



Changes in the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) After 22/7 2011

Annbjørg Ryssdal



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Foreword

After the terrorist attacks in Norway 22. July 2011, the societal safety in Norway got a lot of attention. This paper addresses organizing for societal security in Norway, focusing on PST (Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste) and changes in the agency in the last six years (2012-2017).

The paper presents data and research from the project «Organizing for Societal Security and Crisis Management: Building Governance Capacity and Legitimacy» (GOVCAP), financed by the Norwegian Research Council (2014–2018). The paper is mainly based on Ryssdal (2017): «Is the Police Security Service changing? A study of PST after 22. July 2011».

Annbjørg Ryssdal
16.01.2018, Bergen

Samandrag

Notatet tek føre seg endringar i styringskapasiteten til Politiets tryggleiksteneste (PST) etter terrorangrepet 22. juli 2011. Hovudelementa i notatet er interne strukturelle organisasjonsendringar, samordning med eksterne aktørar og endring i legale og økonomiske verkemiddel. PST er ein viktig aktør i tryggleiksorganiseringa i Noreg. Organisasjonen skal mellom anna styrke tryggleiken i Noreg, motverka terrorisme og førebyggje og etterforske terroråtak i og mot Noreg gjennom kontraetterretning. Målet med notatet er å bidra med ny empirisk kunnskap om organisasjonen og ny kunnskap på tryggleiksfeltet. Etter terrorhendinga 22. juli 2011 blei PST evaluert av eit utval leia av Kim Traavik og av Gjørsv-kommisjonen. PST gjennomførte i tillegg ei intern evaluering. Med bakgrunn desse blei det føreslått ei rekke endringar for å gjere PST betre i stand til å gjennomføre sine arbeidsoppgåver. Studien tek utgangspunkt i desse endringsforslaga, og viser at PST har gjennomført ein del av dei føreslåtte endringane. Ei stor utfordring når det gjeld samfunnstryggleik og beredskap har vore samordning mellom aktørane. Her finn studien at det er tatt nokre steg i retning av meir samordning. Notatet viser òg at PST har hatt høg prosentvis auke i løyvingar over statsbudsjettet etter 2011. Vidare tek notatet føre seg endringar i dei legale verkemidla til PST, og dette blir knytt til styringslegitimitet.

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Summary

The main focus in this paper is on the internal organization of the PST, its relation to other important actors in the Norwegian security field, and on changes in financial and legal means. The analysis is based on qualitative analysis of relevant official document, media-reports and on interviews with leaders relevant for the societal security in Norway in relation to PST. A main finding is that there have been important changes, both within and outside of the agency. The most radical changes concern the internal structure of the PST and an increase of financial and legal means. Certain measures have also been introduced to increase coordination and collaboration with other security actors in Norway. The paper further shows that PST has become a more open organization and that this might strengthen their legitimacy. The paper demonstrates that the PST is an organization that stands out in the Norwegian context. What separates PST from the ordinary police is that PST has authorization for certain specific investigation methods, like the possibility to put citizens under surveillance. Here, Norway has followed the direction of many other western countries in this area, where the use of these types of means are becoming more available.

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List of abbreviations

- VIP = Very Important Person
- NPM = New Public Management
- Post-NPM = Post – New Public Management
- POD = National Police Directorate
- PST = The Norwegian Police Security Service
- E-service = Norwegian Intelligence Service
- EOS-committee = Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee
- NOU = Norwegian Official Reports
- MJ = Ministry of Justice and Public Security
- Prop. L = Proposition to the Storting (bill)
- Prop. LS = Proposition to the Storting (bill and draft resolution)
- ST. MELD = Report No. [nr] to the Storting
- RSU = Government Security Council
- KRIPOS = National Criminal Investigation Service

1. Introduction

The Norwegian Police Security Service (*Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste – PST*) is a special unit in the Norwegian central administration. It has had a key role in the preparatory and operational matters of societal security since before the Second World War. This paper addresses organizing for societal security in Norway, focusing on PST and changes in the agency in the last six years (2012–2017).

Many actors in different sectors and levels of administration, with different tasks, characterize the field of societal security in Norway. PST's main tasks and responsibility is to safeguard the security and to prevent and investigate terrorist attacks in and against Norway through counterintelligence. PST is also in charge of VIP (very important person) except for the royal family, who has their own independent escort service (Traavik, Vikstrøm and Holm 2012, p. 15). Unlike the ordinary police services in Norway, PST is not a part of the National Police Directorate (*Politidirektoratet – POD*), but placed directly under the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJ). The head office is located in Oslo, but there are special PST units in all twelve police districts. What separates PST from the ordinary police is that PST has authorization for certain specific investigation methods limited to their organization. PST has permission to use other legal instrument than the ordinary police, and does not have the same requirements when it comes to transparency compared to other public agencies. Therefore, PST is monitored by the Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee (*Stortingets kontrollutvalg for etterretnings-, overvåkings- og sikkerhetstjeneste – the EOS-committee*), in particular to secure that no one is subjected to unjust treatment. In sum, PST has an important role when it comes to societal security and crisis management at the national level in Norway.

In a report from 1996 POT (*Politiets overvåkingstjeneste*, the former name for PST) was heavily criticized for illegal surveillance of people on the political left. According to the «Lund-commission», this was done following instructions from the Norwegian government and occurred during the cold war period. The report revealed that several people on the political left were put under surveillance due to a fear that they would leak information to the Soviet Union (Lund 1996). The revelations of the Lund report got a lot of public attention, and several Norwegian citizens inspected the information collected about them in the time that followed. The revelations also spurred changes in the security services. A policy reform, implemented in 2000, lead to the transformation from POT to what we know as PST today (St. meld. 22, 2000–2001).

