the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) and the Petroleum Safety Authority. The former has an important function providing social benefits, unemployment benefits and pensions, thus contributing to the «life and health» aspect of societal security. The latter is responsible for safety, emergency preparedness and the working environment in the Norwegian petroleum industry.

The Ministry of Local Government and Modernization is responsible for housing policy, the Planning and Building Act, local government finances and local administration, ICT policy and public sector reform, rural and regional policy, the conduct of elections, government employer policy, Sami and minority affairs and national mapping and geodata policy. Of special relevance to societal security is the Mapping Authority, the Directorate of Public Construction and Property, the
Government Security and Service Organization and the Data Protection Authority. The Mapping Authority is responsible for geographical information, maps and charts as well as correction services (positioning). The Directorate of Public Construction is the government’s key advisor in construction and property affairs, building commissioner, property manager and property developer, and is responsible for protecting cultural monuments. The Government Security and Service Organization is responsible for shared services across the ministries, including security (physical security, ICT security and guarding). The Data Protection Authority facilitates protection of individuals from violation of their right to privacy through processing of their personal data. This includes keeping a public record of all personal data processing that is reported, dealing with and informing about licenses, verifying compliance with regulations that apply to the processing of personal data, identifying risks and providing advice to avoid risk in this area.

_The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy_ is responsible for coordinating the energy policy of Norway. It manages the Water Resources and Energy Directorate, which is responsible for water supply and emergency preparedness for floods and river accidents. The directorate issues flood warnings and give advice to local municipalities, the police and rescue services, dam owners and regional authorities in a flood situation. It plays a central role in the national flood contingency planning and bears overall responsibility for maintaining national power supplies. In 2009 the Directorate was assigned greater responsibility for the prevention of damage caused by landslides. It is responsible for research and development in its fields and is also the national center of expertise for hydrology in Norway. The directorate manages the Power Suppliers Emergency Organization, a joint organization comprising the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate and all power supplier companies in Norway. The organization is responsible for preparedness and crisis management in the power supply area.

_The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries_ covers the industrial and seafood policy of the country. It administers policy for business activities, other industrial and seafood policy instruments and policy for the shipping industry. The Norwegian Space Centre is responsible for satellite communication and navigation. The Maritime Authority is responsible for maritime safety and surveys Norwegian and foreign vessels for that purpose. It also normally carries out inspections after an accident (at sea). The Directorate of Fisheries is responsible for food supply and production in the seafood area. This includes the management and control of marine resources and aquaculture. The National Institute of Nutrition and Seafood Research serves in an advisory capacity to the fisheries authorities, the Norwegian
Food Safety Authority and the fishing industry on issues concerning nutrition and food safety.

*The Ministry of Transport and Communication* has an extensive responsibility for societal security. It has the overall responsibility for postal and telecommunications activities, the civil aviation, public roads and rail transport sector, ferry services, coastal management, the marine environment and port and sea transport policy. Five different agencies, one administrative body, one permanent inquiry committee and two state-owned companies have relevant functions. The National Coastal Administration is responsible for ensuring safe and efficient navigation in the fairways along the coast and into ports, as well as national preparedness for acute pollution. It is also responsible for satellite based communication and navigation, and cultural monuments and symbols along the coast. The Public Roads Administration plans, builds, operates and maintains national and county roads throughout the country, and is responsible for carrying out tests and inspections of vehicles and road users. The Civil Aviation Authority is responsible for civil aviation safety and security. This includes the inspection of all actors within Norwegian aviation – airlines, airplanes, airplane garages, airports, pilots and pilot educations.

Overall, societal security involves a range of different government authorities at central level. Responsibility for different areas is divided among these authorities, although not without overlap. Table 1 replicates a table presented in the Norwegian state budget proposal for 2015, which tries to give an overview of the distribution of responsibility between the many authorities involved.
Table 1. Distribution of responsibility for different areas within societal security in Norway.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Responsible ministry</th>
<th>Executive organization/administrative level with essential responsibility</th>
<th>Other responsible ministries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electronic communication network and services</td>
<td>Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC)</td>
<td>Norwegian Communications Authority, Directorate for Emergency Communication, The Armed Forces</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice (MIPS), Ministry of Defence (MD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT security in the civil sector</td>
<td>MJPS</td>
<td>National Security Authority, Norwegian Centre for Information Security, Directorate for Civil Protection</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satellite based communication and navigation</td>
<td>MTC</td>
<td>Norwegian Space Centre, National Coastal Administration, Norwegian Communications Authority, Norwegian Mapping Authority</td>
<td>MJPS, Ministry of Trade, Fisheries and Industry (MTFI), Ministry for Local Authorities and Modernization (MLAM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water supply</td>
<td>Ministry for Health and Care Services (MHC)</td>
<td>Waterworks owners (public and private), municipalities, Norwegian Food Safety Authority, Directorate for Health, Norwegian Board of Health Supervision, Norwegian Institute for Public Health, Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, County Governors</td>
<td>Ministry of Climate and Environment (MCE), Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and gas</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MLS)</td>
<td>Petroleum Safety Authority Norway, The oil and gas industry</td>
<td>MPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel supply</td>
<td>MPE</td>
<td>The fuel industry</td>
<td>MTC, MTFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>MTC</td>
<td>Norwegian Public Roads Administration, County Councils, municipalities, Civil Aviation Authority, Norwegian Railway Authority, Norwegian National Rail Administration, NSB AS, Avinor AS, Norwegian Maritime Authority, Norwegian Shipowner’s Association, Norwegian National Coastal Administration</td>
<td>MTFI, MPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewage system management</td>
<td>MCE</td>
<td>Norwegian Environment Agency, municipalities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Responsible ministry</td>
<td>Executive organization/administrative level with essential responsibility</td>
<td>Other responsible ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meteorological services</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Research (MER)</td>
<td>Norwegian Meteorological Institute</td>
<td>MTFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial stability</td>
<td>MF</td>
<td>The Central Bank of Norway, The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food supply</td>
<td>MTFI</td>
<td>Norwegian Agriculture Agency, Directorate of Fisheries, the food industry</td>
<td>MAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural monuments and symbols</td>
<td>MCE</td>
<td>Directorate for Cultural Heritage, The National Archives of Norway, county councils, municipalities, Norwegian National Coastal Administration, Directorate of Public Construction and Property</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture (MC), MTC, MLAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life and health</td>
<td>MHC</td>
<td>Board of Health Supervision, Directorate for Health, Directorate for Labour and Welfare, Directorate for Civil Protection, The Civil Defense, Food Safety Authority, National Institute of Nutrition and Seafood Research, National Veterinary Institute, Norwegian Institute for Public Health, Norwegian Radiation Authority, Norwegian Scientific Committee for Food Safety, Norwegian Medicines Agency, Regional Health Authorities, Norwegian Health Network, municipalities, County Governors, The Armed Forces</td>
<td>MLS, MAF, MTFI, MJPS, MD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 illustrates that societal security is a complex and tangled policy and administrative field. In the case of a natural crisis, for example a flood, at least seven different ministries are involved and responsible for different aspects of crisis management. Regulation, planning and implementation tasks are delegated to subordinate bodies that also have different areas of responsibility that may overlap. In some cases, there will also be uncertainty about who is responsible for what. The different bodies also have their own structure of regional and local divisions, creating even more complexity.

Because of the fragmented structure, some intermediate and crosscutting network arrangements have been set up. The Crisis Council (mentioned above) has important crosscutting function during a crisis. In more settled situations, other structures have designated functions. A Royal Decree from 2012 (Kgl. res. 15. June 2012) mentions several meeting points to ensure cross-ministerial coordination. The Ministries’ Coordinative Council for Societal Security was set up in 2007, intended as a forum for exchange of information and experience between the different ministries responsible for societal security and crisis management. The council replaced earlier arrangements (The Council for Civil Preparedness and the Rescue Services Council), bringing together representatives from all respective ministries and from the Prime Minister’s Office, to discuss coordination, planning, exercises and supervision/auditing issues. The Central Total Defence Forum gathers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Responsible ministry</th>
<th>Executive organization/administrative level with essential responsibility</th>
<th>Other responsible ministries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>MD</td>
<td>The Armed Forces, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, National Security Authority, Norwegian Defence Estates Agency</td>
<td>MJPS, MTC, MPE, NFD, MHC, UD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National security in the civil sector</td>
<td>MJPS</td>
<td>Police Directorate, Police Security Service, National Security Authority, Norwegian Mapping Authority, Directorate for Civil Protection, The Armed Forces, County Councils</td>
<td>MFA, MHC, MLAM, PMO, MD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature and environment</td>
<td>MCE</td>
<td>Directorate of Fisheries, National Coastal Administration, Environment Agency, Norwegian Polar Institute, Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, The Armed Forces, The National Institute of Nutrition and Seafood Research, Institute of Marine Research, Norwegian Food Safety Authority, Veterinary Institute, County Governors, municipalities</td>
<td>MTFI, MTC, MER, MD, MHC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

representatives from agencies working within the framework of the Total Defence Concept, i.e. the Directorate for the Police, the Police Security Service, the National Security Authority, the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, the Petroleum Safety Authority, the Directorate for Health, The Radiation Protection Authority, and representatives from different units within the Armed Forces. The Royal Decree further mentions a «Contact Group» set up to coordinate information and actions in crisis situations, regular seminars and conferences focusing on preparedness, and a special unit for societal security led by the Ministry of Justice working to secure coordination within the area of the EU and European Economic Area (EEA) work on societal security. Whether these councils and other arrangements work efficiently or as intended is a question for further research. For instance, a report from the Health Directorate in 2014 revealed that the Coordinative Council for Societal Security had not met since 2012 (Helsetilsynet 2014). The Health directorate therefore recommended a revitalization of the council – alternatively the setting up of other arrangements to foster more and better coordination.