When Norway experienced two terror attacks on 22 July 2011, PSTs capacity was put to the test. First a bomb exploded in the Central Government Complex in Oslo, destroying several buildings, including the building housing the MJ. Later, the same day, the same terrorist shot a large number of people from the Labor Party's youth organization attending a summer-camp on Utøya Island. In total 77 people were killed and many sustained severe injuries. The terrorist attacks were unexpected and a big shock for the Norwegian government and the people of Norway. The terrorist was an ethnic Norwegian male with right wing sympathies. Until 2011 Norway had minimal experience with terrorism and the attack could therefore be seen as what Kettl (2007) defines as an external shock.

A common theoretical perception is that this type of external shock will lead governments to feel the need for explanation and instigate change (Kettl 2007; Baumgartner and Jones, 2005). After 22 July 2011, the Norwegian authorities appointed a commission that tried to answer what could have been done differently before and during the terrorist attacks. The commission was called the «Gjørv-commission» after its leader, Alexandra Gjørv. As PST plays a key role in preventing and detecting terror, the agency is a relevant actor in the evaluations after the attacks in July 2011, and it received some attention from the Gjørv-commission. The commission report (NOU 2012:14) was very extensive, altogether 482 pages long, and addressed relevant actors within the Norwegian social security field and their preparedness, including the PST. At the same time as the appointment of the Gjørv-commission, another evaluation-group was also appointed by MJ. This group was also named after its leader, Kim Traavik, and went by the name the «Traavik-committee». Unlike the Gjørv-commission that evaluated almost all Norwegian security actors, the Traavik-committee only evaluated PST and was therefore more detailed when it came to this specific agency. The committees mandate was to assess whether PST's internal organization – both at the headquarter and at the individual police district-, work process and internal priorities are appropriate in relation to assigned tasks and assess whether PST's utilization of own resources is optimal (Traavik et al. 2012:49). The suggestions from the reports covered a wide range of different elements in the organization. This paper will address some of them.

The report examined the agency at a time when it is conceivable that several changes would be implemented as a result of the terrorist attacks (2012–2017). However, there is no way of knowing how PST would have been organized today, that is if the terror attacks had never happened. Therefore, it is impossible to say that the attacks were the direct cause of the changes. Still, it is likely that the attacks played a major part and in that sense created a «window of opportunity» for changes within PST (Kingdon 1995).

The Gjørsv-commission and Traavik-committee both concluded that the PST could benefit from reorganizing their internal units and that the coordination and cooperation between PST and the other security actors should be improved. Both reports also mentioned that although the agency might need a small increase in their budget, its financial situation was no worse than for similar agencies in Denmark, Sweden and Finland.

In this paper I will address to what extent the suggestions from the reports have been followed up and implemented. This is an important question because it might provide crucial information concerning organizational learning after a crisis.

The overall research question for this paper is:

To what extent and in what way did PST change after 22. July 2011?

The paper has four components: First, it examines the organizational development and changes within the agency. The second part examines the external relations of the organization. The third element is the development of the agency's financial situation. This is an important topic for all governmental organizations, and might say something about political priorities. The financial situation was not a big part of the two reports, but is still important for the capacity of the organization. The report will also look into how the legal frameworks of counterterrorism have changed in the last six years and how this has affected the agency.

This paper presents data and research from the project "Organizing for Societal Security and Crisis Management: Building Governance Capacity and Legitimacy" (GOVCAP), financed by the Norwegian Research Council (2014–2018). This paper is mainly based on Ryssdal (2017): «Is the Police Security Service changing? A study of PST after 22. July 2011». The work is based on extensive qualitative analysis of relevant public documents, further supplemented with four interviews with leaders in the MJ, POD and the EOS-committee. The PST and the E-service declined a request for interviews due to reasons of professional secrecy.

This paper proceeds as follows: firstly, it will look into central element within context that might had an impact on the field of societal security and PST, before a description of the main changes within PST after 2011 based on my empirical data. Here, some of the critical points from the evaluation-reports will be presented and then I will try to answer to what extent the criticism was been taken into account. Furthermore, I will address some elements that did not get a lot of attention in the reports; PST's financial and legal framework. A discussion of the most important findings follows, before some concluding remarks.

2. Central concepts and theoretical approach

2.1 Core concepts

An important aspect when it comes to PST's relationship with the Norwegian population is *legitimacy*. Legitimacy concerns citizens' perceptions of whether the actions of the authorities are desirable, proper, and appropriate within certain socially constructed systems of norms, values and beliefs (Jann 2016; Suchman 1995). Organizational legitimacy refers to the degree of cultural support for an organization (Meyer and Rowan, 2006). Another important keyword when it comes to changes in PST is *capacity*. One could define capacity as the organization ability to carry out its mission (Lodge and Wegrich 2014). Lodge and Wegrich have developed a typology that differs between four types of capacity. *Coordination capacity* is about bringing together and aligning different actors and organizations. Coordination capacity concerns both the vertical dimension between actors and organizations at different administrative levels, and the horizontal dimension, between actors and organization at the same level (Lodge and Wegrich 2014:14). *Regulatory capacity* concerns the state's ability to control and regulate through audit bodies, providing new regulation in policy-areas that previously was not formally regulated (Lodge and Wegrich 2014:11). *Delivery capacity* puts things into action and concerns the resources that are used to insure the public's safety. It describes how to handle the operational level and the ability to mobilize resources when critical events occur. *Analytical capacity* concerns the government's ability to get knowledge, information and use this to project future events (Lodge and Wegrich 2014:14). To analyze information is one of the most important tasks. This concerns predicting risk and producing adequate risk and vulnerability analyses regarding terror (Lodge and Wegrich 2014:14).