Development after 2001

The Vulnerability Commission

In 1999, the Ministry of Justice appointed a public commission to report on the vulnerability and preparedness of the Norwegian society, with an aim to strengthen societal security. The Vulnerability Commission was led by a former distinguished politician and Prime Minister, Kåre Willoch, and presented a broad range of proposals in 2004 (Serigstad, 2003; Lægreid & Serigstad, 2006; NOU 2000: 24). One of the central conclusions was that the policy area was highly fragmented, lacked superior organizing principles, and was to a large extent organized in an ad hoc manner, developed in response to previous crises or accidents (Høydal 2007). Allegedly, this resulted in ambiguity and serious concerns about accountability. The report argued that the Ministry of Justice did not execute its superior and coordinative functions within the area very well. Civil protection and crisis management was mainly executed by a small unit within the Ministry that had limited resources and was not adequately prioritized. In addition, the Ministry’s coordinative responsibilities were vaguely defined and therefore largely ignored by other relevant ministries and departments.

The Commission report was followed by a public hearing and a government White Paper on Societal Security in 2001 (St. meld. nr. 17 (2001–2002)). The hearing process was intercepted by the terrorist attacks in New York on September 11, but
although it made the topic more critical it apparently did not have any major impact in practice (Serigstad 2003). The Vulnerability Commission proposed to establish a new Ministry for Internal Security and Safety, but this was not followed up on. The White Paper proposed a further strengthening of existing structures through a reorganization of several existing agencies and the establishment of two (partly) new agencies; the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, and the National Security Authority. The existing principles of liability, decentralization and conformity were maintained. Consequently, the proposals confirmed existing principles and doctrines of public organization and management within the field rather than introduce major changes (Fimreite, Lango, Lægreid and Rykkja 2014).

The Tsunami Disaster

The Indian Ocean earthquake and the following tsunami on Boxing Day in South-East Asia in 2004 had significant impact on arrangements for societal security and crisis management in Norway, even though it hit abroad. At the time, about 4000 Norwegian citizens were in the area – most of them on vacation. 84 Norwegian citizens were killed. Following from the established principle of liability, the situation was handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the Ministry was not very well prepared for a situation like this, and was quickly criticized for their efforts to coordinate activities and responses, both within the Ministry itself and across other involved ministries (Brygård, 2006; Jaffery & Lango, 2014).

After the tsunami, the Government presented a White Paper on Central Crisis Management, referring directly to the tsunami disaster (St. meld. no. 37 (2004–2005)). The White Paper again raised issues concerning accountability and who were responsible for what. It proposed several measures to improve coordination and crisis management at central governmental level. It emphasized the importance of establishing a «lead agency» in a crisis situation, placing responsibility with the Ministry mostly affected by the crisis. The White Paper also proposed the establishment of a Crisis Council, and a strengthening of the administrative support through the setting up of a Crisis Support Group. Both were established in 2006 as ad hoc organizations, to be called for in the case of a severe crisis.

Developing the coordinative role of the Ministry of Justice

A few months before the tsunami disaster hit, the Norwegian government set up a public commission to report on security concerning «critical infrastructure», also following up some of the suggestions from the Vulnerability Commission. In the resulting report (NOU 2006: 6) four issues were central: The extent of public ownership to secure critical infrastructure, the coordinative role of the Ministry of
Justice, the responsibilities of local authorities, and a proposal for a new, overarching and sector-crossing Preparedness Act. The commission presented several proposals with the intention of strengthening the Ministry of Justice’s coordinative role, and argued for a stronger coordination of relevant agencies under the Ministry.

The Auditor General of Norway further examined the coordinating role of the Ministry of Justice in 2007/2008, following up on some of the issues raised in the preceding official reports and white papers (Riksrevisjonen 2008). The main questions of the Auditor’s report concerned 1) the systematic identification of vulnerability at national level, 2) preparedness planning, 3) supervision and audit of responsible authorities, 4) clarity concerning roles and responsibilities, 5) demands and criteria for obtaining results, and 6) information and communication pertaining to coordination. The audit exposed shortcomings on all six concerns.

The Infrastructure Commission and the Auditor General’s report were followed by a government white paper focusing explicitly on the Ministry of Justice’s coordinative responsibilities for societal security and crisis management (St. meld. 22 (2007–2008). This included the establishment of a new network arrangement: The Ministries’ Coordinative Council for Societal Security (mentioned above).

22 July 2011

On 22 July 2011, Norway was struck by a terrorist attack of unprecedented magnitude. A bomb was detonated in the Central Government complex and destroyed several buildings. Later that day, the same person who had detonated the bomb attacked a political youth camp on the island of Utøya organized by the Labour party. In total, 77 people died. Most of them were shot by the perpetrator. Many were seriously injured. The attacks were a terrible shock to the Norwegian society and to most of its citizens, perhaps especially so because most of the victims were under the age of 18. The attacks also struck at the very core of the country’s democratic institutions, putting the Government and Cabinet under particular pressure (Christensen, Lægreid and Rykkja 2013).

The terrorist attacks exposed serious shortfalls in the government’s emergency preparedness and ability to handle such a crisis. Barely a month later, the Government in consultation with the Storting (parliament) appointed a Commission to examine the ability of the authorities and society as a whole to:

- disclose plans of attacks and prevent attacks
• protect themselves against and reduce the consequences of any future attacks, and

• deal with the situation during and after such events, including taking care of the injured and relatives of those killed or injured. The Commission was also requested to take into consideration the fact that so many of those affected on 22 July were young people.

The Commission was to propose measures for improving preparedness and response in the future. It was also free to consider other factors and measures it deemed necessary.

The Commission report was published a year after the attacks (NOU 2012:14). It pointed to serious shortfalls in the government’s emergency preparedness and ability to handle the attacks. The Commission attributed this to a lack of risk awareness, an inability to learn from previous experiences, and lacking implementation capacity, especially related to crisis planning. Lacking leadership, culture and attitudes were highlighted as more important than a lack of resources or organizational structures. The report exposed a fragmented policy area, accountability pulverization, structural fragmentation, and weak coordination – both strategically and operative (Christensen, Lægreid and Rykkja 2015). It also pointed to a lacking lead role for the Ministry of Justice. The Commission presented six key findings, as well as recommendations on a number of action points. However, the recommendations did not include major changes to the existing organizational structure (NOU 2012:14, p. 257).

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, several reports, evaluations, hearings and programs – in addition to the Commission report – were issued to examine existing arrangements and to improve preparedness as well as overall ability to handle similar crises. Internal evaluations were carried out by the Police Directorate (POD), the PST, DSB, the fire and rescue services, civil defense, the Health Directorate, the crisis council, the Crisis Support Unit, the Rescues Coordination Centre, the National Security Authority, the directorate for emergency communications and the municipalities of Hole and Oslo (Meld. St. 29 (2011–2012), p. 11–17.

An internal report on the MJPS’s responsibility recommended a strengthening of its coordinative role and crisis management functions (MJPS 2012). This was to be done through internal restructuring, the formal establishment of the Ministry’s role as a permanent lead ministry, a strengthening of the Emergency Support Unit, and a tightening up of supervision and control of emergency preparedness and crisis management within central government. Signalling a renewed focus on
preparedness, the MJPS was renamed the Ministry of Justice and Public Security. The top two civil servants in the Ministry were replaced, and a new Department for Crisis Management and Security was created within the Ministry. Rearrangements within central crisis management structures followed. The Support Unit was made permanent and operative 24 hrs, and given more personnel and resources. It was also made responsible for a new Civil Situation Centre (CSC) with designated office facilities and technical equipment; set up to monitor incidents, crises and exercises within the civil sector. From 2013 it was placed within the new Department of Crisis Management and Security.

A parliament committee was established to look into statements made by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Defence concerning the terrorist attacks in November 2011. The 22 July Committee identified eight topics where they gave recommendations: prevention of violent radicalization and extremism, care for and follow-up of victims and relatives, interaction between the police and the armed forces, communication within and between the emergency services, protection of particular vulnerable objects, the Police Security Service, Police response time and helicopter preparedness (Innst. 207 S (2011–2012)).

Shortly before the report from the Commission was ready, the government presented a white paper on societal security (St. meld. 29, 2011–2012). The paper did not suggest any fundamental changes, but proposed initiatives to strengthen the Ministry’s role as a coordinator and driving force within the area. One measure was the introduction of a general principle of cooperation. The principle has been a core strategy for involving private and civil sector organizations in emergency preparedness and crisis management for a long time, and was now introduced to enhance transboundary coordination within central government. The white paper emphasized that this would not change existing responsibility relations, however.

A committee to prepare for a police reform was established in 2012 and delivered their report in 2013 (NOU 2013:9). A reform suggesting a restructuring of police districts and adjustments to the police’s responsibilities was proposed in 2015 (Prop. 61 LS 2014–2015).

The Commission report was followed up by the Government in a revised budget proposal in order to strengthen societal security in general and police preparedness in particular (Prop. 77 S (2012–2013). The proposal resulted in more resources and personnel within the police services, the Police University College, the Directorate for Civil Protection, the Rescue Services, and the Directorate for Emergency Communication. The Commission report was also followed up with a new white
A new coordination resolution was launched in 2012 to clarify the Ministry’s role. It recognized the MJPS’s lead role in civil national crises and urged a strengthening of its supervision of other Ministries’ responsibilities, introduction of more management-by-objectives-and-results, and a stronger training and exercise regime. The resolution established that the MJPS should take the lead in all national crises unless decided otherwise and emphasised the importance of an enhanced focus on auditing. Nevertheless, these changes were not to change the fundamental principles of ministerial responsibility (Kgl. res. 15. June 2012).

A new white paper was presented in 2013 (St. meld. 21 (2012–2013)). It emphasized the importance of changing the leadership philosophy, culture and attitudes. In terms of organization, the white paper encouraged minor shifts rather than major changes. The MJPSs coordinating and encouraging role, its supervision of subordinate units and its crisis management capacity was to be strengthened, but largely within the existing organizational structure. The issue of coordination was addressed in more general terms, and the dilemma concerning the principle of responsibility and the ministerial rule was not discussed. The white paper underscored that the main responsibility for implementing coordination was with each individual ministry, department or unit. This implied «having an active and aware relation to mutual dependencies and which actors one should cooperate with» (St. meld. 21 (2012–2013): 120).

A new (revised) action plan against extremism and radicalization was published in 2014 (MJPS 2014). The plan presented 30 different measures intended to better knowledge and competence, cooperation and coordination, prevent the growth of extreme groups and motivate reintegation, prevent radicalization and internet recruitment, and promote international cooperation. The plan was signed by the Prime Minister together with ministers from nine different ministries.

The most important developments in Norwegian policy for societal security since the Cold War have been a gradual strengthening of the Minister of Justice’s overall coordination responsibilities and the establishment of new agencies and more ad hoc organizational arrangements (Lango et al. 2011). Included are a Government Emergency Management Council and a Government Emergency Support Unit within the MJPS. Lango et al. (2013) emphasize that the principle of ministerial superiority over the years has set distinct limitations on how legislative and organizational proposals are formed, followed up and implemented. This has resulted in a
somewhat cautious adaptation to a new situation (Christensen, Lægreid and Rykkja 2015).

The development reveals important coordination issues. The relationship between the military defence and the civil sector has been strained, characterized by a lack of communication and turf wars (Lægreid and Serigstad 2006). There has been a shift of attention away from military defence towards the civil sector and internal security and safety. (NOU 2006: 6, Fimreite et al. 2014). Coordinating agencies subordinate to the MJPS, such as the Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning and the National Security Authority, have been developed and strengthened and a «light version» of a lead ministry approach was introduced. The MJPS’s coordinative role, both vertically and horizontally, has been a constant challenge.

Experiences with certain crises have revealed that the authorities are not always well prepared. The principle of liability creates important tensions between organizational units, sectors and administrative levels. The Tsunami disaster in South East Asia in 2004 for example revealed serious coordination problems within and between the responsible ministries and prompted central administration reorganization (Jaffery and Lango 2014). Still, it did not result in completely new arrangements, but rather in incremental adjustments to the existing structure.

The organizational changes have been cautious and incremental, in spite of the serious external shock, following a typical pattern. We have observed a reluctant and gradual upgrading of the MJPS as an overarching coordinating and leading ministry (Christensen, Lægreid and Rykkja 2015). The relationship between the MJPS and other stakeholders seems largely to be characterized by «negative coordination», limited to oversight over areas where other line ministries have no specific responsibility. Follow-up and initiative have been neglected, and the Ministry seems equipped with weak steering instruments and ineffective instruction tools, making it difficult to overrule the line ministries. Main challenges concern matching place-based problems with functionally organized services, balancing the internal security mission with existing missions that remain important, and to meet citizens’ expectations in a fragmented system. Thus far, coordination by hierarchy has taken priority, although it is increasingly supplemented by coordination through network arrangements.

Conclusion

There is a consensus in the diagnosis of the problems within the policy area of emergency preparedness and crisis management in Norway, identified by the 22
July Commission and other evaluations after the terrorist attacks in 2011. The problems are broadly identified as fragmentation, challenges concerning accountability and overall weak coordination (Christensen, Lægreid and Rykkja 2015). The proposed solutions to these problems are ambiguous and contested. Changes have been cautious and incremental, also after 2011. Since 2001, and more particularly after 2011, there has been a gradual upgrading of the MJPS as an overarching coordinating and lead ministry, and a number of important adjustments in the central arrangements for societal security and crisis management concerning planning, preparedness, organization and regulation have been introduced. The fundamental principles of ministerial and constitutional responsibility – and the principle of responsibility – stand firm. A main conclusion is that organizing for emergency preparedness and crisis management is influenced by major crises, but to a great extent path-dependent. The solution has thus far been sought in efforts to combine coordination through hierarchy with coordination through network arrangements, collegial bodies and councils and the principle of collaboration. The principle of responsibility, contributing to the rather fragmented structure, still dominates.
Introduction

Sweden is roughly the same size as California (Figure 1), but at 9.7 million has only about 70 percent of the population of metropolitan Los Angeles. It is the third biggest country in the European Union (EU) by size, but only number 14 of 28 by population. This relationship between space and population has meant relatively abundant natural resources, which in combination with prolonged peace and an advanced social welfare system have resulted in Sweden being consistently ranked among the most developed countries in the world in terms of human development indicators (e.g. life expectancy, child mortality, adult literacy, etc). It has low income inequality and is considered one of the most gender equal countries in the world. Crime rates are very low, with for instance only 15 percent of the homicide rate of USA [UNODC, 2013] and 8 percent of the number of people in prison per 100,000 inhabitants [ICPS, 2014], and it is relatively spared by large-scale disasters.

The risk of the deadly disasters of our past have been significantly reduced and Sweden’s current risk landscape is characterized by the hazards and vulnerabilities induced or exacerbated by modernity itself. Even if concentrating only on the risk of the more significant events that are relevant for the crisis management system, the risk landscape is still rather multifaceted. Sweden is an industrialized country with nuclear power plants, transportation infrastructures, chemical industries, hazardous material transports, and most other technological hazards you can imagine. It is also a country in a traditionally precarious geopolitical situation, which has been significantly improved since the end of the Cold War but is generally believed to have entered a period of renewed instability with the conflicts in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) [e.g. Perry and Abizaid, 2014]. Similar to many other western countries that are experiencing increasing asymmetrical threats [Kegley, 2003], Sweden witnessed its first suicide bombing in December 2010, which luckily only resulted in the death of the perpetrator himself and two injured bystanders. The event did not become the pivotal point for security governance that Norway experienced on 22 July, 2011.
In this report, we first briefly introduce the risk landscape that the crisis management system functions in – the most relevant hazards and the overall vulnerabilities of society. Then we present how crisis is defined and declared in Sweden, what central principles that guide crisis management and how the responsibility for crisis management is distributed and coordinated. We then end the report by providing some concluding remarks.

**General features of the crisis management system**

The Swedish crisis management system is based on the notion that all crises are foremost local. They may strike several areas simultaneously or escalate and spread over geographical and administrative borders, but their impact is primarily experienced by individuals, households and communities. The Swedish Parliament has therefore provided the municipalities and county councils (regional municipalities focusing primarily on healthcare) with considerable power over crisis management in their jurisdictions. Power that is embodied in the crisis management committee (krisledningsnämnd) that each municipality and county council must have to facilitate the implementation of necessary activities during crises.

The national level has very few operative functions, but is rather responsible for monitoring and testing preparedness with local and regional actors. In some areas, the influence is more direct, such as counter-terrorism, cyber defense and consular crisis management. The coordinating agency is the The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) that reports to the Ministry of Justice, which also houses a secretariat for crisis management coordination with an internal mandate to the government offices. The Swedish Police became one national agency on 1 January, 2015, partly in order to be more functional in large scale events and to be a more effective collaborative partner on the national level.

The Swedish legislation (2006:544, 1 Ch 4§) defines a crisis, or what it calls an «extraordinary event», as an event that deviates from the norm, presents a serious disturbance or imminent risk of a serious disruption in important societal functions, and requires urgent action by a municipality or county council. It is important to note that this definition is not including any quantitative requirements, but leaves it to the municipality or county council to decide if an event should be considered extraordinary or not. More precisely, it is up to the chairman of the crisis management committee to decide to call the committee together, which in turn
confers considerable powers to the committee. If the chairman for some reason is unavailable to do so, the deputy chairman has that delegated authority.

Three central principles for crisis management in Sweden

The system for crisis management in Sweden is guided by three central principles that constitute the foundation for legislation and are clearly visible in the structure and function of the system: (1) the responsibility principle; (2) the parity principle; and (3) the proximity principle.

Responsibility principle

The principle of responsibility states that the actor responsible for a certain activity under normal conditions is also responsible for that activity during a crisis. For example, the Transport Administration continues to the furthest possible extent to be responsible for the functioning of a bridge in the national road network, regardless of crisis. The Swedish solution that has produced this principle is based in a widely held belief that a modern network administration cannot be shifted into a command and control mode at the advent of a crisis. Furthermore, the assignment of a lead organization with far-reaching mandates to coordinate and direct the response of other entities has been rejected in most societal sectors for the same reason. The natural consequence is to inject authority and mandates in crisis, proportional to the division of labor that exists in routine administrative processes. The model causes an inability to redistribute resources for emergency measures and time-consuming collaborative processes that more hierarchical systems can forego.

Parity principle

The principle of parity states that the localization and organization of activities should, as far as possible, be the same under normal conditions as during a crisis. For example, the internal organization of how the Transport Administration performs its tasks is to the furthest possible extent the same in crisis as in everyday circumstances.