An important motive for change in public organizations is to increase organizational capacity. What is considered sufficient capacity and good performance – and which tools are needed to achieve those objectives – may vary, but increased efficiency, effectiveness, resilience, performance and implementation are fundamental. Literature in the field has established that it is important to see capacity and legitimacy together when it comes to societal security (Christensen; Lægreid and Rykkja 2016).

Coordination is a particularly important challenge in the field of social security because it is a field that often involves many actors at several levels and in several sectors. The reform-waves labeled NPM (new public management) and post-NPM (post- new public management) have been introduced and implemented in Norway and other western countries in an effort to deal with increased specialization and following

coordination challenges (Lægreid and Rykkja 2014). The reforms mainly emphasized efficiency and were mostly concerned with vertical coordination, however. The NPM reforms resulted in a higher degree of specialization and division of work in public administration (Christensen and Lægreid 2013). Post-NPM reforms, on the other hand, are characterized more by structural reorganizations and efforts to join up the different parts, for instance through the establishment of network arrangements. These arrangements are meant to ensure more coherence between specific policy areas where there is need for more cooperation (Lægreid and Rykkja 2014). Horizontal coordination has over time become a key concept in the field of social security and crisis management (Christense, Lægreid and Rykkja 2015; Lægreid and Rykkja 2014). One of the reasons attributed to this is that social security can be seen as a *wicked problem*. Such problems are typically difficult to solve, being multidimensional and weakly coupled, and characterized by complexity, uncertainty, transboundary and ambiguity (Head and Alford 2015). There is often a mismatch between the problem structure and the organization structure. These are characteristics for any area that struggles with coordination, typically when there are many operators involved, when authority diverges, and when there are traditions that are difficult to change – even after a crucial crisis.

2.2 Theoretical approach

The institutional perspective of organizational-theory shows that organizations is not merely a technical and logistical issue, but rather an issue of political priority, norms, value, attention, coordination and routines. The main assumptions of the institutional perspective is that organizations have some sort of intrinsic value (Selznick, 1957). The expectation resulting from this perspective can be seen in two different ways. One is that PST was path-dependent when it came to changing the internal and external elements in their organization and that the parliament was reluctant to change the conditions for the agency. This is based on the fact that many of the decisions taken inside the institution today are based on decisions taken in the past and it is there easier to continue like before (Krasner 1988). On the other hand, external shocks like a terror-attack, can often lead to a shift in political debate and public policy (Baumgartner and Jones 2005; Kettl 2003). This could often lead to introduce several measures as an immediate response and this could lead to changes because of an unexpected event like terror-attacks.

3. Changes after 22. July 2011

3.1. Internal organizational changes

3.1.1 Remarks from the reports

Because of the many actors that are involved in the security field in Norway, it is important for PST to cooperate with other actors, both horizontally and vertically. This might, in some cases, be constrained by the «principle of ministerial responsibility» in which the line ministries are responsible for task within their own sectors (St.Meld. nr. 17, 2001–2002). This paper focuses on four of the actors that PST has to coordinate with: the MJ, POD, Norwegian Intelligence Service (E-service) and the EOS-committee. These actors were chosen because they are vital for the security in Norway and because they are organized vertically and horizontally to PST.

The reports from the Gjørsv-commission and Traavik-committee pointed to the fact that PST could benefit from reorganizing. They concluded that it might lead to a more efficient organization, both financial and in the day-to-day work (Traavik et al., 2012: p.44). One important point was to avoid overlap, i.e. doing the same work twice. Among other things, the reports proposed to merge some departments, like the operating department and establish a more project-based way of working in this era. It was also suggested to create new departments, including one for contact with the district department in PST. Another important focus area in the reports was the need for improvement of the ICT-safety system and the need for raising the competence in that area:

The Commission believes that PST should prioritize a productivity boost through the use of ICT that can ensure effective work on information and sharing internally within the organization (NOU 2012: 14, p.384)¹.

The Traavik-committee also concluded that PST could not solve the elements mentioned above only through reorganization, but that a change in culture was also needed. In practice, this means changing the way of thinking and working. Within organizational science there is an assumption that a change in the organization will also change ways to act and behave (the culture). One does not rule out the other, culture and structure are connected.

¹ All quotes from interviews and documents in this paper are translated from Norwegian

Based on the data collected for this paper, it is difficult to say anything about changes in culture, but a new organizational structure might, in theory at least, facilitate such changes (Traavik et al., 2012:30; Fimreite, Lango, Læg Reid and Rykkja 2014:263–264). In an internal evaluation, the PST admitted that they had capacity challenges when it came to processing and evaluating the large amount of information that the agency receives every day (PST 2012a:30). An organizational change could also in theory, be a solution to that problem as well.

3.1.2 Changes within PST



Organizational chart – PST, 2012

In 2012 PST went through major changes through a project called «the KAOS-project». The name comes from the principles the project was based on (Oslo Politiforening 2014:32):

- K – for Knowledge. This means that PST should be a knowledge-based service.
- A – for Action on. This principle says that PST should react fast when a serious event occurs.
- O – for Open horizon. This means that PST should be focused on challenges further down the line.
- S – for Strategic. This means that the activity within the organization needs to be strategically rooted.

The result was almost a complete restructuring of the entire organization. The only department not changed was the department of investigation. All other departments were either divided or merged. The result was that five departments became eight (Giæver, 2013). This was according to our informants in the Ministry a smart move:

Then this KAOS-project began. It was necessary and very important and the implementation was a success. Now, when the new organization has settled, I think that you can see that many changes have been done the right way (Senior adviser, the Police department, MJ).

The reorganization also resulted in the creation of a new technology department. This suggests increased focus on technology and this may be seen as a response to suggestions from the two committees for a better technical system for information-gathering and might contribute to increasing analytical and delivery capacity.



Organizational chart – PST, 2016

The reorganization had a large impact on the employees of PST. Virtually all employees were affected, either in the form of changes in the departmental structure, new leaders or in the form of new tasks. According to the Police trade union, the situation created uncertainty and frustration in different parts of the organization. On the other hand, the cooperation and communication between the employer and the employees were generally good so the difficulties were in the end resolved (Giæver 2013). A restructuring agreement was established that ensured that the employees would keep their rank and salary, and for the most part they were offered the same position as they had had before.

PST-employees have traditionally collaborated with other employees in the same section with similar tasks. The Traavik-committee argued that this was a weakness in the work process in the organization, because it leads to a fragmentation of the work-tasks, also known as «siloization» (Traavik et al., 2012:4). There has been an increased emphasis on inter-organizational coordination across Europe, aimed at countering the specialized «silos» that were part of the New Public Management (NPM) reforms. The purpose of the new organizational model was to prevent silo-thinking and promote knowledge sharing across departments. However, the split of the organization into more departments than before could lead to more fragmentation, not less. To prevent this, PST employees were primarily organized in units based on workflow and task execution, and not according to the type of crime or criminal environment they were working towards. This could be seen as a measure to increase the coordination capacity within the organization.

According to the PST communication manager, the changes in the organization were necessary (Giæver 2013). A main reason given was the globalization of threats that has developed since the last time PST reorganized in the early 2000s. This seems to

relate also to a new awareness of such threats after 22. July. PST had to adapt to the development and increasing numbers of threats and all the information the agency needed to analyze. The changes can therefore also be seen as an attempt to strengthen the organizations analytical capacity. The communication manger further emphasized that the reports after July 22 laid the groundwork for how the agency should be organized in a better and more effective way. This support the assumption that the attack 22. July had an impact on the reorganization of PST.

4. Internorganizational changes

4.1 Remarks from the reports

The Gjørsv-commission and the Traavik-committee heavily emphasized a need for increased cooperation and coordination. The Traavik-committee wrote that «cooperation and interaction with other social actors have generally improved over the last few years, but can and should be even better» (Traavik et al. 2012: 5). The evaluations-reports suggested a closer cooperation between PST and the E-service, PST and POD. They also pointed out that PSTs bodyguard service and the bodyguard service for the royal family should be merged into one department. Oslo police district is for the time being responsible for the royal family's protection, and that means that a possible merger between the two depends on cooperation and agreement between PST and the ordinary police.

Regarding the relation between the agency and the MJ, the Gjørsv-commission wrote: «The leaders in PST call for a more active dialogue with the ministry, where strategic and professional issues are linked, and gets more attention in order to achieve the goals of the agency» (NOU 2012: 14, s. 368–369). The report further emphasized that «The MJ should have the competence and capacity to conduct a clearer assignment-based dialogue with PST, discussing strategic priorities» (NOU 2012: 14, s. 395). This was something that PST agreed with in their own internal evaluation. Here, they admitted that they had prioritized to inform the MJ on ongoing issues and investigation, and that the dialog therefore lacked talking points about the strategic development (PST 2012a). The concrete changes proposed by the Traavik-committee in the relation between PST and the MJ, were that the dialogue should focus more on questions of a strategic and long-term nature and, to a lesser extent, on the ongoing issues and methodology in these. In other word, less detailed management. They also recommended that the police department in the MJ expanded its capacity with an aim to strengthen both the strategic guidance and the follow-up of PST (Traavik et al. 2012:6). The committee also shed some light on the need for a clarification of what PST can share with other public security bodies in other countries (Traavik et al. 2012:40). The suggestion was that PST together with the MJ and the Ministry of Foreign affairs should design and maintain a list of how close PST could collaborate with other country's security services (Traavik et al. 2012:40).

4.1.1 The ministry of justice and public security

The relation between the MJ and PST is hierarchical, due to the fact that PST is organized under the MJ. Agencies in Norway in general are semi-autonomous and often located outside the ministry. In some countries, agencies are closer to the ministry. The empirical data from this study shows that there have been some changes in this relation after 2011, and that most of the suggestions from the reports have been taken in to account. There has been more focus on dialog on strategic matters between PST and the MJ:

The ambition is that the discussion should be more strategic, with less focus on minor issues, and the four years I have led the police-department, I think we have moved a certain step in that direction. We discuss the more general issues, especially in the formal dialogue» (Director General, MJ).

According to the data available, the suggestion from the Traavik-committee to grant more resources to the police-department in the MJ that oversees PST has not been taken into account. The Traavik-committee also suggested an extensive list that described how closely PST could collaborate with other country`s security services. In November 2016 the MJ, the ministry and PST had a meeting to discuss where the line of information-sharing with other similar bodies abroad, so it seems that this is a question that is being prioritized.