Much along the same arguments as for the responsibility principle introduced above, the principle of parity facilitates the management of a crisis by limiting the difference in comparison with normality. It asserts that it is the same individuals that should address the challenges of the crisis, utilizing the knowledge, skills and
experiences they have accumulated in everyday circumstances over time. They should work with the same colleagues they normally work with, facilitating trustful relations that are so important for effective cooperation (Barbalet, 1996). Organizing the same way as in everyday circumstances also provides familiar lines of communication that facilitate the otherwise so challenging dissemination of information during crises. Finally, the principle of parity also asserts that the activities themselves should, to the furthest possible extent, be performed in the same location as during everyday circumstances. This means that people are more likely to know where to go, both professionals and the public. Being in the same location also facilitates for the individuals involved in managing the crisis to have access to infrastructure and equipment they are familiar with.

Proximity principle

The principle of proximity states that a crisis should primarily be handled where it occurs, by those who are closest to it. For example, a crisis that is affecting municipality A is managed to the furthest possible extent by the actors in that municipality. If a crisis escalates and affects several municipalities in a county, the crisis is managed to the furthest possible extent by the actors in that county, and so on. The proximity principle is one way to counteract the common tendency towards centralization of crisis management functions. Higher level societal bodies are deemed by local actors to have more resources and expertise to deal with serious problems and «the buck» is correspondingly habitually passed up the societal ladder and leaves national and federal levels overburdened by operative tasks as well as the more customary strategic and normative functions. However, the higher pace and wider reach of modern communications and infrastructural dependencies often causes the need for simultaneous response from multiple levels of the administration and this renders the proximity principle problematic, especially in large scale events or events with serious cascading effects.

A matrix of responsibility

The three principles introduced above provide the crisis management system in Sweden with the framework within which the responsibility for crisis management is distributed. The principles of responsibility and parity prescribe sectorial responsibilities to specific actors, while the proximity principle implies a need for coordinating across sectorial boundaries within the geographical area. The responsibility for crisis management can therefore be divided into two main categories – sector responsibility and area responsibility – that together form a matrix of responsibility for crisis management in Sweden (Figure 2).
Sector responsibility

As stated above, the sector responsibility for crisis management rests on the premise that actors are responsible for performing and maintaining their everyday functions also during crisis. Such responsibility thus applies at all times, in all situations and for all actors. However, it is interesting to note that the formal sector responsibility in the system for crisis management in Sweden is often limited in the current discourse to only include public authorities and enterprises. This common misconception may be based on the narrow span of membership organizations of the six coordination areas that are specified in the legislation (2006:942, 8§) and introduced below, but is also exacerbated by repeatedly restricting publicly available descriptions of the system to only give public actors as examples. Another common problem is the tendency for non-public actor to avoid responsibility for an emergency response system over which it has little ownership and few ways of influencing in the planning stage. We elaborate more on these problems in the discussion.

Sector responsibility can be exercised on different administrative levels. For example, the Fire and Rescue Services in Sweden function on the municipal level, although there are an increasing number of regional associations providing these services to a number of municipalities, while the Swedish Police was divided into 21 regional police forces coordinated by the National Police Board until 2015 (but is now reformed into one national authority with a new regional division that resembles no other existing regional division). However, the administrative level of a specific authority or organization is not necessarily restricting it to function solely on that level. For instance, the Swedish Social Insurance Agency (Försäkringskassan) is a national authority that functions to a large extent directly on a local level and the Swedish Transport Administration (Trafikverket) has organized a significant part of its activities into six regions that merge two to five counties into operational entities. In addition, many actors in the crisis management system are difficult to place on an administrative level in the first place. Examples of this are the many private electric power companies competing on the Swedish market, some of which are mainly local but with scattered customers in other municipalities, while others are more regional or even national but not following any formal administrative and geographical divisions. Regardless of level, and although they control their own infrastructure, they are competing with each other on a household-by-household basis, distributing the responsibility for the electric power supply of any given area in very complex ways.
One of the most central aspects of the system for crisis management in Sweden is risk and vulnerability analysis. The legislation prescribes all county councils (2006:544, 2 Ch 1§) and national authorities (2006:942, 9§) to analyze the risk of extraordinary events and how vulnerable each sector is to their impact. The related responsibilities of municipalities and county administrative boards are presented under the section on area responsibility below. These analyses should then inform planning of proactive risk reduction and reactive crisis management, as well as training and exercises of staff (2006:544; 2006:637; 2006:942). The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) is in two directives (MSBFS 2010:6; MSBFS 2010:7) and a guideline (MSB, 2011) further specifying what risk and vulnerability analysis should entail, particularly emphasizing focus on critical societal functions and the dependencies between them. It is important to note that the sector responsibility of the national authorities is double in the sense of both including their own internal functioning, as well as the functioning of the entire sector.

Area responsibility

The area responsibility for crisis management rests on the premise that society is a unified whole and that there are various dependencies between sectors. The system for crisis management is thus complementing the sector responsibility of various actors with the area responsibility of municipalities, county administrative boards and the government to facilitate coordination and collaboration within their respective jurisdiction.

In addition to the responsibility of a municipality to maintain the critical societal functions that the actual municipal administration is performing in everyday circumstances, it is also responsible for coordinating the overall crisis management within its geographical area. The municipality is thus responsible for analyzing risk, vulnerability and critical dependencies, as well as for coordinating risk reduction and preparedness planning, actual crisis management activities, and public information (Ibid.). However, studies of compulsory municipal risk and vulnerability analyses indicate that many municipalities mainly focus on their own organization and not much on the geographical area as a whole (Hassel, 2012; Hassel et al. 2012). Although the legislation is not mentioning market and civil society actors outside the paragraphs on confidentiality and information security, central guidelines explicitly point out the importance of municipalities also including these actors when exercising their area responsibility (e.g. MSB 2011).

County administrative boards are governmental authorities representing the national government in their respective counties and coordinating the counties’ development in line with national legislation and policies. Not to be confused with
the county councils, which are regional municipalities focusing primarily on healthcare. The county administrative boards share the same double responsibility as municipalities, being responsible for maintaining both their own functioning regardless of crises, as well as for coordinating the overall crisis management within their geographical area of responsibility. This includes again risk and vulnerability analyses, which to a greater extent focus on the geographical areas than the municipal analyses (Hassel et al. 2012). Such regional analyses are based, among other things, on the municipal risk and vulnerability analyses and is part of the foundation for the national risk and vulnerability analysis. However, aggregating the result of different analyses is rife with challenges of different kinds (see Cedergren and Tehler, 2014) and potentially undermining the geographical area focus of the regional analyses by simply relaying the common internal focus of the municipal risk and vulnerability analyses.

The ultimate area responsibility for the national level belongs to the Government but has in several respects and concerning the operative and coordination functions been permanently delegated to national agencies (or in some instances county councils). The government has over the last ten years increased its ability to exercise this responsibility, by creating functions in the ministries and the government offices as a whole to deal with strategic and normative issues at the national level. There is, however, many vertical gaps in responsibility that can lead to time lags and confusion as to responsibilities during large scale crisis that demands a wide coordination effort at the national level.

The National Level

The government upholds a readiness to convene at all times by assuring that five ministers are available in the Stockholm area. The Ministry of Justice entails a Secretariat for Crisis Management Coordination that conducts 24/7 monitoring and has organizational tools to activate relevant parts of the Government offices. The Minister of Interior is located at the Ministry of Justice and holds the portfolios on both civil crisis management (MSB) and the Police. Operative crisis management mandates at the national level are primarily delegated to the relevant national agencies, although the principle of proximity creates mechanisms that counteract centralization of operations. Correspondingly, most national agencies are poorly prepared to assume national responsibility for a national event – their mandates are usually more directed towards fostering planning, mitigation and preparedness.
Six coordination areas

To facilitate coordination, the Swedish crisis management legislation (2006:942, annex) stipulates six coordination areas and their memberships. These coordination areas represent important categories of critical societal functions for which coordination is necessary for crisis management. The six coordination areas are (1) Technical infrastructure, (2) Transportation, (3) Hazardous material, (4) Economic security, (5) Geographical area responsibility, and (6) Protection, assistance and care. Each of the coordination areas includes five to ten governmental authorities or enterprises, except the geographical area responsibility that includes one national authority and the 21 county administrative boards.

Technical infrastructure

The coordination area for technical infrastructure involves seven governmental authorities and public utilities, each of which responsible for vital parts of Sweden’s critical infrastructures and flows of vital resources.

1. **Swedish National Grid** (Svenska Kraftnät) is a state-owned public utility that is responsible for transmitting electricity from the major power stations to the regional electrical grids, for maintaining the balance between production and consumption of electricity, and for guiding the work of the regional and local authorities concerning dam safety.

2. **National Electrical Safety Board** (Elsäkerhetsverket) is the governmental authority responsible for electrical safety and for electromagnetic compatibility (EMC).

3. **Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency** (MSB) is the governmental authority responsible for issues concerning civil protection, public safety, emergency management and civil defense as long as no other authority has responsibility over measures taken before, during and after an emergency or crisis.

4. **National Food Agency** (Livsmedelsverket) is a governmental authority working towards healthy dietary habits for the population, safe foods and fair and environmentally friendly practices in the food trade.

5. **Swedish Post and Telecom Authority** (Post- och telestyrelsen) is a governmental authority responsible for overseeing the electronic
communications (telephone, the Internet and radio) and postal sectors in Sweden.

6. **Swedish Energy Agency** (Energimyndigheten) is a governmental authority working towards the use of renewable energy, improved technologies, a smarter end-use of energy, and mitigation of climate change. It is also responsible for balancing supply and use of energy and works for the secure supply of electricity and other energy for short- and long-term.