When it comes to the MJs supervision of the results of PSTs work, this is seen as a difficult job:

It is difficult to measure the effect of preventive work, because obviously a terrorist-attack can occur even if PST does a brilliant job. The absence of a terrorist-attack is not necessarily a proof that PST does an outstanding job.

This is an interesting assessment, which can also apply to the Norwegian population as a whole and their perception and legitimacy in regards to PST. The trust in the policy in Norway is generally high, perhaps because the crime-rate is also generally low compared to many other countries (SSB 2010; Politiet 2016). When it comes to the MJ`s management over PST, it is natural to compare PST to POD.

The managing of the two agencies is largely based on yearly allocation letters (tildelingsbrev). POD normally receives many more missions in addition to such grant letters. This is to a much less extent the case for PST. The reason for this is most likely that PST`s job is more specialized (i.e. to prevent terror), while POD`s assignments are broader and continuing throughout the year. On the one hand, this might mean that PST is under less control compared to POD. On the other hand, the interviews indicates that a close relation between PST and the MJ was important for both, and the PST in a sense wants to have a close relation and to be supervised because then it appears

to be a legitimate actor. Compared to POD, PST is relatively free from detailed management. However, the agency also has something to gain from having a close relation with their superior ministry.

Another interesting element is the development of a closer relationship between the PST and the Office of the Prime minister (Statsministerens kontor – SMK). In 2013, a security body was established with the SMK. It was designated to take care of the overall coordination and follow-up of security and preparedness work across the ministries and help lift and clarify responsibilities (Regjeringa, 2013). It also has a secretariat function for the Government Security Committee (RSU)². This secretariat has its own professional director at the SMK. The first director at RSU was later hired as a director for the new anti-terror center. In October 2016, the Senior Vice President for Strategic Analysis at PST took over this position. Traavik himself also worked as a national security coordinator at the SMK for a short period of time. This reinforcement of the security functions at the SMK was largely a result of a political initiative from the government to focus on social security and preparedness, but also the involvement of PST personnel here shows that PST plays an important role. It is also possible to see this as a direct response to the Gjørsv-commission, in its calling for «awareness of PST`s responsibility to proactively inform national authorities and relevant security bodies» (NOU 2012: 14, p. 459–460)

4.1.2 POD

PSTs cooperation with the ordinary police in Norway has two dimensions. The first one is the relation between POD and PST on the higher administrative and strategic level. Here, the two organizations figure at the same level and on the same organizational line under the MJ. The other dimension concerns cooperation on a lower administrative level relating to the day-to-day work in the police-districts. According the interviews for this project, there has been considerable disagreement when it comes to how to organize on the lower level.

This has also been pointed out in previous research (Christensen and Aars 2017; Difi rapport 2017: 2). However, according to the section-director in POD, the relation has taken steps in a positive direction.

As earlier mentioned, one disagreement between POD and PST is the fact that a small country like Norway has two separated services for VIP-protection:

² The Government Security Council is the supreme body for discussing security issues in Norway. The committee consists of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Finance. Only those with the strictest security clearance have access to the meetings.

It was unfortunate that the professional environment related to the VIP-protection that is divided between PST and Oslo police-district. There has been a lot of back and forth through the years. Everything was gathered with the Oslo-police for a period, and then it was split up again at some point a couple of years ago. So there have been professional disagreements when it comes to this matter... It was unfortunate to divide that field of professionals, because it can lead to develop different practices in doing things, since you have two different units developing different set of tools and skills (Head of section, POD).

Despite this, and also contrary to the recommendation from the Traavik-committee, the VIP-protection continues to be organized in two different public bodies.

The PST has had people working for them in each district, but the amount of people and size of office has varied in accordance with the size of the district. In 2015, a large police reform was launched in Norway. The organization of the PST-units in the reform is still a bit unclear; there is not much data on this yet and at the time of this study (2016/2017) it was not settled how this will be arranged in the future. According to the available documents on the reform there is still supposed to be a PST-unit in each police-district (Innst.306 S, 2014–2015:84–92). According to the data available for this project, it seems there has been some disagreement between PST and POD about the responsibilities in the districts, also regarding the budget. The Traavik-committee suggested that PST should be in charge of the budget for the PST-units in the police-districts (Traavik et al. 2012:22). This was not implemented and the responsibility is still with the chief of police in each district. The reason for this is not spelled out, but the MJ reports said that today's model should be continued so far (Prop.61, 2014–2015:79). According to the MJ this is grounded in an established principle that states that the chief-of-police should have the full and whole responsibility within their own district. An instrumental change that has been implemented is that a representative from each PST-unit now is a member of the chief-of-polices executive-group in each district.

4.1.3 E-Service

The cooperation between the PST and the military E-service has a long history, but as the globalization and the threat of terror from groups outside of Norway has increased, the line of responsibility between PST and the E-service has become more blurred. One can say that the E-service has the same tasks and responsibility as PST, but outside the Norwegian borders. The cooperation between the two agencies is organized horizontally. While PST is responsible for the domestic security, the E-service is responsible for the security overseas. Both the Traavik-committee and the Gjørsv-commission meant that cooperation should be strengthened and more formalized and integrated, preferably through the establishment of a joint analysis unit (NOU 2012: 14, s.395). Both PST and the E-service had a positive attitude towards

increased cooperation in their response to the reports (Etterretningstenesta 2013: s.1; PST 2012b:6).