7. **Swedish Fortifications Agency** (Fortifikationsverket) is the governmental authority responsible for managing the defense estate, including airfields, naval bases, HQs, barracks and depots, as well as land including training and testing areas for the Swedish defense sector.

**Transportation**

The coordination area for transportation involves five governmental authorities and enterprises responsible for different means of transport – road, rail, sea and air – together with the governmental authority responsible for fuel security.

1. **Swedish Transport Administration** (Trafikverket) is the government authority responsible for the long-term planning of the transport system of Sweden, as well as for the national road- and railway networks.

2. **Swedish Maritime Administration** (Sjöfartsverket) is the governmental authority and enterprise within the transport sector responsible for maritime safety and availability.

3. **Swedish Energy Agency** (Energimyndigheten), see 6.1.

4. **Swedish Transport Agency** (Transportstyrelsen) is the governmental authority responsible for good accessibility, high quality, secure and environmentally aware rail, air, sea and road transport. It has the overall responsibility for issuing regulations and ensuring that authorities, companies, organizations and the public abide by them.

5. **Swedish Civil Aviation Administration** (Luftfartsverket) is a governmental enterprise operating air traffic navigation services for civil and military customers.
Hazardous material

The coordination area for hazardous material includes ten governmental authorities, each of which involved in vital parts of the management of hazardous material in Sweden.

- **Swedish Coast Guard** (Kustbevakningen) is a governmental authority working for a sustainable marine environment and improved maritime safety. It operates along the entire coastline of Sweden, as well as in the two lakes of Vänern and Mälaren.

- **National Food Agency** (Livsmedelsverket), see 6.1.

- **Swedish Police** (Polismyndigheten) is the governmental authority responsible for reducing crime and increasing public safety.

- **Public Health Agency** (Folkhälsomyndigheten) is the governmental authority responsible for promoting good public health by building and disseminating knowledge to health care providers and others responsible for infectious disease control and public health.

- **National Board of Health and Welfare** (Socialstyrelsen) is the governmental authority responsible for social services, health and medical services, environmental health, communicable disease prevention and epidemiology.

- **Swedish Board of Agriculture** (Jordbruksverket) is the governmental authority responsible for the agricultural and horticultural sectors and the expert agency in matters of agri-food policy.

- **Swedish Radiation Safety Authority** (Strålsäkerhetsmyndigheten) is the governmental authority responsible for promoting and overseeing proactive and preventive nuclear safety, radiation protection and nuclear non-proliferation.

- **National Veterinary Institute** (Statens veterinärmedicinska anstalt) is a governmental authority tasked to be the veterinary expert support to society striving for good animal and human health, a good environment and sustainable food production.

- **Swedish Customs** (Tullverket) is the governmental authority responsible for collecting customs duties and tax, monitoring and checking international
traffic across the Swedish borders to ensure compliance with regulations for import and export, and preventing illegal goods to enter the country.

- **Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency** (MSB), see 6.1.

**Economic security**

The coordination area for economic security involves five governmental authorities with central responsibilities for the economic security of Sweden.

1. **Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority** (Finansinspektionen) is a governmental authority responsible for authorizing, supervising and monitor all companies operating in Swedish financial markets to promote stability and efficiency in the financial system as well as to ensure an effective consumer protection.

2. **Swedish Social Insurance Agency** (Försäkringskassan) is the governmental authority responsible for administrating and managing the system of social insurance in Sweden.

3. **Swedish National Debt Office** (Riksgälden) is a governmental authority responsible for managing the Swedish national debt.

4. **Swedish Tax Agency** (Skatteverket) is the governmental authority responsible for administrating the taxes, population registration and estate inventories in Sweden.

5. **Swedish Customs** (Tullverket), see 6.3.

**Geographical area responsibility**

The coordination area for geographical area responsibility introduced in the matrix of responsibility above includes one national and 21 regional governmental authorities.

1. Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), see 6.1.

2. County Administrative Boards (Länstyrelser) is the governmental authorities responsible for coordinating the development of the county in line with goals set in national policy.
Protection, assistance and care

Finally, this coordination area includes seven governmental authorities involved in the protection, assistance and care in case of crisis in Sweden.

1. Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), see 6.1.
2. Swedish Coast Guard (Kustbevakningen), see 6.3.
3. Swedish Police (Polismyndigheten), see 6.3.
4. Swedish Maritime Administration (Sjöfartsverket), see 6.2.
5. National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen), see 6.3.
6. Swedish Transport Agency (Transportstyrelsen) see 6.2.
7. Swedish Customs (Tullverket), see 6.3.

Discussion

We have so far mainly described key aspects of the system for crisis management in Sweden and it is time to consider more explicitly what these entail in terms of strengths and weaknesses in context. Since it is challenging to do such complex issues justice in just a few pages, we focus this discussion on three main themes: (1) the collaborative culture that constitutes the foundation for the entire system, (2) the conformist tradition that facilitate collective action in the Swedish crisis management system, and (3) the controvertible aspects of the system that continue to undermine it.

Collaborative, conformist culture

The system for crisis management in Sweden is based on coordination and collaboration. There is no crisis general assuming control and directing all actors in case of an extraordinary event. Instead, it is the same myriad of actors that contribute to the functioning of society in everyday circumstances that also pull together to address the challenges of the crisis. Except for some provisions in the legislation granting the Fire and Rescue Services and the Police extra power in specific emergency situations, there is no actor that can issue binding decisions in a specific crisis situation that all other actors must obey. The Government, governmental authorities or county administrative boards cannot directly order a municipality or county council to do anything. There are no state of emergency
rules that grant extra powers, and the government can only propose changes in the legislation that everybody must follow by normal parliamentary procedures. Nor can a minister directly decide what a governmental authority should do or not do, not even for authorities within the same policy area of that minister. It is the Government as such that make collective decisions, but the Swedish constitution restricts both Parliament and Government from interfering with the governmental authorities’ acts of authority directed at citizens. Similarly, but less different from most other countries in the world, public actors cannot directly order market and civil society actors to do anything that is not stipulated in legislation. In other words, chains of command may exist within organizations, but between organizations decisions are made and implemented in dialogue.

For a collaborative system to work at all, there must be some level of trust between the actors, some norms that provide persistent and predictable guidelines for behavior, and some networks of social relations that facilitate coordinated action. In short, there must be some kind of social capital. Social capital is a multifaceted concept, but Sweden rank in the top more or less regardless of approach to it.

A large global survey of 50 countries ranked Sweden highest in terms of interpersonal trust [Elgar et al., 2011]. Most Swedes would be proud of this, while others probably would call us naïve. Moreover, Swedes place high trust in their public institutions [Grönlund and Setälä, 2011; Schaap and Scheepers, 2014] and expect everybody to be treated equally by them [Rothstein, 2005]. A high trust society has many advantages in dealing with emergencies, but also potential liabilities. There are fewer instincts of social control by authorities and the media which allows for incompetence and neglect to go unchecked for longer than in societies with lower trust. Also, individual preparedness to face difficult conditions tend to be low as the general trust in public actors to safeguard society is high.

It is difficult to present the complex combination of norms that guide social behavior in Sweden. However, there are a few that are fundamental for the collaborative system for crisis management. First of all, Swedish society sees itself as rational and pragmatic (Daun, 1996; Holmberg and Åkerblom, 2001), valuing practical solutions over principles when it comes to dealing with current and future challenges. Secondly, Swedish society is egalitarian. Not only in the sense that everybody is considered equal in the political and legal sense of the word, as well as having one of the lowest income inequalities in the world (World Bank, 2014), but also in a deeper social sense.
Contradictory system

Although the collaborative culture and conformist tradition facilitates a rather well functioning system for crisis management in Sweden, there are contradictions and unattended flaws that undermine it. First of all, a critical observer could argue that it can be considered to function well only because it is so rarely utilized. At least the reactive parts of crisis management, since the more proactive parts – e.g. risk and vulnerability analysis, preparedness planning, etc. – are more or less continuously ongoing but with varying results (Hassel 2012). The provisions in the legislation for municipalities and county councils to manage crises are significant and perhaps the most viable explanation of the general reluctance to formally activate to system, while at times activate it in situations that more resembles everyday accidents, is lack of knowledge, experience and guidelines. The members of the crisis management committees are normally elected politicians with various educational and professional backgrounds and different policy focus, most often not including crisis management. It may therefore be fair to assume a certain insecurity and perhaps anxiety when faced with the demands of crisis management, leading to a general reluctance to leave the comfort of organizational normality. Giving profound power and responsibility without matching training and resources may also lead to poor implementation.

Changes since 2001

States have their watershed moments, and for Sweden the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. turned out to have marginal implications for the crisis management system. It joined the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) system and redirected its foreign policy to emphasize the focus on Afghanistan in particular by joining the NATO mission there as partner. The major pivot for the crisis management system was triggered by the East Asian tsunami of 2004, which exposed the poor preparedness of the national level to respond to major events involving Swedish citizens. A major inquiry found that successive governments had failed to act to ensure a national ability to act decisively in a number of crisis related areas and that the national system needed substantial reform.

The result was the merging of the national Rescue Services Agency and the Swedish Emergency Management Agency into the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. Also, the Government offices created its Secretariat for Crisis Management Coordination. One trend that the country has resisted, however, is the move towards more structured incident command systems, all the while maintain the loosely coupled
agency collaboration processes suggested in the section on the principle of responsibility.