As a follow up of this suggestion, an anti-terror center was established within the PST in 2014. The center functions as a joint analysis unit, where the director is from PST, and the second in command is from the E-service. According to Johnsrud (2014), the establishment of the center was a direct consequence of the terror-attack on 22 July 2011. This can be seen as a strengthening of PSTs analytical capacity. An important principle in this corporation is that there at all times should be an even number of employees from the two agencies implying that if there are ten employed by PST, there should be ten employed by the E-service. This means the coordination-capacity of the two agencies also is being strengthened. Based on the empirical data collected for this paper, it seems that the establishment is seen as a success so far. The main challenge that has been pointed out is that the two agencies have different ways of defining some essential methodical terms, but this was apparently worked out in the first face of the establishment (Samfunnsikkerhetskonferansen, 2017). Also, the two services is subject to different laws when it comes to what kind of information they can share with each other. This is something that the MJ and the ministry of defense had to map before the anti-terror center was established.

4.1.4 EOS-committee

The EOS-committee is an oversight body appointed by the Norwegian Parliament and has seven members and a permanent secretariat. The Committee is responsible for external and independent control of the Norwegian Secrets services. The members of the committee are elected by the Storting in a plenary session on the recommendation of the Storting's Presidium.

The relation between the EOS-committee and PST is in many ways hierarchical; since the EOS-committee is supposed to control that PST do their job within their legal framework. This committee was not mentioned much in the evaluation-reports, but is still an important body for PST's legitimacy. According to the empirical data collected for this paper the relation between EOS-committee and PST has not changed much since before 2011. The committees' mandate is the same, but it's budget and number of employees has increased. My interviewees also point out that the EOS-committee has been allocated more resources from the parliament:

The committee has received the resources it has requested. When the parliament is adapting new laws for the EOS-services, they take the control-needs of the new law into account and this benefits us. The EOS-committee has been strengthened; in 1995 there was only a half position, while 11 people work here today. So, you could say that there is both increased competence and increased opportunity to prepare control and follow up better» (the leader of the EOS-committee).

It is also stressed in several public documents that the committees' control function is important for the legitimacy of PST. An example of this is an evaluation of the EOS-committee, led by Bjørn Solbakken in 2016 (Solbakken 2015–2016). One might say that it is even more important now than before 2011, since new and extended legal measures taken to prevent terror have been introduced after 2011. It is important that the PST's use of these new means is carried out correctly, within the framework of the law, and don't carry out illegal monitoring of citizens.

The EOS-committee also has a role when it comes to separate the roles and legal framework of PST and E-service in the new anti-terror center. There are certain methods the E-service has legal basis to use, but not PST and the other way around. An example is that if PST through communication discovers information that a foreign state plans a military operation against Norway or Norwegian interests, that information cannot be shared with the E-service today. The EOS-committees' responsibility is to make sure that the two agencies do not step over their boundaries.

4.1.5 Communication with the public

My empirical data shows that PST has become a more open organization, in that they to a larger extent communicate with the media and the people that they are set to protect. Many of the public servants interviewed for this study pointed out that the reports and threats-assessments that PST provides have become more extensive since 2011. One example is a report on the background of people who became radicalized by extreme Islam in Norway (PST 2016b). Another example is the threat assessments that the agency has published since 2002. Several of the interviewees pointed out that these assessments have become more detailed. There is now also a regular press conference in connection with the release. This contributes to the impression of PST as more open to the public.

The agency is also more «hands on» in relation to the media when a terror-attack strikes, although these most often happen outside of Norway. Examples of such incidents are the terror attacks in Berlin (2016), Nice (2016), Stockholm (2017), Manchester (2017) and Barcelona (2017). This might be a sign of increased delivery capacity, by being more «hands-on». This seems to respond directly to the remarks from the Gjørv-commission and the Traavik-committee that it was important for PST to strengthen the reputation of the organization and that PST itself could contribute to this through «*maximum openness and accessibility*» and through a more «*offensive social communication*». According to the Traavik-committee, this will meet a need in the society to communicate the importance of PSTs efforts to safeguard of a

democratic society and its citizens in a nuanced and positive way (Traavik et al. 2012: s. 9–10). The leader of the EOS- committee stated that she had observed this change:

I would say that PST has opened up when it comes to facilitating our control. We have seen it for quite some time now. Everything that has happened in the last couple of years has contributed to us now controlling PST with a greater degree of openness on their behalf, than we did in the past (The leader of the EOS-committee).

This might also suggest that the agency has become better at communicating with the public.

Table 1.1. The table summarizes the proposals from the report and the extent to which PST has followed recommendations

Recommendation from the Traavik-report (T) and the Gjørørv-commission (G)	
Reorganizing the departments for a more efficient organization, both financial and in the day-to-day work (T) (G)	Yes
Improving the ICT-safety to ensure effective work on information (T) (G)	Partly
Closer corporation with POD (T)	No
Closer corporation with the E-service (G)	Yes
A more strategic dialog with the MJ, with less focus on ongoing issues and investigation (T) (G)	Partly/yes
Communicate more openly with society to strengthen the reputation of the organization (T)	Yes

5. Financial means

5.1 Comments from the evaluations

Financial resources are vital in the matter of social security. It is often very difficult to prioritize and direct resources within this field because the problems are complex. This might also be related to the fact that it is rather difficult to measure the effect of the means and measures within this area. In the reports from the Gjørsv-commission and the Traavik-committee, the economy of the PST was mentioned only a couple of times, and they did not point to any deficit in the years before 2011. However, the Traavik-committee argued that PSTs budget should be slightly increased in the coming years to accommodate the reorganization that they suggested within the agency. PST had also pointed out to the MJ that they were in need of a budget increase and that they had been forced to make some very difficult prioritizations in the past (PST 2012a).