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) was tasked with all phases of crisis management and has an operative role (albeit limited) as well as capacity building, coordination, and communication. The lesson from the tsunami experience was that core national capabilities need to be concentrated under one command. Ironically, this created a perception of excessive powers and lead to softer, voluntary-based tools for coordination, which has caused problems for the agency to be an effective broker across societal sectors.

The goals behind the reforms are directed at national coherence, international compatibility, and effective divisions of labor in the crisis management system. However, without adding structuring tools to the repertoires of the main actors, these aims are still largely unfulfilled. Sweden has since its accession to the EU constantly become more integrated into the European union structures and is increasingly reliant on common resources in certain respects (e.g. There is no national helicopter resources for firefighting). Intelligence cooperation on terrorism is another area where Sweden has moved towards a more collaborative stance.
GOVCAP COUNTRY Report: UK

Martin Lodge, London School of Economics

Introduction

This document reflects arrangements prior to the May 2015 election. While the brief was to provide for a «civil emergency» mapping exercise, some overlap with terror-related arrangements is unavoidable.\(^\text{19}\) This is due to the formulation of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 that includes terrorism, serious damage to the UK’s security, human welfare or environment. The reform of societal provisions followed incidents such as fuel protests in 2000 and the foot and mouth disease outbreak in 2001.

Previous emergency powers were solely concerned with civil protection and civil defence (Civil Defence Act 1948). Therefore, societal security and crisis management were of a civilian nature. Military involvement required specific authorisation, and was supposed to be reserved for specific events where civilian authorities required additional capacities to handle crises. The military has been involved in recent years in the context of flooding. There were calls for engaging the military in the management of the London riots of 2011. These calls triggered considerable controversy, especially with the police. Ultimately there was no call for the military to police the streets (and this brief paper does not include arrangements in Northern Ireland). The military was also used in the security management of the 2012 Olympics. The involvement increased after a change in security level estimate, and the failure of the private security contractor, G4S, to deliver on the required number of security staff.

Mapping

The arrangements for central government involvement are summarised in the 2010 A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty and the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.\(^\text{20}\) This established the position of the National Security Council, a committee of key departmental ministers under the chairpersonship of the prime minister that also included military and intelligence staff as well as the National Security Advisor (since

\(^{19}\) https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/emergency-planning

2012, Sir (Nigel) Kim Darroch, a career diplomat). The chief function of this committee was the identification of risks, such as terrorism, cyber-security and natural hazards. This was a different role to the one of the chairperson of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which as to act as interlocutor between intelligence services and the Prime Minister. The Joint Intelligence Committee became a particular concern in the context of the Iraq war. The so-called «dodgy dossier» that represented the UK government’s case regarding alleged weapons of mass destruction was supposed to be based on information from the Joint Intelligence Committee. Subsequently, the JIC was anxious not be used as justification for political action – until David Cameron used the JIC to make the case for war in Syria (namely, the claim that 70,000 «moderate rebels» would support bombing efforts on the ground).21

The National Security Advisor was also involved with the chairing the «Horizon Oversight Group» which was to consider the risks emerging from social media, technological innovations and diseases. In recent parliamentary hearings, the members of the legislative Public Administration select committee accused the «forward looking» units as being good as using «American jargon» but not displaying any forward-looking capacity.22

The National Security Advisor was supported by a range of actors. At the heart of this infrastructure was the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS). The Civil Contingencies Secretariat was in charge of improving the UK’s capacity to prepare, respond and recover from crises and emergencies («risk assessment, preparation and planning, response and recovery, and «building a resilient society»). The arrangements and powers were governed by the the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act. This Act established the powers for local responders (local government, utility firms, and emergency services). It also established authority and emergency powers in the case of more serious emergencies, namely those that required the involvement of central government departments and agencies.23 The Act widened the range of actors that were involved, especially as traditional actors, namely local authorities, fire brigades and police forces were seen as incapable in handling major incidents, such as the fuel protests and flooding of 2000 (in which flood defences were said to be lacking) or the foot and mouth disease of 2001 (see below)


At the heart of civil contingency related co-operation across agencies were so-called Local Resilience Forums consisting of so-called «Category I responders». These Forums’ size and reach followed the jurisdictional boundaries of existing police forces. Co-operation among these forums was facilitated by the Department for Communities and Local Government. In London, co-ordination was facilitated by the Greater London Authority. Cross-cutting all of these organisational boundaries was the recognition of a distinct «government security profession» within the civil service. Local authorities were also required to support business continuity planning among local business. The Emergency Powers were granted on the basis of temporary emergency regulation by means of an Order in Council. This Order in Council could be used to amend all legislation (apart from the Human Rights Act 1998, something the newly elected government is going to change).

The Concept of Operations (produced by the Cabinet Office)²⁴ of 2013 noted how central government departments were to respond to potential emergencies (regardless of cause). Matters were somewhat complexified by the diverse devolved arrangements governing the UK. The strategy established the principle of a «Lead Government Department». The crisis management regime as defined in the 2004 Act followed a three step approach. Initially, crises were to be resolved by local actors alone. Central government actors were only to become involved at higher levels of emergency, especially when the capacities of local responders were likely to be overwhelmed.²⁵

«Major incidents» were supposed to be managed through local multi-agency arrangements, led by a particular service depending on the nature of the specific incident (crime = policy). Central government only got involved in the case of «significant emergencies» (mostly weather related incidents) or «serious emergencies» (terrorist attacks, widespread urban flooding, animal disease outbreaks, collapse of essential services etc) in which sustained central government support and co-ordination was said to be required. In these «serious emergencies», the Cabinet Office would co-ordinate responses through «Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms» (COBR). Finally, in the case of «catastrophic emergencies» («Chernobyl-scale industrial accident» or major natural disaster), the Prime Minister would be expected to lead the effort. Emergency powers were identified in diverse pieces of legislation (such as the 1976 Energy Act) or in the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act.

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At the heart of the crisis emergency arrangements within central government were the so-called Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR, widely referred to as Cobra in public discourse). It was widely called upon during times of crisis and anticipated crisis. For example, it was called upon to consider the Ebola outbreak in late 2014 (chaired by the health secretary of state or the prime minister) and in the context of beheadings of hostages by ISIS (chaired by the prime minister). The responsible minister for international development chaired a COBR meeting on the Nepal earthquake in April 2015. Similarly, the Secretary of State for Health chaired a meeting of COBR to address potential contingency plans in the case of a strike of ambulance workers in January 2015. A COBR-like meeting was also held before the Olympics (chaired by the prime minister).

The initial idea for COBR is that of a war room – its decision-making style was therefore not deliberative. Instead, formulated decisions were agreed upon (and the type of evidence on which decisions were made was agreed upon). Only if there was disagreement, then decisions were delegated to other venues. COBR emerged in response to the miners’ strike in 1972 (which brought early elections and the defeat of the incumbent government). The existing provisions were said to be put in the spotlight by events in the early 2000s, in particular the fuel protests in September 2000, the foot and mouth outbreak of early 2001, and, subsequently, 9/11. Reference to COBR meeting is said to have increased since the passing of the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act, reflecting a political strategy of «being in control» during times of crisis.

The key objective of COBR was the protection of human life and the environment, the continuity of «everyday activity» as well as the maintenance of the rule of law and of democracy. COBR involved both ministers and top officials and included security, intelligence, policy and other emergency services. For civil emergencies (i.e. non-terrorist) incidents, the cabinet committee called «Civil Contingencies Committee» (CCC) was in charge. There was no fixed membership, but members involved those departments and agencies centrally involved in the particular emergency. In contrast, in case of terrorist or other related incidents, decisions were to be made by a committee that was chaired by the prime minister, the home secretary or the foreign secretary.

The administrative infrastructure involved diverse arrangements, due to devolution. However, it involved local responders including central government agencies, such as the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the Highways Agency) as well as policy, fire and ambulance services. In terms of lead departments, the allocation of

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responsibilities was on the basis of policy field. In other words, the Home Office (ministry of interior) was responsible for terror-related emergencies. Where no clear competence existed, the Cabinet Office was to be in charge. If incidents largely affected a devolved jurisdiction, then central government would only marginally be involved. The allocation of the lead department role potentially varied between response and recovery stages.

At the local level, the emphasis was on an «Integrated Emergency Management» approach that was to provide for collaboration across diverse agencies. Later initiatives focused on the capacities of different agencies, such as Fire Services.

Central government organizations

As noted above, the organization of societal security in central government relies on a few central organizations and, surrounding this «spine», a wider universe of central government departments, agencies and services.

At the heart of the administrative infrastructure were the Cabinet Office and its Civil Contingencies Secretariat. This body had around 130 staff and was a unit within the Cabinet Office. It was centrally involved in advising and leading on civil emergency planning and responses. Its central function was therefore to offer horizontal co-ordination across departments and agencies, and to provide for a central secretariat that would operate contingency planning. It was therefore also in charge of the National Risk Register and performed National Risk Assessments.

Home Office: The Home Office is centrally involved in the co-ordination of policing, immigration and law and order. It is also dealing with MI5. It is therefore involved with questions about crime and terrorism. The overall budget is £8.9bn and had 32,000 staff in 2012. Among its various units involved in societal security were UK Borders (in charge of border control), the «Police Improving Agency». The Home Office was involved in vertical and horizontal co-ordination.

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs: This department was in charge of the Environment Agency and set the overall legislative and regulatory framework for environmental crises. Its wider portfolio included agriculture (and disease/pandemics), flood relief and wider climate change issues.

Department for Communities and Local Government: This department was to support local authorities in developing capacity to manage crises. It was also in charge of developing capacities for local emergency services, for example in appointing the «Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor» to advance national resilience
considerations (the role of this advisor was reduced in 2013 in terms of time investment, and in terms of reporting lines (from minister to «director»)).