5.2 Changes in financial mean

PST's budget was considerably increased after the terror-attacks in 2011: In 2007 the increase was 6 million NOK, and from 2015 to 2016 145 million NOK. Altogether, the budget has increased from 525 million in 2012 to 932, 5 million in 2017, and will most likely reach 1 billion NOK in a few years. By comparison, the police received 15 billion NOK in 2016 (Finansdepartementet 2016). Another interesting fact is that there has been a budget increase for the agency regardless of which political party has held the majority. It is likely that the increase has made it easier for the agency to perform its tasks and that it has increased its capacity. One likely consequence is that the agency has employed more people. For security reasons, it is hard to find figures to confirm this, but according to Botheim (2013), the number has risen from 460 in 2012 to 515 in 2013. This indicates that there has been an increase in the overall capacity of the organization, but particularly when it comes to analysis and delivery because this is something PST manages without other actors.

When it comes to spending the budget, it seems that the PST has more leeway when it comes to prioritizing, compared to POD. The MJ is in charge of both, but POD has to a larger extent experienced detailed management (Njaastad 2017). The management of POD is rather detailed and politicians are more involved in deciding the direction of POD. In the interviews with public servants and leaders within the MJ, this was explained by referring to a greater political attention towards POD's work, compared to the work of PST. It also seems like the MJ have an overall higher trust towards PST.

6. Legal means

Neither the Gjørv-commission nor the Traavik-committee commented on the legal means of PST. Still, these changes are an important part of the changes made after 2011 and clearly relevant to the capacity of the PST, and are therefore also relevant to include in this paper.

After 9/11, intelligence agencies across the western world have been provided with more tools in the form of new hidden police methods like telephoning, data readings and surveillance (Epifanio 2011). Western politicians have responded to the threat of terrorism by providing agencies like PST with the opportunity to use these kinds of methods (Christensen and Aars 2017). Norway has followed many western countries in this area. The most extensive legal changes against terrorism in Norway over the last five years came in 2013 and 2016, and were mostly suggestion from PST. The legal changes contained regulations for more monitoring, surveillance and data sampling (Prop.68L, 2015–2016). The regulations made it illegal to receive training or instruction that may be used to carry out acts of terrorism. To be in a place where terrorist training is conducted, whether or not you are part of the training was also criminalized. On the one hand, this increased PST's capacity because they got more tools to discover and stop planning for terror in Norway. On the other hand, one might say that there is a limit in how far an intelligence agency can go, when it comes to monitoring the citizens. When this legislation was suggested there were protests from different actors. Some of the actors who voiced criticism to the changes were the International commission of lawyers, the Data Protection Authority, ICT-Norway (the interest group for the Norwegian ICT Industry), a Legal society group at the University of Bergen and the Liberal party (Venstre). Many of these actors objected through hearings organized by the parliamentary Justice committee. It was said that the new legislation was in violation of the Norwegian constitution, Paragraph 102, which states that:

Everyone have the right to respect for their privacy and family life, their home and their communication. House-searches cannot take place except in criminal cases (Lovdata, 2016).

The leader of the Liberal party pointed to what she saw as a problem. According to her, it seemed like the MJ had copied the wishes from PST without being critical as to what the consequence of the changes might be (Stortinget 2016; NRK 2012).

At the same time, core actors argued that the legislation was needed, including the PST, Oslo Police Chamber and the National Criminal Investigation Service (Kripas). According to them, the legislative changes will enable them to do their job better and more efficiently. It was also pointed out that the existing legislation and juridical

system was old-fashioned and had a hard time keeping up with the criminals and their use of new technology. Another argument was that it was necessary to stop the increasing number of terrorist attacks by working together with other security services in Europe, where this type of legislation already had been implemented.

These are probably the main reasons why a majority of the political parties in the Norwegian parliament voted in favor of the legislation change (Stortinget 2016b). It could be claimed that this is yet another example of PSTs high impact on decisions regarding their own organization and that PST enjoys a high level of trust from politicians and the ministry. Also, the debate shows that the balance between capacity and legitimacy is being challenged. The changes in legal means is also a clear example of increased regulatory capacity, because the parliament (after a suggestion from PST and the MJ) has provided new regulation in policy-arear that previously was not formally regulated.

7. Discussion

This paper has shown that there have been important changes within PST and in the agency's surroundings since 2011. It seems like there have been changes in all of PST's capacities after 2011. The need to improve the coordination capacity was pointed out by the reports after the terror-attack and the data in this paper shows that this has been a prioritized area for the organization. The analysis capacity has most likely increased as a result of the new anti-terror center and the regularity capacities has probably increased because of the changes in legal and financial means. The delivery capacity is difficult to measure, but it is likely that this has changed too, due to the fact that the capacity influences each other and that we can see changes in the other three capacities.

A plausible explanation for the changes is that the «external shock» of the terrorist attacks leads to a shift in the political debate and also in policy. The agenda changed and there was a shift in attention. This is in line with Kettl's (2007) argument that system stress (such as a terror-attack) will motivate politicians and governments to introduce new measures as a response. These measures however, have proven difficult to sustain for bureaucratic organizational structures where the organizations involved in the coordination has strict boundaries, which is typical for the police and the military. A strengthening of coordination can involve a shift in the balance of power, and this is something bureaucratic organization, like in the police-sector, often opposes (Kettl, 2007). This might also be the case for the cooperation between PST and other security actors like POD and E-service. One example is the disagreement between PST and POD about the organization of the VIP-protection in Norway, where it seems that none of the agencies want to coordinate the VIP-protection if it means «giving up» their own department. A possible conclusion is that PST's coordination-capacity has improved in the relation with some of the other actors, but in a lesser degree in relation to POD. Another interesting element is that the PST themselves took the initiative to many of the changes. The head of communication at PST emphasized that the extensive changes were absolutely necessary (Giæver 2013). It was necessary to build an organization that would be able to look further ahead in time and that with a greater degree of accuracy could analyze what future scenarios. The reports from the Gjørsvik-commission and Traavik-committee seem to have worked as a «recipe» for the organization and set the basis for how the organization should be. Based on the data in this study, PST appears as an organization that recognizes the need for change within their own organization and has the capacity to act on this and make such changes happen.

Further, as far as the available empirical data can tell, the majority of changes correspond with the suggestions from the Gjørsvik-commission and the Traavik-committee. This implies a willingness to learn from the attack. It seems like the changes are a result of criticism after the attacks in July 2011, but it is also possible that some of these changes would have been made either way. The most likely conclusion to be drawn out of the findings in this paper is that the reason for change is a combination of the two.

The findings in this paper also show that Norway has taken the same path as many other western democracies when it comes to increasing legal means. Surveys have showed that September 11 2001, had a major impact on the legislation of Western democracy (Epifanio 2011). This type of legislation definitely has an impact on the regulation-capacity of organizations like PST, but in a long term it might be a problem for the legitimacy of the organization. Several research articles show that the people of Norway have a high level of trust in the police (Egge, Strype and Tomassen 2013). This means that the Norwegian police and PST have a high level of legitimacy to do their job, both in the view of the people of Norway and the politicians. This might change if the legal means continued to be expanded and freedoms limited, but for now doesn't seem to have an impact. This is a clear sign of PSTs increased regulation capacities. It also points to the difficult balance between legitimacy and capacity. How far should PST be able to go regarding monitoring citizens and prevent terror, and when will it have a negative effect on the legitimacy? This study shows that PST has opened up in the last couple of years and become somewhat more transparent and communicative. This might turn out to increase the legitimacy of the organization.

It is often difficult to implement change because of both external and internal factors, but in this case some of the external factors, like financial and legal means, has led to an organization with a stronger implementation force and a bigger budget and more capacity.

Considering the change in financial and legal means over the last five years, it seems clear that the politicians' trust in PST is high and that its work is a prioritized area for the politicians. At the same time, the EOS-committee receives, what seems to be «unlimited» founding when it comes to their responsibility to supervise the agency, which indicates that the monitoring of PST's use of legal means also is important for the politicians. The assumption that PST would be characterized by path-dependent processes seems only partially true. There have been some instrumentally oriented changes in the agency, but it is difficult to say if or to what extent there have been any institutionally oriented changes in the organization. The empirical data shows that new routines, norms and ways of thinking are in place, and the interviewees in the MJ in general thought these changes were successful.

The theory of external shock can contribute to explain the changes in and around PST. It was the external shock (the terror in Oslo) that led the reports being written, and thus the external shock has had an important impact through the reports. Although it is not possible to rule out that some changes might have happened if the terror-attacks had not happened. An interesting question is whether the changes in PST have had the desirable effect. Both legitimacy and capacity is hard to measure. It is difficult to say to what extent PST is a «better» agency and is more capable to protect Norway from terror now than before 2011. The lack of terror after 2011 cannot necessarily be explained with the changes regarding PST.

8. Conclusion

This paper has analyzed at both internal and external changes in relation to PST. The findings in this paper show that there have been taken measures to strengthen external coordination. The expectation was that PST was path-dependent in their relation with other organizations. This assumption turned out to be only partly true, even though it is hard to determine exactly how large impact the changes have had on routines and practices de facto. The analysis indicates that it might have been easier for PST to introduce internal changes, compared to changes in relation with external actors. This is particularly the case in relation to POD. The external changes seem to be more difficult to implement because they depend on establishing a common understanding of tasks. They also represent a process that requires horizontal coordination, which often is challenging in itself (Christensen, Læg Reid and Rykkja, 2015).

The data shows similar types of changes found also in the MJ after the attacks in 2011 (Jensen 2016). The willingness to implement changes is often present after a crisis, but the ability to do so might be constrained by institutional factors and path-dependency. PST appears to have great autonomy and ability to bring forward changes, because of the high level of discretion in interpreting and enforcing decisions. These findings may indicate a pattern of change characterized by a blend of «*drift*» and «*conversion*» (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). *Drift* mean that the process of change has been characterized by new interpretations of existing goals because of environmental change. *Conversion* means that the process of change has been abrupt and lead by the organization itself.

The main conclusion is that it is difficult to find optimal solutions to how a public organization like PST can and should to ensure societal security, especially in the face of major transboundary crises. Although the terrorist attacks can be seen as a «window of opportunity» (Kingdon 1984), it is hard to find «a best solution» in a policy area where preparing for the next crisis is difficult. The fact that it is difficult to measure the effect of the work being done complicates this further.

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