Department of Transport: This department was in charge of developing transport infrastructures that would be resilient and provide for a degree of redundancy.

Department of Energy & Climate Change: This department was in charge of nuclear decommissioning and the wider climate change agenda and therefore was involved in some aspects of societal security-related matters, especially in relation to energy companies.

Ministry of Defence: Although, as noted, societal security sought to be based on civilian responses, the military was involved in those cases where emergencies required additional capacities, such as in the case of flooding, or mega-events (Olympics).

Ministry for Justice: This department was in charge of the judicial system – especially in relations to prisons and the court system.

HM Treasury: The Treasury was not at the heart of crisis management activities, but retains an important role in terms of spending allocations as well as the provision for emergency funding.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office: The department had no immediate role in societal security, but was nevertheless involved given its engagement in external crises and international relations.

Department for Culture, Media and Sport: This department was involved in societal security in the context of the Olympics.

Sectoral agencies

Health

Public Health England: This executive agency, previously the «Health Protection Agency» (until 1 April 2013). It had a staff of approx. 5,000 and a budget of £5.45m. Among its portfolio was to provide for the provision and co-ordination of a network of specialist divisions for health protection (i.e. radioactive hazards, contagious diseases), as well as for knowledge dissemination. The central co-ordinative function was both vertical and horizontal. Scotland had a similar agency.

Environment

Environment Agency: This agency was centrally involved in flood and coastal defence management. It had 11,000 staff and a budget of approximately £1bn (2009) - its budget and staff were cut as part of the «austerity» measures. It operated within the portfolio of DEFRA. It was centrally involved in coordinating local operations, but also took central decisions about how flood protection measures were to be organized and managed. It therefore was involved in vertical co-ordination and execution. It was widely criticized during the flood crisis in early 2014: after weeklong flooding (which had been assessed during an earlier flood planning exercise and found to be acceptable), the head of the agency (Lord (Chris) Smith) was widely criticized by ministers and parliamentarians (threaten to «stick his head down the loo and flush»).28 The responsible minister apologized to the public («I am really sorry that we took the advice...we thought we were dealing with experts»). In turn, the agency criticized budget cuts and «value for money» rules.

Marine Management Organization: This executive non-departmental public body was involved in species protection, licensing regarding fishing and other marine activities, and in dealing with the co-ordination of marine emergencies. Its parent organization was DEFRA. It was involved in horizontal co-ordination, especially with the Environment Agency.

Maritime and Coastguard Agency: This agency was to provide rescue services and to offer other emergency management in relationship to maritime crises. It was an executive agency and as a coordination agency.

Transport

Highways England (as of April 2015): This former executive agency («Highways Agency») was to develop the road safety and infrastructure, especially in response to flooding incidents. It was largely about broad planning and delivery of projects, in vertical co-ordination with the Department of Transport.

Crime/Terrorism

Centre for Applied Science and Technology: This secretariat to the Home Office was centrally involved in developing new technologies to deal with law and order issues.

Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism: This unit’s parent organization was the Home Office and was centrally involved in dealing with questions about «counter-terrorism» and intelligence. It was largely dealing with analysis and advice to the Home Office.

Research Information and Communication Unit: This unit’s parent organization was the Home Office. It was centrally involved in developing communication strategies to counter terrorist activities.

UK Border Agency («reformed in 2013» by being placed back inside the Home Office, and the «border force» remaining a separate entity): This agency’s parent organization was the Home Office. It was in charge of the actual «immigration controls», but was also involved in back-office and embassy work, deciding on visa and other immigration matters. The agency came under criticism following the move towards a risk-based approach was condemned as too lenient, regardless of budget cuts. It was also attacked regarding its visa backlogs, its reluctance to remove rejected visa applicants, and its former chief executive’s conduct in front of parliamentary select committees. In 2006, it had been branded as «not fit for purpose» by the then Home Secretary.29

National Steering Committee on Warning & Informing the Public: This office was to support the Civil Contingencies Secretariat to advise on communication strategies regarding information directed at the wider public, and also for improving information flows among emergency responders.

GCHQ: This agency was one of the central intelligence agencies in the UK, in particular in relation to communications security. It co-operated vertically Departments and horizontally with other intelligence agencies (MI5/6).

MI5/6: MI6 provided for foreign intelligence, MI5 for domestic intelligence.

National Security and Intelligence Office: This secretariat within the Cabinet Office was to provide for advice to the Prime Minister and other senior ministers on matters of national security.

Oversight/Account-holding forums

All ministerial departments were accountable to parliamentary select committees. The below are those that were centrally involved in societal security.

29 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmhaff/792/79202.htm
Home Affairs Committee: This parliamentary committee held the Home Office and its subordinate agencies to account regarding their policies and administration. The committee could choose its areas of inquiry.

Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament: This parliamentary committee oversaw the work of the intelligence services; it included members from both the House of Commons and the House of Lords. It was established by the «Intelligence Services Act 1994», but its role was reformed in 2013 to make its role more similar to that of a «normal» parliamentary select committee (by, first of all, making it a creature of parliament and giving it a wider oversight remit).

Public Accounts Committee: This parliamentary committee focuses on the efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditures. It therefore holds politicians and senior civil servants to account over matters of administration (not policy). Its focus is largely reactive, on the basis of reports by the National Audit Office.

Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman: While this ombudsman did not deal with questions about security, it did get involved in complaints regarding the execution of crisis management, such as the consequences of flood control management. This body was accountable to Parliament (i.e. was independent of the executive). It was a complaint handler.

Events since 2001 that shaped societal security and crisis management

The main changes since 2001 were in response to domestic events prior to 2001 and not a response to terrorist events (such as 9/11). In particular, the Civil Contingencies Act was a response to two domestic incidents in the early 2000s, the 2000 fuel protests and the 2001 foot and mouth disease.

The 2000 fuel protests were led by truckers who blockaded access to refineries in order to call for a reduction in fuel duties on diesel and petrol. Subsequent protests (of 2005 and 2007) did not cause similar disruption and did not enjoy similar support. In September 2000, the blockade of an increased number of refineries led to the rapid closure of petrol stations due to fuel shortages. The government had to resort to the Order in Council (under the Energy Act of 1976) to ensure essential services received fuel. The health service started to cancel operations, supermarkets warned of food shortages and there was evidence of panic buying. The government used emergency powers to provide for police escorts for petrol deliveries. COBR met and considered the use of the military.
The second main motivation was the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease. This event led to the postponement of the general election, required military involvement and cost over £8bn. The criticism regarding the government’s response to this disease (for example, its lack of memory of previous outbreaks) influenced the development and establishment of the Civil Contingencies Act. This included closer co-ordination with UK border agencies, amended emergency planning structures, regional operators at DEFRA, and enhanced cost-benefit analysis in the use of different crisis response methods. The main concern here was also criticism that the responses seem to have been primarily shaped by demands of farmers rather than the wider «rural economy».

2003 Heatwave – led to criticism about inappropriate response over unnecessary (additional death) due to heat. Criticism about how central government responded to the heatwave influenced the Civil Contingencies Act’s provision on communication.

2005 (7 July) London Bombings (52 dead, over 700 injuries). The aftermath led to greater sensitivity about the lack of information about domestic extremism. It further led to the establishment of the «Research, Information and Communications Unit». There was also some updating of the Civil Contingencies Act, and changes to crisis management in terms of «major incident» training for frontline staff on the London Underground. It also led to a review of the capability and funding for emergency medical care in London. A few weeks later (21 July) a further attempt was uncovered involving four bombs, the detonator fired, but did not ignite the explosives. Three car bomb attacks (failed) in late June 2007 (London and Glasgow airport).

2005 Buncefield. The Buncefield incident was a series of explosions at an oil storage terminal (the fifth largest oil products storage depot in the UK) – measuring 2.4 on the Richter scale. Apart from the explosion there was also concern about groundwater pollution. A joint official inquiry was conducted by the Health and Safety Executive and the Environment Agency. – The official agencies are declared not to have failed and companies are prosecuted for negligence. A later report by the Major Accident Investigation Board suggested that management failings had contributed to the explosion. Nevertheless, Buncefield did lead to the proceduralization of diverse processes across regulatory agencies involved in large industrial facilities.

2006 Tornado in London/Brent – leads to advanced engagement with Association of British Insurers and how uninsured residents might be particularly vulnerable.
2007 Napoli beaching/oil spill – criticism over decision to beach the ship, evidence of looting. The incident led to demands for greater responsiveness to such events. The cause of the incident was found to be structural weakness of the vessel.

2007 Floods – leads to a major review (Pitt; http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100807034701/http:/archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/pittreview/_/media/assets/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/flooding_review/pitt_review_full%20pdf.pdf) which suggests greater private sector involvement, enhanced information, and the need for closer co-operation among domestic agencies and with international support. Also highlights the vulnerability and interdependencies between different critical infrastructures.

2007 Avian Influenza outbreak – mass culling of Turkeys and screening of individuals with contact with birds. Inquiry suggests that media management should reduce ability of media to report form sites so as to not hinder the operations. Recommendation to have expert in house for media exposure so as to «control the message»

Sellafield – ongoing. Continued criticism about safety and financial performance of this nuclear waste facility.

2009 Swine Flu – Investigation by Health Protection Agency criticized information provision during initial outbreak. Procedural problems in ordering vaccine and delay in the provision of Tamiflu. Subsequent criticism that too much Tamiflu had been ordered without realising its limited effectiveness; and further criticism that companies are withholding information regarding the effectiveness of the drug.30

2010 Icelandic Ashcloud – this raised two crisis management issues, one the concern about safety of launching planes, and the other about coordinating the return of UK citizens stranded abroad. The crisis led to considerable re-consideration among air safety regulators; and their relationships to air carriers.

2010 Heathrow snow disruption – Over 4,000 flights cancelled due to snowfall, closing (partly) Heathrow airport. Highlighted capacity constraints at the airport. Response was «Heathrow Winter Resilience Enquiry» highlighting lack of preparedness, insufficient stock of critical supplies, lack of procedural protocols to deal with severe snow and lack of collaboration between regulator, airport operator and airlines. Response was a «Snow Plan».

2011 London riots – initial protests over killing of a civilian by police leads to widespread urban disorder, leading to five deaths and mass deployment of the police. Riots highlight new social media as mobilization tool («Blackberry riots»). Response was to consider future anti-riot methods, such as the decision not to employ water-canons. Emphasis also on the role of courts in imposing harsh sentences. Emphasis to advance community relations.

2012 London Olympics – No acute crisis but deployment of services throughout event at high level and problems with failure of private security company to recruit sufficient personnel.

2013 Horsemeat scandal – The issue emerged in Ireland and highlighted existing concerns about food supply chain.


2013 Badger Culling – Controversial decision by government to trial badger culling to reduce cattle TB in two regions leads to considerable public order concerns. Initial trial has to be abandoned due to lack of security personnel given Olympics (2012), subsequent trials lead to lack of results in terms of badger culling but considerable policing cost.

2013 Murder of off duty British Army soldier, Lee Rigby. The soldier was hacked to death on the street in an attempted beheading and attackers spoke to passers-by before unarmed police arrived. This led to the Intelligence and Security Committee to demand greater powers to receive information from the intelligence services as both attackers had been known to the intelligence services. In addition, a new ministerial task force was launched to deal with Islamic extremism in Britain and raised the concern with identifying the «risk» of known individuals with extremist views.

2014 Flooding – wettest winter on record leads to coastal flooding, especially in Somerset. Investigations suggest that collaboration and «lead local authority» regime have proven successful. Main suggestion was to advance drainage and sewer improvements in various areas. Wider political conflict as minister challenges competence of Environment Agency over the management of flood protection.
barriers. Raises issues about methodology of deciding on priorities and budget cuts imposed on flood protection.31

2014 Ebola – despite being «low risk», government established emergency management collaboration among visa, immigration, police, defence, health and cabinet office officials.

2014 ISIS fighters (leaving and returning)

Changes since 2001

There was a review of the 2004 Act in 2012 and it involved reflection on four major incidents. The «Buncefield Incident», the «Foot and Mouth Disease» outbreaks of 2001 and 2007, the major flooding of 2007, and the London terrorist attacks of July 2005.

Main developments in the field reflect two patterns. One is a response to events during which administrative arrangements are said to have been unsatisfactory and modifications of existing organizations and frameworks as part of wider machinery of government reforms or EU provisions.

2001: establishment of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat within the Cabinet Office to facilitate resilience within central government. This included assessment, operations and overall policy-setting, involving terrorism and natural disasters.

2001: New Dimension Programme – to increase the capacity of the Fire Service to deal with multiple and simultaneous domestic emergencies. This initiative emerged as part of the Department of Communities and Local Government, backed initially by £132m during the first three years, and provided for equipment, training and standardized procedures to support the overall crisis management infrastructure.

2004: Civil Contingencies Act. This piece of legislation represented the main basis for the area of societal security. It replaced earlier (and disperse) emergence and civil defence legislation by extending the definition of an «emergency» beyond that of «civil defence» by including terrorism, including that promoted by a foreign state. It also responded to a series of domestic incidents, namely the fuel protests of 2000, flooding in 2000 and the foot and mouth disease outbreak of 2001. The overall theme was to establish a) local arrangements for civil protection («continuity planning»), b) emergency powers and c) assigned responsibilities for

the execution of legislative powers (i.e. emergency planning officers and co-
ordination responders (category 1/2/3).

2005 Inquiries Act: This granted the executive powers to engage in matters of public concern, despite generating criticism about the role of the executive in this process.

2006: establishment of the Research, Information and Communication Unit; this unit was established to concentrate on monitoring communication of extremist groups and to advance a «technology-focused» co-ordination towards threats.

2009 & 2010: Flood Risk Regulations and Flood Management Act to respond to flooding during these years. These initiatives were in response to EU-level legislation in order to manage extensive flooding, including risk maps, flood risk management and flood risk assessment.

2010: Defence Reform – this involved considerable reform in the operations of the Ministry of Defence.

2011: Emergency Preparedness Guidance – established the legal obligation for UK-based emergency responders to participate in exercises on a regular basis.

2011 Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme: these measures sought to modify the initial legislation by integrating existing legislation, updating emergency response and recovery guidance, refine duties, amend resilience arrangements and the overall risk management process.

2012: France and UK decide to install detectors for «radioactive and fissionable materials» in the Channel Tunnel.

2013: establishment of Centre for Applied Science and Technology to create a unit for the collaboration of experts in science and technology to deal with crime. This represented a response to the criticism that the Home Office lacked expertise.

2013: establishment of National Crime Agency as part of the Crime and Courts Act. This agency brought together a number of existing agencies (serious organized crime, child exploitation and online protection, national cybercrime)

2013: Banking Reform Act – claims to enhance the resilience to any future financial crisis.
References


**Public documents**


Appendix

Organizing for Societal Security and Crisis Management: Building Governance Capacity and Legitimacy (GOVCAP)

Mapping Protocol
GOVCAP studies government arrangements for societal security and crisis management. The overall research question is:

*What makes a well performing governmental system for societal security and crisis management?*

The project focuses on both government capacity and legitimacy. As a basis for further research into these issues we will perform a mapping of relevant government institutions, organizations and network arrangements for crisis management in each of the participating countries (Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK) with a main focus on the central government level.

Each partner is expected to deliver a written report, according to the collaboration agreement:

*Perform a mapping of relevant government institutions and network arrangements in the field of social security and crisis management within your home country in 2014, including major changes and reorganizations since 2001. The mapping should result in a written report delivered to the project managers.*

The mapping is intended to feed into the context part of the Case Studies (a separate template will be provided).

Length: 5000–6000 words

Instructions
1. **Map existing organizational arrangements at central government level** responsible for societal security and crisis management in your country with a special focus on the strategic level and the non-military civilian area.

    The *main focus* should be on core ministries and central agencies responsible for coordinating internal and civil security, such as the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Justice, and relevant subordinate agencies such as agencies for civil protection or the central organization of the police. In some cases, this will also include the Ministry of Defense and the Prime Minister’s Office.

    You should also include more *brief descriptions* of ministries and central agencies responsible for preventing and handling natural disasters (such as floods, forest fires, hurricanes), diseases and pandemics, industrial and transportation accidents (chemical, nuclear incidents, airplane and train crashes, shipwrecks etc.), food
scares (BSE, E Coli etc), infrastructure failures (ICT, electricity, pipelines) and terrorist attacks.

Consider the following: What responsibilities, mandate, competences, capacity and resources (personnel, budgets) do these organizations have? Is a generic, all-hazard approach implemented, or is the approach more sector-specific? Is a lead ministry/lead agency model applied, and if so, how? Describe any intermediate arrangements (network arrangements, committees, boards, task forces, teams, working groups, expert panels, councils, special positions with coordination responsibilities (tsars), inter-agency collaboration units, etc.) responsible for transboundary cross-level, cross-policy area or cross-sector activities. Focus on their responsibilities, mandate, competences and resources. How formal/informal and permanent/ad hoc or temporal are they?

Pay special attention to:

- Coordinating forms (hierarchy, network, internal–external, vertical, and horizontal).
- Forms of specialization (geography, tasks/purpose, process, client)
- Centralization/decentralization
- Integration/fragmentation
- Variations in responsibility regarding prevention, preparedness and response

2. **Describe the development of the policy field in your country after 2001.** Here, we take as a starting point that 9/11 2001 is a watershed moment that has resulted in important organizational and policy changes in public sector crisis management across the world. These changes may have manifested themselves differently in different contexts, however.

Consider the following questions:
- What characterizes the policy field after 2001? Is it characterized by stability or change, political conflict or agreement? What have been the most important policy discussions – what issues have been debated, and who are the actors involved in these debates (politicians or administrators)?
- What characterizes the main reorganizations or major reforms, if there are any (Has it been about establishing, merging/splitting or terminating organizations at central government level, more vertical or horizontal specialization or de-specialization)?
- What are the main goals behind the reorganizations and reforms? What problems are identified and what are the main tools introduced to solve them?
- Are there any major changes in the relationship between the central government and regional/local government level, between the central government level and supra-national level, or between the state and the private sector/civil society?
- Are there any new major/broad changes in laws and regulations relevant to crisis management, internal security and societal safety?
- Who are the main actors and participants (political and administrative executives, stakeholders, interest organizations etc.) in the reform processes?
- What are the main driving forces and constraints behind the development? To what degree does policy features, administrative culture and tradition, external shocks/crisis, performance deficits, financial crisis, political programs,
administrative politics etc. explain? Are reforms mainly incremental and ad hoc or comprehensive and planned?

- Describe briefly any major national crises or disasters since 2001 that may have had an impact on public sector crisis management. Include information on available professional evaluations/inquiry commissions of these major crises. What are their main findings and conclusions?

**Recommended reading**


ANVIL Country studies. Available from: [http://anvil-project.net/downloads/](http://anvil-project.net/downloads/)

Includes: Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom,


